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PREFACE 
st. Thomas Aquinas himself would be the first to insist now, as he did 
in a_ well-known passage, that the purpose of the study of philosophy is not 
to learn what opinions men have held, but what is the truth about reality.l 
Nevertheless, as a matter of actual tact it is a great help toward attaining 
the truth to be able to take advantage of the accumulated philosophical ex-
perience of mankind, and particularly of the recorded statements of the ad-
mittedly great thinkers of the remote and recent past. So true is this that, 
if the fact be noted, in a great many philosophical discussions, when we at-
tempt to solve a problem about reality we find it advisable and even neces-
sary to avail ourselves of the added help afforded by such thinkers as Aris-
totle or st. Thomas. But immediately the problem becomes, just what did Aris• 
totle say? or, just what did Aquinas mean when he said this or that? Con-
sequently, any work which will facilitate our study of the meaning of St. 
Thomas' philosophical language will be a great help ultimately in our pursuit 
of the truth about things, that is, of philosophy itself. 
The existence of many works testifies to this fact. Not a few men have 
thought it worth their while to compile some sort of lexicon or glossa~y of 
the terminology of philosophical writers, especially that of St. Thomas. 
Most notable, perhaps, is that of Dr. Ludwig Schatz, whose Thomas-Lexicon 
was compiled first from the two Summas and later from the other works of st. 
lrn De Coelo et Mundo I, lect.22. 
iii 
iT 
Thomas.2 Whatever be its excellence in comparison with the present offering, 
it has the disadvantage of being in German, besides being ill-adapted for 
comparative study between the terminology of the different works of St. 
Thomas and study of chronological development in the use of terms such as is 
afforded by dictionaries prepared from individual works, and lastly it oannot 
hope to account for every occurrence of a ter.m as does the present work. The 
great Du Gange Glossarium Mediae~ !nfimae Latinitatis is of little value to 
students of St. Thomas, for it practically ignores him. Other works, such as 
N. Signoriello, Lexicon Peripateticum Philosophico-Theologicum,3 and George 
Reeb, S.J., Thesaurus Philosophorum,4 treat of axioms and distinctions rather 
than of the precise meaning of terms. Moreover, the last three mentioned all 
include other writers than St. Thomas and hence are not truly representative 
of his characteristic terminology. Similar difficulties occur in connection 
with such works as that of Jos. Zama Mellinio, Lexicon Scholasticorum 
Verborum,5 and the various lists in the edition of the Summa Theologica 
edited by Xavier Faucher, o.p.6 There are a few other glossaries prepared 
for certain other works of St. Thomas, but nothing on~ Veritate ~ 
Since none of the above-mentioned works is in English, they are of litt~ 
22nd. ed., Ferdinand SohCningh, Paderborn, 1895, x-889 PP• 
3Bibl. Cath. Script., Neapoli, 1893, 423 PP• 
4weger, Brixinae, 1871, 421 PP• 
5s. Thomae Aquinatis Summa Theologica, 1~rietti, Taurini, 1928 (not in earli-
er editions), VI, "ex editione Patavina, 1712." 
6Editio Altera, Lethielleux, 1924, v. 
v 
use to a large number of American students interested in st. Thomas. There 
is in preparation at the present time in another American university a glos-
sary of the complete works of St. Thomas. This will lack the advantages of 
dictionaries for each separate work, as discussed above, and involves a dif• 
ferent procedure than that used in the preparation of this work. Further-
more, since it is being undertaken by the classics department of that uni-
varsity, it would seem to be linguistic rather than philosophical. It is im-
possible to settle the precise meaning of st. Thomas' terms on linguistic 
grounds alone, since the precise meaning of each term depends on the philo-
sophical context and hence requires such knowledge of the philosophy of St. 
Thomas as will make the contextx clear. Moreover, a knowledge of the history 
of medieval philosophy can be shown to be very important in the preparation 
of such a glossary. 
There is only one translation of E! Veritate! published in English.7 
The small glossary at the end of that volume is not only not confined to the 
language of St. Thomas, but the poor rendering of many of the terms in the 
translation makes it suspect; to give but two examples, "comparatio" is 
translated "comparison"8 when the obvious meaning is "relation," and "per-
tingit ad" is translat.ed "pertains to"9 when the obvious meaning is "arrives 
at" or "attains to." 
7Richard McKeon, Selections from Medieval Philosophers, Scribner's, New York, 
1930, II, 159-234. 
8 . ~·· 182. 
9Ibid., 232. 
The burden of this present undertaking, then, was to develop a technique 
for the detailed study of st. Thomas' use of philosophical terms in a given 
work, and to apply it to the first of his Quaestiones Disputatae ~ Veritate. 
The results of this task are presented in the for.m of a dictionary in which 
is laid dow.n the meaning of same 321 terms as used by St. Thomas in that work. 
with appropriate comments as occasioned. (It will be seen that almost any 
one of these words could form the subject of a research task of doctorate 
proportions.). The chief values of the procedure used are that every occur-
rence of the word being studied is accounted for, and the exclusive use of 
just one work of St. Thomas makes the present work of value to later students 
who may wish to do comparative study either with other works of St. Thomas or 
with later scholastic terminology. 
Although the use of the term in other works of St. Thomas as well as the 
works of subsequent philosophers and critics have been taken into account and 
occasionally noted, the primary source of information has been, in keeping 
with the foregoing comments and criticisms, the context of De Veritate I it-
self with reference to the exact thought of st. Thomas as developed in that 
work. That such intensive attention to a philosophical text, not from the 
view-point of textual criticism or paleography or linguistics but with the 
primary aim of philosophical meaning always in view, has been of real profit 
to a student of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas can be put dow.n as a 
matter of recorded fact. 
Sincere acknowledgment is due to the Rev. John J. Wellmuth, s.J., chair-
rti 
man of the Philosophy Department of Loyola University, whose help and guid-
ance at every stage of this work have been invaluable. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DE VERITATE 
CHAPTER I 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND DATE OF ITS COMPOSITION 
Henry Denifle, O.P., the great authority on documentary sources for the 
history of the University of Paris during the time of st. Thomas Aquinas, 
makes the remark in a note in the Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensisl 
that the old lives of St. Thomas agree about one date if about nothing else: 
st. Thomas was made a magister in theology at the University of Paris in the 
year 1256. This is important, because it clinches beyond all doubt the 
dating of the Quaestiones Disputatae ~ Veritate. For biographers, histori-
ans, and critical scholars are in unanimous agreement that the work was the 
fruit of his first years of teaching at the University of Paris, immediately 
after he was advanced to the magisterium. 
The oldest sources for the life of St. Thomas are in remarkable agree-
ment on the facts of these years of st. Thomas's life and work. A study of 
the writings of William of Tocco, Bernard Guido, and Peter Calo reveals that 
St. Thomas was made licentiate in theology in the early months of 1256, and 
master later in that same year.2 Bartholomew, or Ptolemy, or Tolomey, of 
1Henrious Denifle, O.P., et Aemilio Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis 
Parisiensis, Delalain, Paris, 1889, I, 307, note 1. 
2Friedrich Ueberweg, Grundgriss der Gesohichte ~ Philosophie (rev. Bern-
hard Geyer), Yittler & Son, Berlin, 1928, II, 423. An excellent biblio-
graphy on the life of St. Thomas Aquinas is contained in P. Mandonnet, O.P., 
and J. Destrez, O.P., Bibliographie Thomiste (Biblioth~que Thomiste, I), Le 
Saulchoir, Kain, Belgique, 1921, 1-1. More recent is that in P. A. Walz, 
O.P., "Chronotaxis Vitae et Operum s. Thomae de Aquino," Angelicum, 1939, 
XVI, 463-473. The Bollandists list the old sources and reproduce many of 
them., Acta Sanctorum: :Martii, I, 655-657. 
1 
2 
Lucca was a disciple or st. Thomas and a church historian who died in the 
year 1327. In his life of St. Thomas he says, "Post hoc, ipso magistrato, 
fecit Questiones de Veritate. Post tres annos magisterii sui redit in Itali-
am ••• n3 Another early biographer, Bartholomew of Capua (Logotheta), a Sicili-
an who as a student followed the lectures of St. Thomas, dates the De Verita-
~ as being written after St. Thomas was made master and during his first 
period of teaching· at Paris, before going to Italy in 1259.4 The English 
Dominican Nicholas Trevet, who died in 1328, made a catalogue of the works or 
st. Thomas between the years 1319 and 1323, in which he notes that St. Thomas 
"scripsit etiam primam partem de Quaestionibus disputatis de Veritate et 
~ltra, quas Parisiis disputavit."5 
The older historians, following these sources, tell us that the young 
Thomas came to Paris ·in 1252 from the school of Albert the Great at Cologne, 
and spent the years 1252-1256 as a bachelor in theology in Paris. Although 
they agree that he was made master in 1256, there seems to be good evidence 
that the formal inceptio by which he was recognized as a master by the faculty 
of the University of Paris did not take place until October, 1257. This is 
the opinion of J. Echard in his life of st. Thomas,6 of the church historian 
3Fide Pierre Mandonnet, O.P., Des Eorits Authentiques de S. Thomas d 1Aquin 
(2me edition), Saint-Paul, Fribourg, 1910, 59. --
~Alexander Birkenmajer, "Kleinere Thomasfragen," Phi1osophisches Jahrbuch, 
1921, XXXIV, 32. 
~la.ndonnet, ~ Ecrits Authentiques, 47-48. 
6Echard-Quetif (Bibliothecae Scriptorum Ordinis Praedicatorum, Paris, 1719-
1721, I, ad annum 1274), !! Thomae Aquinatis Opera, Simon Occhi, Venetiis, 
1775, I, ix-xxv. 
Fleury, of John Francis Bernard Maria de Rubeis, O.P.,7 and of Ueberweg.a 
Since all agree that he left for Italy in 1259, Quaestio! of the De Veritate 
was almost certainly written in 1257. The editors of the Viv~s edition, how-
ever, say "1257 Parisiis ••• Laurea donatus, ab anno 1258 ad annum sequentem 
Questiones de Veritate ••• scripsit."9 (The fact mentioned by the Bollandists 
in the~ Sanctorum,lO that St. Thomas was made doctor of theology in the 
year 1253, must not be confused with his being made magister at the Universi~ 
of Paris, for the doctorate was always previous even to the licentiate in 
those days, and in this case was probably granted by the Dominican Order 
rather than by the University.) 
The most recent investigations confir-m these conclusions. Dr. Martin 
Grabmann in his Thomas ~ Aquinll states that st. Thomas received his licen-
tiate in 1256 and left Paris in 1259, and in his latest work on Die Werke des 
~ Thomas ~ Aquinl2 he makes these the outside dates for the writing of 
the De Veritate. Pierre Mandonnet, O.P., in the latest expression of his 
mind on the subject dates the De Veritate I as somewhere in the year 1256-
7Dissertationes Criticae etc. (Pasquali, Venetiis, 1750, Dissertatio XI, 
caput ii), ~ Thomae Aquinatis Opera (ed. Leonina), Ramae, 1882, I, clxxv. 
80p. ~· 424. 
9opera Omnia s. Thamae Aquinatis (ed. Stanislaus Edward Frett~ et Paul Mar~), 
Apud Ludovicum Viv~s, Paris, 1871, I, xii. 
1~tii, I, "Cammentarius praevius," 657b. 
llF. Pustet, M«nchen, 1926, 3-5. 
12Aschendorff, ~~star, 1931, 276, 280. 
4 
1257.13 A most recent summary (1939) of the investigations on the subject 
lays down the following chronology:l4 
1252-1256 Parisiis, Baccalaureus 
1256 Obtenta licentia, fit magister in theologia 
1257 a collegiis magister agnoscitur 
1259 in Italiwm rediit. 
and states that the disputed questions E! Veritate date at the outside fram 
1256 to 1259.15 From all this we gather that it is quite safe to assign the 
year 1257 as the extremely probable date for the first question. for it is 
certain that St. Thomas was at work on them by that time and it is highly 
probable that he at least did not progress very far during 1256. 
It must be noted that the controversies which raged for some time in 
the various European learned periodicals between Grabmann, J. Koch, Mandonnet, 
P. Synave. O.P., and others regarding the chronology of the disputed ques-
tions does not touch the date of the E! Veritate at all, but centers rather 
around the dating of De .Anima, .£!_ Spiritualibus Creaturis, and _E! Unione 
Verbi Inoarnati. A good idea of these discussions can be obtained from the 
reviews in the Bulletin Thomiste for 1924 and 1926.16 All the authorities, 
as well as all of the old catalogues, especially two "book lists" of the 
13s. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae, Lethielleux, Paris, 1925, "In-
troduction," I, 19. He here summarizes his "Chronologie des questions dis-
putees de saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue Thamiste, 1918, XXIII, 266-287, 
341-371. 
14walz, ~ ~~ 470. 
15Ibid. 
16Bu1letin Thomiste, 1924, I, 58-61; 1926, III, 1-21 especially. 
5 
University of Paris dating fr~ 1275-1286 and 1292-1294 respeotively,l7 assurE 
us that the De Veritate is the first of the disputed questions of St. Thomas. 
The historical facts being established, it remains to interpret them in 
ter.ms of their setting. The ~ Veritate represents the work of St. Thomas 
during a relatively early period in his productive career. But he was by 
this time no novice in the realm of philosophy and theology. He had been 
commenting on Peter the Lombard's books of Sentences since 1252 and had c~-
mitted the fruits of this teaching to writing. He had composed s~e seven or 
eight small philosophical works, including the~~ et Essentia •. He was 
by then a veteran of the battle which grew out of the antagonism which the 
secular clergy and laity of the University of Paris had shown toward the new 
Order of Preachers; as his own share in the controversy he had contributed 
the Contra Impugnantes ~ Cultum _!! Religionem. Now With William of St. 
Amour condemned and his own Order vindicated by the Pope,l8 Aquinas began to 
teach as a master of theology in one of the two Dominican colleges which by 
that time had been incorporated into the University of Paris. 
This meant a very active engagement in the public scholastic life of 
that violently intellectual atmosphere. For in the Paris of that day school 
meant more than dull classroom routine. In the twelfth century a question 
arising out of the interpretation of scripture or s~e author, usually Peter 
the Lombard, had formed the basis of the lecture of the master. This easily 
17Denifle-Chatelain, Chart, Univ. Paris., I, 646. 
18J. Echard, Vita Santi Thomae, uses the expression, "Paoatis tandem rebus 
laurea donatus questiones de veritate disputavit ••• " ~~, x. 
6 
turned into a discussion or dispute. The dispute finally detached itself 
from the lesson and became a separate exercise in its own right, being known 
as the "ordinary disputation." Every master in theology at Paris had to put 
on several of these ordinary disputations a year. According to Mandonnet and 
synave St. Thomas held them as often as twice a week. Pelsterl9 and Birken-
majer20 disagree with the methods used to arrive at that conclusion, but 
only, it would seem, in order to dispute about the chronology of some of the 
later Quaestiones Disputatae. At any rate, he certainly held them oftener 
than a few times a year. 
The subject was fixed in advance, and was usually confined to a single 
topic although more than one might be discussed if they were related. All 
the classes of the other bachelors and masters ce~sed for that morning, and 
we may imagine with what curiosity they flocked to the disputation hall of 
the brilliant young disciple of the Aristotelian Albert, already making a 
name for himself. At this session, however, the magister only presided; he 
might summarize and otherwise help, but the bachelors did the arguing. The 
next day, or the first day on which nothing prevented, there followed the 
magisterial "determination," the formal recapitulation and pronouncement of 
the master upon the subject of the previous disputation. Bachelors could 
not "determine," this being the sole right of the master, though the pre-
liminary arguments which he presented were usually those proposed by the 
19F. Pelster, S.J., review of P. Synave, o.P., "Le Probl~e chronologique des 
questions disputees de s. Thomas d 1Aguin," Scholastik, 1926, I, 587-590. 
20o ·t 36-45 
...F.!. 2.::....!..' • 
. I""" 
7 
bachelors the day before. The Quaestiones Disputatae as we have them are the 
written for.m, then, not of the disputation but of the deter.minatio of the 
master.21 Each article of the present for.m represents one such determination 
We possess 510 of these written by St. Thomas, of which 253 are under the 
general title E! Veritate, though only twelve are included under the first 
question which really forms the treatise bearing that name. 
These disputations with their magisterial determinations gave st. Thomas 
a chance to work out at great length and in a controversial atmosphere much 
of what he was later to set forth more positively and succinctly in the two 
summas. They do not, it is true, represent his best period, namely that from 
1268 (when he got hold of certain material in translation from the Greek) 
until his death in 1274. Yet they do form an important part of his writings, 
being often his fullest treatment of a topic. The De Veritate shows a de-
cisiveness and a fir.mness of touch not observed in the commentaries on the 
Sentences. The problems essayed are difficult, the manner of their treatment 
profound and skillful. Since in them historical background is more prominent 
than in the Summa Theologica, they reflect better the doctrinal milieu in 
which he was working. The significance of this will come to fuller light in 
Chapter V of this introduction. 
21Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Euro~e in the Middle Ages (new ed., 
rev. F. M. Pawicke):-Glarendon Press-;-Oi.for , !9'36;-I, 49o-4"96T"'Mandonnet, 
Quaestiones Disputatae, "Introduction," I, 8-15. 
CHAPTER II 
AUTHENTICITY OF THE WORK 
As might be sur.mised from the foregoing chapter, the authenticity of the 
De Veritate ! is beyond all dispute. It is attested by the unanimity and 
forthright nature of the assertions of all the early chroniclers of St. 
Thomas's life and of all the early cataloguers of his works. A recent and 
thorough study by Jean A. Destrez, O.P., "La Texte de la Question Disput'e 
•De Veritate' de Saint Thomas d'apr~s la tradition manuscrite"l assures us 
that the authenticity of this work is unquestionable, whether one examines 
the extant manuscripts of the text or the codices containing the old cata-
logues. Mandonnet in 1910 in his Des Ecrits Authentiques had quoted the 
catalogues of Nicholas Trevet, Ptolemy of Lucca, Bernard Guido, and the so-
called "official" catalogue of the year 1319 (MSS. 3112 and 3113 lat., Biblio• 
th~que nationale de Paris), and had declared that all the thirteen catalogues 
listed by him2 leave no doubt as to the authenticity of theE! Veritate !• 
An old price list of works sold by a stationer in Paris at prices fixed by 
the masters of the University in the years 1275-1286 gives us precise in-
formation about such details as the number of its pages and the price.3 The 
1Etudes Critiques sur las Oeuvres de Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Biblioth~que 
Thomiste, XVIII),-r6 Saulchoir, Kain, Belgique, 1933, 33-160. 
2op. ~· 106. Cf. also J. Koch,~~~ 361-362. 
3Denifle-Chatelain, Chart. Univ. Paris., I, 646. 
8 
9 
Bollandists quote Wi~liam of Tocco quite definitely on the point,4 and De 
Rubeis is no less certain.S Birkenmajer assures us that the controversies 
between von blichelitsch and Grabmann on the "official" catalogue in no way 
involve the~ Veritate.6. More recently, Synave has made a new study of this 
catalogue in comparison with others and confirmed our assurance as to the 
authenticity of the De Veritate,7 whatever question it may occasion concern-
ing other works. 
Fr. Pelster, S.J., reported in 1929 that he had found an autograph 1~. 
of the De Veritate (Vat. lat. 781).8 This would put it along with one half 
of the Summa Contra Gentiles and parts of the commentaries on Boethius and 
Isaias in that very privileged group of works which we have in St. Thomas's 
own hand. Fr. Destrez, however, expressed rather strongly in 1933 his 
opinion that it was not an autograph, though it is evidently not in the hand 
of a professional copyist. He conjectures that it is probably that of' some 
student of the time of St. Thomas or shortly after.9 
4vita Sancti Thomae., caput iv, n. 18, Acta Sanctorum: Martii, I, 665a. 
Sop. cit., Dissertatio XI, caput i, clxxiv; Dissertatio II, caput i, lxxvi-
'Ii'Xix.-
6 Op. ~~ 32, note 6. 
711Le catalogue oi'i'iciel des oeuvres de saint Thomas d'Aquin," Archives d'his-
toire doctrinale ~ litt~raire du moyen 1ge, 1928., III, 25-103, esp. ~5-86. 
8
"Beitrfge zur Chronologie der Quodlibets der Hl. Thomas von Aquin," Gregori-
anum, 1929, X, 60-61. 
-
9
"Le Texte de la Question Disputee 'De Veritate' ••• : 105, note 2. 
~ -~------------------------------------------------------------------. 
CHAPTER III 
THE TEXT: PRINCIPAL EDITIONS 
The text of the first question of the~ Veritate does not present great 
difficulty. ~estrez, in his work on the text of the De Veritate referred to 
in the last chapter, reports that there are 66 extant manuscripts. He lists 
them on pages 106-140, giving a full description and the location of each. 
They are deposited in universities and libraries all over Europe and date 
from the late thirteenth century on. He has personally examined 48 of the 
66. He traces very carefully the history of the manuscript sources for the 
earliest printed editions of the work, and especially the Roman, or Pian, 
edition of 1570 from which all later ones stem. A summary criticism of his 
method of exemplaria and peciae and the reception which it got among review-
ers, as well as ample references to the pertinent literature on the question, 
can be found in the Preface to the new Ottawa edition of the Summa.1 Since 
any actual consultation of the manuscripts is out of the question for the 
present, and since the results of his investigations bring no important 
changes to the part of the text involved in this work, the question is not as 
important here as the survey of what texts are actually available in this 
country. 
In order to establish as sound as possible a text from which to elaborate 
1s. Thomae de Aquino Summa Theologiae (ed. Instituti Studiorum Medievalium 
ottaviensiSJ, Stud. ~en. 0. Pr., Ottawa, 1941, I, viii-x. 
10 
11 
the dictionary, avery available edition was carefully checked for possible 
variant readings, as follows. 
1. Divi Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici, ~~ Opera Omnia, 
Gratiis privilegiisque Pii V Pont. Max. typis excusa, ad. Vin-
centius Justinianus et Thomas Manriques {the title page has 
!~rriques, but this is probably a typographical error as Man-
riques appears three distinct times on p. vii), Apud Julium 
Accoltum, Romae 1570, 17 vols. in folio {some catalogues say 
18, but the copy examined had only 17 and it is so listed in 
the Prefaces to the Viv~s and Parma editions). 
De Veritate ! is found in vol. XIII, pages 289-296 (each 
number represents four folio columns, as every other page is 
numbered). In article five it reads "ad sextum dicendum" 
where all the others read "ad sextum et septimum dicendum," 
with the result that the reply to the eighth argument is en-
titled "ad septimum" and so forth for the rest of the article. 
2. Divi Thomae Aquinatis ••• Opera, aditio altera Veneta, cudebat 
Simon Occhi, Venetiis, 1775-1788, 28 vols. in quarto. Contains 
the Life of St. Thomas by Echard and the Dissertationes Criticae 
of Jo. Fr. Bernard Maria De Rubeis. This edition seems to be 
identical with that brought out apud Jos. Bettinelli, Venetiis, 
1745-1788. This opinion is based on the absolute similarity of 
paper, format, and printing, and upon the fact that in those days 
~------------------------------------------. 
such undertakings occasionally changed hands when one printer died 
or sold out. 
De Veritate I is contained in volume XVI (1784), pages 124-147. 
3. s. Thomas AqUinatis Opera Omnia, ad. Joannes Maria Allodi, 
typis Petri Fiaccadori, Parmae, 1852-1873, 25 vol. in small folio. 
De Veritate I is in volume IX (1859), pages 5-22. 
4. ~ Thamae Aquinatis Opera Omnia, ad. Stanislaus Edward Frett~ 
at Paul Mar~, apud Ludovioum Viv~s, Parisiis, 1871-1880, 34 vo1. 
in small folio. 
De Veritate I is in volume XIV (1875), pages 315-341. 
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5. ~ Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae ad fidam optimarum 
editionum diligenter recusae, sumptibus P. Lethie11eux, Parisiis, 
1884, 3 vols. in 12 mo. This edition is the same, except in arrange-
ment of questions, as the following. 
6. ~ Thamae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae ad fidem optimarum 
editionum diligenter reousae, Nova aditio amandata et augment~e 
d'une Preface par le R. P. Mandonnet, O.P. (sic), sumptibus P. 
Lethielleux, Parisiis, 1925. 
De Veritate I is in the first of the three 12 mo. volumes, 
pages 1-30. 
7. ~ Thamae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae, aditio quinta 
~-------------------------------~ 
Taurinensis, Marietti, Taurini-Romae, 1927, 5 volumes in octavo. 
~ Veritate lis here numbered Question XI {i.e., of all the 
disputed questions) and occupies pages 1-26 of volume III. 
13 
Thus every available edition of the ~ Veritate was examined; there are 
also extant those versions of the 1750 Roman edition printed at Venice in 
1592-1594, at Antwerp in 1612, and at Paris in 1636-1641 and 1660,2 and a few 
editions mentioned by Ueberweg {~~~ P• 422). 
In only three places has there been sufficient difference in the readings 
to demand recognition in the construction of the dictionary itself. These 
will be discussed below. Some very minor and insignificant variations serve 
as clues to trace the relations between the various editions. Many of these 
editions state bluntly that they are based on the Roman edition of 1570. 
Examination of the others revealed that they likewise stemmed fram it. Un-
fortunately, the editors of many of the editions keep it a dark secret upon 
what they based their text and how they emended it--"idam tenet silentium 
altissimum," as we find the Ottawa editors saying.3 
The Venice edition of 1784 is based directly on the Roman edition, hav-
ing only three minor, variants. John Mary Allodi, the editor of the Parma 
edition, tells us that except for a few certain works, not including the~ 
Veri tate, 
Pro aliis vero operibus universis adhibuimus 
2Listed in the Viv~s edition, I, xviii. 
3summa Theologiae, I, xix-xx. 
,.--------------------, 
.I"'"' 
Romanam, jussu s. Pii V Pont. Max. excusam, an. 1570. 
XVII voll. in fol., et Venetam apud Bettinelli cum il-
lustrationibus P. Bernardi Mariae de Rubeis an. 1745. 
28 voll. in 4to.4 
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The Parma edition does have minor variations in six places, three of which 
are the same as those of the Venice edition. The Lethielleux edition of 
1884, the 1~donnet edition, which is admitted to simply reproduce it, and 
the Marietti edition all follow the Parma edition exactly. The Viv~s edition 
is the only one of the six to vary at all notably from the Roman edition. 
The editors state that they have used the Parma text but checked it against 
tour MSS. of the Biblioth~que nationals de Paris and adopted variant readings 
from them when they seemed justified.s The fact that they strangely fail to 
identify the four Paris codices used except as A, B, C, and D presents little 
difficulty, for in the complete list of extant manuscripts which Destrez 
prints, only four MSS. are listed as in the Biblioth~que nationals de Paris.6 
Due, evidently, to the influence of this added textual source, the Viv~s 
edition varies in some fifteen minor places from the Roman. In summary, the 
relatively small number of discrepancies among the various editions, extreme-
ly f~ of which are attributable to anything but unimportant and obvious 
typographical errors, seams_to indicate that the text for at least Question 
I is fundamentally sound. 
Since the majority of the available editions followed the Raman edition 
4opera Omnia, Parma ed., 1852, I, xii. 
5opera Omnia, Viv~s ed., 1871, I, xix. 
611Le texte de la question disput~e 'De Veritate'•••• It 124-126. 
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quite faithfully, and especially since the Parma, Mandonnet-Lethielleux, and 
Marietti editions agree exactly, it was thought practical to use the most 
commonly available text, the Marietti, in the preparation of the dictionary, 
and to refer to it in the manner which is customary in referring to the Bek-
ker pages of Aristotle's works. The Marietti differs from the Parma only in 
one place, an obvious typographical error, rendering 11 sensun for "sensus" in 
25a48 contrary to all six of the other editions examined. 
As to the variant readings which seem of enough import to enter into 
this work, they are all instances in which one or more of the Paris l~S. used 
by the Viv~s editors give a different reading from that in any of the printed 
editions. In 4bl9 they read "personis" with codex B, in place of "personae"; 
correctly, it would seem, as noted under the word APPROPRIO in the dictionary, 
infra. In 2lal7 they read "aliquam" for "aliam" with all four of the codices 
to support them, and in so doing confirm the conjecture of the Venice editors 
in a footnote~ loco, and copied by the Parma and Mandonnet editions in 
similar footnotes; this reading is accepted, as noted under the word RECTI-
TUDO, infra. In 12bll the Viv~s editors again have all four codices as 
grounds for inserting "quamdam," as against all the printed editions; the 
manuscripts are probably correct because St. Thomas in similar contexts does 
use the expression 11adaequationem quamdam," e.g., in 3bll. Lastly, in 2la35 
they omit the word "exemplari" from the expression "de causa exemplari effi-
ciente" with B, C, and D; this is no doubt correct, and the questionability 
of the word in the printed editions is further revealed by the fact that in 
~~------------------------------~ 
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this single instance the Roman edition varies from all others by having 
"exemplaris," pointing to some corruption of the text because it makes no 
sense at all in the passage. 
~------------------------~ 
CHAPTER IV 
OUTLINE OF ITS CONTENTS 
The progression of ideas in the treatise is very deliberate. It is 
made up of twelve articles of varying lengths. St. Thomas begins by asking 
the age-old question, ~at is truth?" and proceeds to an5Wer it in the first 
article. Here he is careful to keep unentangled from subsequent questions, 
laying down the meaning of the bare notion of truth in its most basic and all 
inclusive sense, "adaequatio rei et intellectus." The preliminary arguments 
consist largely of various definitions of truth taken from older philosophers 
and in the body of the article, after explaining truth as a certain attribute 
of being itself, he is at pains to accept these definitions in some sense or 
other as agreeing with what he has said. He does not use the modern scholas-
tic term "transcendental attribute," but he substantially conveys this idea, 
and he does say that being and true are convertible. 
Having settled the notion of truth in general, he goes on in article 
two to refine more precisely the matter by asking ~ether truth is to be 
found chiefly in the intellect rather than in things?" He answers that truth 
is to be found as a primary and intrinsic analogue in the intellect, second-
arily and by extrinsic denomination in things. He does not usa the tar.ms 
"logical" and "ontological truth." 
In the third article he takes up the point made in the second article 
that truth is primarily in the intellect, and asks in more detail "Whether 
17 
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truth is in the intellect compounding and dividing?" i.e., in the judging 
intellect. He an5Wers that it is more properly in the intellect combining 
and separating, i.e., affirming and denying, than in the simple formation of 
intellectual quiddities; still less properly is it said of things, and lastly 
it is said of man who can speak truly or falsely. 
Article four asks '~ether there is only one truth by which all things 
are true?" and here for the first time a long series of preliminary arguments 
fifteen in all, betrays the fact that he is on more controversial ground. 
The reason, of course, is St. Augustine's persistent emphasis on the Divine 
Truth. But St. Thomas manages to preserve what is good in Augustine and fit 
it in with his Aristotelianism by carefully distinguishing between truth in 
the mind and truth in things, then subdistinguishing truth in the divine 
mind from truth in the created mind, and likewise differentiating the truth 
of things because of their relation of conformity to the divine mind from 
their truth because of conformity or conformability to the created mind. The 
truth in the divine mind is one, of course, and the truth of any one thing is 
one insofar as it is simply the entity of the thing itself; but there are as 
many truths in created minds as there are created minds conformed to the 
thing's entity. 
Article five continues the discussion of matter important to the Augusti· 
nians, as is shown by the number of arguments, twenty-four in number this 
time, which precede the body of the article. He asks ~ether any other 
truth is eternal besides the first truth?" and proceeds very surely upon the 
r.----------------------------~ 
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foundation he has alreadyBid for himself in previous articles. The truth in 
God's mind is of course eternal, and there is a sense in which the enuntiable 
truth contained in a proposition is eternal, but truth in things and in 
created minds is'not eternal. 
In the sixth article he deals with a rather intricate point, ~Vhether 
created truth is unchangeable?" This requires many subtle distinctions. 
Truth cannot be the subject of change; but things can change with regard to 
it, in certain ways. The truth of a thing with respect to the divine mind 
cannot change into falsity when the thing is changed (any more than can the 
truth of the divine mind itself), but only into another truth. In relation 
to the human mind, however, the truth of a thing changes into another truth 
if the mind keeps pace with the change; but if the mind fails to change with 
the thing, there is falsity. 
Article seven takes up a purely theological question, ~ether in God 
truth is predicated personally or essentially?" He dispatches it in short 
order with the necessary distinctions between predicating attributes of the 
divine Essence and appropriating them to a certain divine Person, and between 
the proper use of the term "truth" in regard to God and the metaphorical use 
of it in connection with the Person of the Word. 
In article eight he returns to matter in which there is room for dis-
agreement between him and anyone with Neoplatonic leanings, as the Augusti-
nians were almost bound to be. He asks '~ether all truth is from the first 
truth?" He answers that the truth of things, their being, must be from God, 
~--------------~ 
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as imitations of His divine exemplarity. He further placates the Neoplaton-
ists in his audience by saying that truth in the created intellect must also 
be from God; but he avoids the illumination theory by giving as his reason 
that truth is a good of the intellect, and all good is from God ultimately, 
thus leaving open the possibility of an Aristotelian theory of cognition. 
Article nine completes the positive treatment of truth by taking up the 
question of its lowest possible mode of existence in a knower--mw.hether truth 
is in the sensa?" The article is deplorably short, considering the importan 
attached to it nowadays. He answers that truth is properly in the sense, but 
not formally. That is, sense knowledge can be true, but being incapable of 
perfect reflection the sense cannot recognize its conformity with the object 
which it truly knows; however, it does have a sort of imperfect reflection 
by which it is conscious of its act. 
The last three articles deal with the opposite of truth, namely falsity. 
Here the order is ascending, the first step being taken in article ten with 
the question ~ether any thing is false?" In the light of articles four, 
five, and eight it is easy to reply that no thing can be false with respect 
to God's intellect, nor consequently in its own being. But because our human 
knowledge is acquired through a multiple process beginning in the sense 
knowledge of accidents and ending in the intellectual knowledge of essences, 
material things can be called false in the sense that the discrepancy between 
their sensory appearance and their internal nature may sometimes be the oc-
casion for falsity in our minds. 
rr-· --------------------~ 
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Article eleven continues the discussion of falsity with the question, 
"Whether falsity is in the sense?" The answer is that falsity can be said to 
obtain in sense knowledge in two ways: first, insofar as sensory impressions 
are the occasion of falsity in the intellect; secondly, insofar as they mis-
represent reality. In the first case, he notes, the sense impression can 
partake of falsity not as an entity itself, for every thing is truly what it 
is, but only insofar as it presents things to the intellect. In the second 
case, the sense is false, strictly speaking, only when there is sense judg-
ment, i.e., the action of the internal senses upon the common sensibles and 
the sensibles ~ accidens; in the direct sensation of proper sensibles 
falsity is only improperly said to occur, when there is an impediment in the 
organ or the medium of cognition. 
Article twelve concludes the treatise by raising the question of falsity 
to the highest plane, '~ether falsity is in the intellect?" The answer to 
this is simply the natural correlate of article three, and the brevity of the 
article indicates that he considers it such. Falsity is properly said of the 
intellect when judging, and never properly of its simple apprehension of quid 
dities except insofar as there is an implied false judgment in a definition. 
Such is the doctrine, very briefly, of St. Thomas's most formal treatise 
on truth. He treats of substantially the same points in questions 15 and 16 
of the first part of the Summa Theologica. It is there in much more con-
densed form--often, one must admit, without suffering in clarity on that ac-
count. The long series of preliminary arguments give way to two or three at 
r----------------~ 
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the head of each article. The treatment smacks much less of the controversial 
air of the disputation hall, and although St. Augustine is still prominent, 
one is not so conscious of an effort to keep an audience of Augustinians 
satisfied as the various points are taken up. The subject-matter of portions 
of De Veritate I is also treated in the commentary on the first Book of the 
- -
sentences, distinction 8, question l, article 3; distinction 19, question 5, 
articles l, 2, and 3. It is scattered through the Summa Contra Gentiles, 
Book I, chapters 59, 60, 61, and 62; Book II, chapters 36, 83, and 84; Book 
III, chapter 47. ?arts of it also appear in lecture 4 on Book VI of Aris-
totle's Metaphysics, Question XXI~ Veritate, articles land 3, and Summa 
Theologioa, Ia, 85, 6. 
CHAPTER V 
DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE 
What the Good was to Plato, or Being to St. Thomas, Truth was to st. 
Augustine. "We gaze upon indestructible truth,nl he says, for "In every 
place, 0 Truth, thou givest audience to such as consult thee, and at the same 
time thou answerest all their demands, be they ever so diverse."2 Charles 
Boyer, S.J., in the first sentence of the first chapter of his L'IdGe ~ 
v~rit~ ~.!!:, Philosophie ~ Saint Augustin, states that "On every page of 
st. Augustine, one reads the word truth."3 Whether or not this be literally 
true, the general Dnpression it conveys is sound. When Fr. Erich Przywara, 
s.J., undertook to arrange An Augustine Synthesis, he saw fit to set the key-
note, as it were, by devoting the first forty pages to Section I, "Truth," in 
which he reproduces selections from all the important works of Aug~stine.4 
Consequently, when St. Thomas essayed to discuss the subject of truth in 
a series of formal disputations, he could not have helped being conscious of 
the prevalence of Augustinians at the University of Paris in his day. This 
put him in a difficult predicament, for while he was determined to propound 
the doctrine of Aristotle, he yet had to placate the Franciscans and other 
1E! Trinitate, IX, vi, n. 9 (PL 42, 966). 
2Confessiones, X, xxvi, n. 37 (PL 32, 795). 
3Beauchesne, Paris, 1920, 1. 
4Sheed & Ward, New York, 1936, 1-40. 
23 
~~----------~ 
24 
followers of Augustinian· teaching who made up such a large part of his audi-
ence if he wanted to gat a hearing at all. Hence the notable prominence of 
quotations from Augustine and of Augustinian expressions in the De Veritate ~ 
and the paucity of references to Aristotle, as compared with other and espe-
cially later works of St. Thomas. 
In certain matters it was relatively easy to give Augustine prominence 
as an authority, especially when there was question of the one f~rst and 
eternal truth, God. For in matters pertaining to God Aquinas really owes 
much to Augustine, and finds no quarrel with the latter's exclamations, "O 
Eternal Truth ••• thou art my God"5 and "thou art truth presiding over all."6 
Also, the impact of the Neo-platonio strain in Augustine appears in such ex-
pressions as "exemplariter procedit" in De Veritate ~~ article 4, ad Sum. 
But on other matters he saw in Augustinianism error which he could not 
tolerate. An early biographer of St. Thomas, William of Tocco, in speaking 
of the disputed questions of St. Thomas seems extremely impressed with the 
newness of doctrine contained therein: 
He was proposing new articles in his lectures, finding 
a new and clear method of determining, and adducing 
ne~guments in the determinations; so that no one, 
WhO had heard him teach these new things, could doubt 
that God had illumined him with the rays of a new 
light ••• so that he did not hesitate to teach and 
write new opinions ••• 7 
5Confessiones, VII, x, n. 16 (PL 32, 742). 
6Ibid., X, xli, n. 66 (PL 32, 807) • 
.......... 
7Vita Sancti Thamae, caput iii, n.l5, in Acta Sanctorum: Martii, I, 663 
Ttranslation and italics mine). · 
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this can best be interpreted as meaning that St. Thomas created no little 
stir in a hall thronged with Augustinians by proposing theories which were 
largely those of Aristotle. Fo~ as M. Gilson has brought out in his excel-
lent study "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqu6 saint Augustin, n8 his quarrel 
was really with Neoplatonism and with what the Platonizing Arabs had done to 
Aristotle's doctrine. St. Thomas recognized the Platonic nature of Augustin-
ian philosophy,9 though it is extremely difficult even for modern scholars 
to say just how much influence the Neoplatonists had on Augustine.lO Dr. 
Martin Grabmann has studied the question with regard to the matter of cogni-
tion, so important De Veritate ~, in his Der Ggttliche Grund Menschlicher 
Wahrheitserkenntnis ~ Augustinus ~ Thomas ~ Aquin, and tells us that 
st. Augustine's theory is a grafting of Platonic and Neoplatonio influences 
on the thought from the New Testament that Christ is the "Li~ht of the 
world.nll 
However that may be, the Platonizing Augustinians of the University of 
8Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen ~ge, 1926, 1, 5-127. 
9"Augustinus autem Platonem secutus quantum fides catholica patiebatur," 
Qq. Disp. De Spirit. Creat., q. un., a.lO ad Sum; but compare "Augustinus 
""Se'quitur opinionibus Platonis, non asserendo, sed recitando," Summa Theol., 
Ia, 77, 5 ad 3um. 
10cr. Charles Boyer, S.J., Christianisme et Neo-Platonisme dans la Formation 
de Saint Augustin, Beauchesne, Paris, 1~0, 233 pp., esp.CFiapiTre II, 11Les 
livres des Platoniciens, 11 79-119. 
llAschendorff, Munster, 1924, 26. Cf. also Sancti Augustini Doctrina De Cog-
nitione: Textus Select. (ed. Keeler, Pont. Oniv. ureg., Textus et Lrocu-
menta: Series Philosophica, 11), apud Aedes Greg. Dniv., Ramae, 1934, t 
on Augustine's debt to the Platonists, 36-37; on the "lumen intelligibile, 11 
53-63. 
~------------------------~ 
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paris and Platonizing Arabians like Alkindi, Alfarabi, Algazel, and Avicenna 
were alike unwelcome to St. Thomas's Aristotelian mind. On the fundamental 
question of human cognition he held strongly for the Aristotelian acting in-
tellect, abstracting essences from sense data and then reasoning to what is 
above sense. He opposed the ontologism and divine illumination theory com-
mon among the Franciscans which centered around truth in the judgment, as he 
did the illumination and separate intellect theory of Avicenna concerning 
the production of the concept.l2 Just what proportions of Platonism and 
Aristotelianism go to make up the complete doctrine of St. Thomas is not easy 
to determine;l3 unfortunately, he has left us no "Confessions" or "Discourse 
on. Method." But Wilhelm Schneider is not far wrong in his "Die Q.uestiones 
Disputatae des Thomas von Aquin in ihrer Philosophiegeschichtlicher Beziehung 
zu Augustinustt when he says that in the matter of human cognition Aquinas 
paid lip service to Augustine in the discussions, but held close to Aristotle~ 
line of thought in his own doctrine.l4 However, Aquinas does take what is 
true in Augustine and incorporate it into his own doctrine whenever possible, 
and tries at every point to show that he is not in opposition to Augustine 
when properly understood. 
12Etienne Gilson, "Les sources GrGco-Arabes de 1' augustinisnte avicennisant," 
Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litt~raire du moyen lge, 1929, IV, 5-107. 
13Aime Forest, La~Structure M~taphysique du Concret selon Saint Thomas d'A~ 
J. Vrin, PariB; 1931, 323-325. --
14Beitrgge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Ndttelalters, 
1930, XXVII, 93. Cf. also-Ch. Boyer, s.J:; Essais sur la Doctrine de 
Saint Augustin, Beauchesne, Paris, 1932, Chapitre v:-vsaint Thomas et saint 
Augustin, 11 138-165. 
~--~--~---------------------------------. 
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Another thing to remark about the De Veritate from the standpoint of 
doctrine is that it is one of the chief sources for texts relative to the 
critical problem and the so-called Louvain solution. St. Thomas never dis-
cusses the matter formally. but moderns interested in the problem find much 
to say about the last four articles and especially articles nine and eleven. 
To give even a brief survey of the literature of this question is far beyond 
the compass of this work, as is evident from a mere listing of such names as 
No8l, Roland-Goss~lin, Cardinal Mercier, Jeanniere, Picard. Jolivet, Mar~chal 
Bonnet, de Tonquadeo, Barron. Boyer, 1maritain, Gilson. Rousselot, Gardeil. 
Naber. Kremer, Sentroul, Leslie Walker. Frank Simon, and Chevalier. (It is 
peculiar to note that in Mar~chal's ~Point de Depart~ la M6taphysique. 
replete though it is with quotations from st. Thomas,l5 no mention of De 
Veritate ~ meets the eye, and there are only a few citations from the other 
question of De Veritate.) Paul Wilpert is quite right in "Das Problem dar 
Wahrheitssicherung bei Thomas von Aquin: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des 
Evidenzproblems" when he says that St. Thomas was undoubtedly a realist, and 
avoided the difficulties arising from Augustinianism by adhering to Aristo-
telian realism.l6 An important point, however, is that he escapes the semi-
sensism of Aristotle by his clever working out of the matter of intellectual 
15J. Nar~chal, S.J •• Le Point de Depart de la ~taphysique, Museum Lessianum, 
Louvain, 1927, I, ~93; 192tf; V, 33-4Er.f.--
16Beitr~ge zur Geschichte d~r Philosophie und Theologie des Y~ttelalters. 
1931, XXX~07. He gives:ii good bibliography of the critical problem, as 
does Edward F. Talbot, Knowledge and Object, Paulist Press, New York, 1932, 
107-111. 
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reflection in articles nine and twelve.17 M. Gilson's R~alisme Thomiste is 
perhaps the best expression of how the doctrine of St. Thomas stands with 
regard to the critical problein.18 St. Thomas's treatise on falsity in ar-
ticles ten, eleven, and twelve is also most illuminating in this connectionl9 
A final feature to be noted about the doctrine of De Veritate I is the 
prominence given to sense knowledge in the treatise. This is brought out by 
a study of the texts and usages which appear under the words APPREHE~~O, 
COGNITIO, COGNOSCO, JUDICIUM, JUDICO, VERITAS, VERUiv1, VERE, etc., in the body 
of the diotionary.20 In brief, St. Thomas uses all these terms with refer-
ence to sense knowledge as well as intellectual knowledge. The significance 
of this for the critical problem is brought out by Gilson in his R~alisme 
Thomiste.21 St. Thomas's treatment avoids Platonism both in epistemology and 
17see also Blaise Romeyer, "La Doctrine de Saint Thomas sur la v~rit6," .Ar-
chives de Phi1osophie, 1925, III, n. 2, 32. On the importance of inte~ 
lectual:reflection as described by St. Thomas in De Veritate I, see also 
Blaise Romeyer, "Saint Thomas et notre connais sance de 1 I esprit humain," 
Archives de Philosophie, 1928, VI, n. 2, 1-114. That Augustine is the 
source of~is is clear from an examination of De Trin., IX, iv (PL 42, 
963), and vi (PL 42, 965-966). --
l8Etienne Gilson, R~alisme Thomiste et Critique~~ Connaissance, J. Vrin, 
Paris, 1939, 239 PP• 
19 . See also Leo W. Keeler, S.J., The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant, apud 
Aedes Greg. Uni v., Romae, 1934-;-chapter V,"'St. Thoma:s;11 83-llL.-
20see also Joseph de Tonquedec, La Critique de la Connaissance, Beauchesne, 
Paris, 1929, Chapitre VI, "La question de 'la~rit~, 11 219-246, and Appen-
dice VIII, "Commentaire des trois premiers articles de la question I de 
Veritate," 508-518; Ch. Boyer, "Le sens d'un texte de saint Thomas 'de 
Veritate q. 1, a. 9 111 , Gregorianum, 1924, V, 424-443, and the remarks of 
Wilpert on this latter, ~ ~~ 114-119. 
21ep. cit., 184-239. 
--
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~th regard to the ultimate nature of man, guarantees the realiam of our in-
tellectual knowledge, and brings out strongly the unity of our cognitive 
processes. 
II. THE DICTIONARY 
NOTE ON THE METHOD OF ARRANGEME~~ 
Treatment of the Vocabulary Items. 
The aim of this work is primarily to establish the meaning of the 
various words which make up the philosophical vocabulary of Saint Thorr~s 
Aquinas in the first of his disputed questions on truth. Everything has been 
pointed as far as possible to this end. Many helps for translation are give~ 
but the English equivalents are offered first of all as an attempt to indi-
cate meaning, whatever the result in point of beauty or smoothness of ex-
pression so achieved. 
Likewise, the aim being philosophical and not literary, only those words 
are studied which have some philosophical import or are peculiar to the 
language of St. Thomas, or which are necessary to the understanding of his 
meaning. And since it is his meaning with which we are here concerned, no 
attempt has been made to study the vocabulary of other writers quoted by him, 
except insofar as he makes their language his own in later discussion. For 
the same reason the language of the preliminary dialectical arguments with 
which each article begins, sometimes questionably called "objections," is 
quite obviously of no concern here unless taken up by Aquinas in his reply; 
experience in constructing the dictionary has shown that the study of words 
in these arguments is otherwise irrelevant, for they are sometimes deliber-
ately beguiling and vague and downright equivocal, and never represent the 
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tor.med opinion of Saint Thomas.! 
Unless the contrary is explicitly stated, the principal source of evi-
dance on which the choice of meaning is based is the context. This means the 
way Saint Thomas uses the word in the passage cited, as compared with other 
occurrences of the word in Question I of De Veritate, but nowhere else, what-
ever other works of St. Thomas or extraneous sources may have been,consulted. 
This exclusive use of textual evidence guarantees the usefulness of the die-
tionary for comparative studies. 
It is presupposed throughout this work that the reader has some know-
ledge of Latin. It does not presume to supplant a standard Latin dictionary 
when use of such may be necessary for words not appearing in this dictionary, 
or for details of grammatical forms, etc. The source for all classical 
usages has been the Lewis and Short revision of Harper's Latin Dictionary.2 
Mechanics of the Dictionary. 
The system of arrangement used was designed with a view to making up for 
lack of that variety of type-faces at the disposal of the printer, and at the 
same time of not employing such a multitude of arbitrary signs and artificial 
devices as to render the dictionary difficult to use. 
1see the~ under the word OBJICIO in the body of the dictionary, infra. 
2Founded on the translation of Freund's Latin-German Lexicon edited by E. A. 
Andrews (rev. Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short), American Book Company, 
New York, 1907, xiv-2019 PP• 
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The vocabulary entries are made up as follows, 
First, the word studied is given in its alphabetical place, in capital 
letters. If a verb, it is listed under the first person singular, present 
indicative active, followed simply by the infinitive ending. When a parti-
ciple is used as an adjective or substantive in its own right, and the verb 
from which it is derived does not appear in the work, it is listed under its 
own form. Likewise the verbal substantives "esse," "essendi," and "ens." 
For nouns, the genitive singular is given, and the three genders of the 
nominative singular are given in the case of adjectives. The part of speech 
is not further indicated except when there is danger of confusion or for 
some other special reason. Phrases are listed under the first word of the 
phrase. Cross references are given. 
On the same line with the word-entry, a simple English translation of 
the word is attempted, giving the basic meaning common to all further refine-
ments. If possible, this is done by giving one word which will serve as an 
English equivalent in translation of the word anywhere in the work, though 
perhaps without all the shades of connotation discussed later. However, if 
such an equivalent is not available, as many words are added in this basic 
translation as are necessary to sum up the representative meaning of the word 
in the various contexts. This basic and general meaning is always followed 
by a period. 
Each subsequent refinement of meaning or added translation is given on 
a. new line, and is always followed by a colon(:). It may be followed by ex-
planations and examples of usage quoted from the text. These citations and 
33 
explanations are followed by a period only when there is a distinct change of 
meaning, otherwise the subdivisions and clarifications are separated by a 
semicolon (;). Meanings of a word which are notably divergent are indicated 
by arabic numerals (1, 2), slight variations in meaning or differences of 
usage by small letters (a, b). 
Bvery specific meaning set down is justified by the citation of at least 
one context from De Veritate I in which the word occurs with that meaning, 
! 
the word studied being underlined. ~ach occunence is identified after the 
manner of the Bekker paging of the works of Aristotle, by page, column (a or 
b), and line, not separated by any punctuation. Thus, 2al7 means thatthis 
word appears on page 2, the left-hand column, line seventeen, in the context 
. 
cited. 1'he location of every other occurrence of the word in that meaning 
is added, preceded only by a comma. The edition used is the Marietti, as 
explained above (p. 15). The location of the word under consideration is 
always given without parentheses; that of any other word referred to is in 
parentheses. In the case of a few words used very frequently and with con-
sistent meaning throughout the work, only a few typical citations are given 
and any discrepancies noted, as will be stated in each case. 
If reference is made to the alphabetical listing of another word in this 
dictionary, the word is printed in capital letters. If cross-reference is 
made, the reader is simply told to "see" the other heading. If for the unde 
standing of the meaning of one word comparison is necessary with the discus-
sion of another word, the reader is told to "confer" (~, or q.v.) the other 
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entrY• If it is felt that another word will throw some additional light on 
a topic, reference is indicated by "see also." 
A 
ABSOLUTE adv. Absolutely, unqualifiedly. 
1. Absolutely: opposed to relatively -- 3al~ 10, equivalent 
to "in se", which is contrasted with 11in ordine ad 
aliud" (2b54). 
2. In every respect: 
a) unqualifiedly: 2b7, equivalent to 11per se 11 {23b4); 
b) with no exceptions: "oportet etiam absolute dicere, 
quod omnia veritas sit a Deo" 20b27. 
ABSTRAHO, -ERE To abstract. 
To prescind: "tDei) cognitio ••• abstrahit ab omni tempore" 
13a34. 
Note. The word literally means to draw away from, but in 
philosophical usage it usually means to abstract, to attend to 
some aspect and disregard same other. The most usual sense is 
that of intellectual abstraction of intelligible form from a 
material body. In this, the only occurrence of the word in 
this work, the meaning is not so restricted, but closely similar. 
-ACCEPTIO, -IONIS Acceptance, acceptation. 
The understanding of a word or statement in a certain sense: 
18b52; of. ACCIPIO, l. 
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ACCIDENS, -ENTIS n. Accident. 
That which is non-essential: hence, 
1. In the real or physical order, 
opposed to "res" -- "quantum ad accidentia, mutatio accidere 
potest etiam manente re" 18a7; 
opposed to "quod quid est" -- 11accidentia magnam pa:riem con-
ferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est" 23a36; 
opposed to "natura" "color auri et alia hujusmodi 
accidentia" 23a47; 
opposed to "essentia" -- "sensus et imaginatio sola exteri-
ora accidentia cognoscunt" 26a54. 
2. In the mental order, 
a non-essential note: 11per modum quo differentia additur 
generi, vel accidens subjecto" 2b29. 
3. The logical fallacy resulting from an illegitimate shift 
from accidental to essential or necessary predieation: 
11fallacia accidentis" 20b32. 
(PER) ACCIDENS see PER ACCIDENS. 
ACCIDE1~ALIS, -E adj. Incidental. 
That which need not be, an attribute which does not necessarily 
pertain to a given subject: "Veritas autem quae dicitur de 
rebus in comparatione ad intellectum humanum, est rebus quod-
ammodo accidentalis, quia posito quod intellectus humanus non 
r.--------:-----------. 
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asset nee esse posset, adhuc res in sua essentia permanerent" 
9a22; 
opposed to "essentialis" in a context of the same import 
as above, 23b6. 
Used as a substantive, equivalent to ACCIDENS, 1 -- "mutatio 
accidere potest etiam manente re, et ita quantum ad accidentalia 
potest fieri mutatio veritatis rei" 18a9. 
ACCIPIO, -ERE To accept. 
1. Except as noted belov1, nn. 2, 3, the word is always used in 
this work in a metaphorical sense, 
to take mentally, to consider in such a way, to take as 
meaning a certain thing: "nomen intellectus dupliciter 
accipi potest" 26b4, "si intellectus accipiatur secundum 
illam actionem a qua nomen intellectus imponitur" 26b37, etc. 
2. Once it is taken in a logical sense, 
to include: "qui rationem non entis accipit in seipso" 
3bl5. 
3. A few times it is taken in a literal or ontological sense, 
to be acted upon, to receive a perfection from outside: "in 
majori mundo superiora nihil accipiunt ab inferioribus" 
26al2, "intellectus speculativus accipit a rebus" 5b29, 
"intellectus a rebus scientiam accepit" 9a36, "intelleotus 
aliquid acoipit a sensu" 26al5. 
r------------------------~ 
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ACTIO, -IONIS Action, activity, operation. 
1. Very broadly, in any sense in which a being can be said to 
"agere 11 (q.v.) -- 24al4, 23. 
2. The proper action of a specific human power: 11illam actionam 
a qua nomen intellectus imponitur 11 26b38; of'. ACTUS, 2. 
ACTIVUS, -A, -UM Active 
Being a source of action as opposed to a recipient, active: 
"principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus 11 2lb27. 
Note. This is an excellent instance of the way St. Thomas 
reminds us of the fact that, although the acting intellect and 
the possible intellect are really distinct (of. Summa Theologica, 
Ia, 79, 7 corp.), still they must not be separated to the extent 
of failing to consider the intellect as a whole, as one active 
principle, including the possible intellect which is the formally 
cognitive part. 
ACTUS, -US Act, actuality, action, perfection. 
In general, the word signifies actuality as opposed to the 
various senses of potency. 
1. The act of existence, the actuality of existence: 3a6-7, 
3b30, 4b9, 10 -- it is so interpreted explicitly by st. 
Thomas when he makes "actus essendi 11 (4b7) equivalent to 
"essen (4b6) --"cum dicitur 1Diversum est esse et quod est,• 
' distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit" 
r----------------------------------~ 
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4b5-8, where the "actus ille" clearly refers to "actus 
essendi"; thus the ablative, 
actually, really, in existence: 6a48, 14a23 (twice); 
actually existing: "in actu" 12b32. 
2. Second act as distinguished from first act (existence), 
a) synonymous with ACTIO, 2, 
b) 
act, activity, action, operation, perfection: 
11actibus animae" 5b9, "virtutis ••• actum" 14a55, 
"actus intellectus" 6b32, 33, 2lbl4, 20, 22, 25, of 
sense power 2lb32, 40; 
the activity proper to a given thing: "naturalis 
actus alicujus rei semper est uno modo, nisi per 
accidens impediatur" 25b43; including 
the action of God, considered entitatively and not 
terminatively, and hence in this case not really 
distinct from Himself: "actus divinae voluntatis'• 
2la6, 7, 12, "in ~ int ellectus di vini 11 6a54; 
looked at as an entity in itself rather than as the 
operation or perfection of the acting principle, 
the act, the deed: "actus fornicationis" 20b35, 53, 56, 
the act: ttactus cognitionis est medius inter cognos-
centem et cognitum11 2lb50. 
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ADAEQUATIO, -IONIS Equation, equivalence, correspondence, 
similarity. 
Note. St. Thomas seems to have recognized that the word literal-
ly means "equality to", as is evident from its use in 23al as 
the opposite of 11 ina.equalitas" (23a3). This is further brought 
out by his example from algebra of "equals subtracted from 
equals" (17a54-55) in a context where he uses it in the typical 
sense found in this work, namely as expressing that relation 
between intellect and thing known in which is fulfilled the 
formal notion of truth, 17a53. 
Still it is obvious from a comparative study of contexts 
that when so used it never quite means mathematical equality, 
but rather a correspondence between the real and the repre.senta-
tive orders, a "sort of equation" -- 11adaequationem quamdam" 
pbll. That mathematical equality is not meant is further brought 
out by the fact that he uses it to express the relation of the 
Divine intellect to finite things, and to negative entities 
(cf. infra). This equality or correspondence refers to that 
which is represented, though the manner of existence in the two 
differs. 
Explicitly equivalent to 11correspondentia 11 in 3a43, to 11 conformi-
tas 11 in 3a47, to 11commensuratio" in 12b29, and "proportio11 
(2lb23) and "aequalitas" (18b7, 12, 19) and used to the same 
effect. 
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The word most frequently used in the definition of truth -- "quae 
quidam correspondentia adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur, 
et in hoc formalis ratio veri perficitur" 3a44, and likewise in 
3b27, 5a40, 41, 6b35, 42, l2bll. 
Used to express both the relation of intellect to thing l0a54, 
20a25 and thing to intellect 20bl3, 38, and of both Divine 5b47, 
10a54, 23al8 and human intellect 5b55, and also of both "intel-
lectus mensurans" and "intellectus mensuratus" 5b45, and even of 
the conformity of the intellect when one of the terms of the 
relation is non-existent 12b29 or a negation 20b38, 23al8. 
In 10a51 it might better be translated "mode, or manner," of 
equation or correspondence. 
ADAEQUO, -ARE To equal, to correspond. 
a) active. To make (the human mind) conform or correspond to, 
to adequate: "omne ens potest sibi adaequare intellectum 
humanum" 6a22; 
to bring (our mind or intellect) into conformity with: 9b5, 
13b5. 
b) passive. Most frequently used, always to express that 
relation of mind and object described as truth, 
to be made equal to, to be equated to, to correspond to, to 
measure up to: it is used in all the different ways in 
which ADAEQUATIO (q.v.) is used -- of intellect to things 
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18b28, 20a25 and things to intellect 20a43, 20bl6, of 
Divine 7a27, l0a51, 53, 56, 12b39, 13b3, 14a22 and human 
intellect 7a28, 20a43, of relation to non-existent objects, 
whether future 12b33, 39, 14a22, 28 or negative 20a49, 20b8, 
23al3, but the meaning always remains the same -- "ens non 
potest intelligi sine hoc quod correspondeat vel adaequetur 
intellectui" 3b51, 6b36, 51, 7a41, 17b47, 18bl6. 
c) ~participle. proportionate, commensurate, adequated, con-
formed: "adaequata" 5b21, 6al7, 21, 9b4. 
ADDITIO, -IONIS Addition. 
Used in this work only in the sense of the adding of notes to 
the comprehension of an idea or concept -- "omnes aliae concep-
tiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens" 2b26. 
ADDO, -ERE To add. 
Used in the same sense as ADDITIO {q.v.) only -- "modum quo 
differentia additur generi" 2b28; so also 2b26, 33, 43, 45. 
See also Su~ERADDO. 
AEQUALITAS, -ATIS Equality, correspondence, similarity, 
equivalence. 
1. Used, less frequently than ADAEQUATIO but in the same way, 
to express the relation between mind and object in the 
definition of truth. The drawing of an analogy between its 
r· 
l 
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literal, strict sense of mathematical equality and its use 
in his definition and discussion of truth indicates that it 
is not to be taken literally in such context -- "inaequali-
tatem ••• quae se habet ad falsitatem siout aequalitas ad 
veritatem" 7b9; much less does it mean identity -- "sed 
aequalitas diversorum est" 6b37. This is further confir.med 
by its use to express the relation between the Divine intel-
lect and finite things 18b7, 12, 19. 
2. Literally, when speaking of the Trinity, 
equality: "aequalitas in divinis quandoque importat rationem 
quae designat distinctionem personalem, sicut cum dicimus 
quod Pater et Filius sunt aequales; et secundum hoc, in 
nomine aequalitatis, realis distinctio intelligitur. Quando-
que autem in nomine aequalitatis non intelligitur realis 
distinotio, sed rationis tantum, sicut cum dioimus sapientiam 
et bonitatem divinam esse aequales ••• et talis est distinctio 
importata per nomen veritatis, cum sit aequalitas intellectus 
et essentiae'' 19a2-15. 
AEQUO, -ARE To equal, to correspond to, to be in con-
formi ty with. 
Used, less frequently than ADAEQUARE but in the same way, to 
express relation of mind and object -- 4a25; 
used of both human and divine intellect -- 13bl0; 13bl3 --
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"intellectui cuicumque aequetur." 
It is used in the passive voice throughout. 
AESTIMATIO, -IO!JIS Estimate, conception. 
Concept: 11 vera.m aestimationem (rei in intellectu humano]" 5b57; 
correct estimate, judgment: 7a31; 
evaluating action of the mind: "aestima tionem animae C de rebus 1" 
6a39. 
AFFECTIO, -IONIS Impression. 
Imposed state, impression, condition received: "sensus non 
possunt omnino enuntiare nisi affectionem suam" 25bl -- equivalent 
to 11dispositio 11 25a54 (q.v.). 
Note that the word does not mean a feeling state as in modern 
psychology. 
AFFIR!~IO, -IONIS Affirmation. 
Positive predication, affirmation: "definitio non potest esse 
falsa, nisi in quantum implicat affirmationem falsam" 26b33; 
3b33, 24a9; 
assertion: "affirmationem propositionis" 23b17. 
AGO, -ERE To act. 
1. To act, to operate: "potentiae naturales insensibiles ••• 
agere" 22al4; 
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opposed to being acted upon -- "anima non patitur ••• sed 
magis quodammodo agit" 23a54, 11agentis et patientis 11 18al9; 
to act (upon): "quamvis malum non agat in animam nisi per 
speciam boni" 2la42, 24a16. 
2. With "de", 
to treat, to discuss: "de qua agebat" l3a44. 
(INTELLECTUS) AGENS see INTELLECTUS AGENS. 
ALIQUID, -CUJUS 
1. a) 
neut. pron. Something. 
Technically defined as distinct being, 
some other: "ens accipiatur secundum divisionem 
unius ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen 'aliquid', 
dicitur enim aliquid quasi 1aliud quid'; unde sicut 
ens dicitur unum, in quantum est indivisum in se, ita 
dicitur aliquid in quantum est ab aliis divisum11 
3al3-22. This et~~ology is confirmed in classical 
Latin. 
b) Except in this explanatory text in the first article, 
untechnically, 
something, something or other: except, 
2. "something" in the logical order, some note: "verum et ens 
differunt ratione per hoc quod aliquid est in ratione veri 
quod non est in ratione antis'' 4a29; so in 2b27, 33, 4a31, 
52, 57, 14b22, 23b31. 
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ALTERATIO, -IONIS Alteration. 
Change of intrinsic, accidental form: 16b57. 
Soul. 
1. The subject in 'Which our operative powers reside: 11 in anima 
autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva 11 3a28; hence, 
the (ultimate) principle of our operations: 11actibus 
animae 11 5b9; especially 
the subject of intellectual operations: 11anina, quae quodam-
modo est omnia" 3a26. 
2. By synecdoche, the whole being taken for the part, i.e., the 
ultimate subject for the proximate principles of operation, 
the mind: 
a) the knower: as opposed to the thing known, whether 
i) extra-mental reality -- "res extra animam" 
5bl0, 6a26, 38, 40, 6b41, 45, 9a50, 13a53, 
20a35, 45, 50; or 
ii) privations and negations -- 11non anti, quod 
est extra animam11 2la29, 31, 32; 
b) mind, the (proximate) subject of knowledge: 
i) sometimes non-committal as to whether sense 
knowledge or intellectual knowledge is involved 
-- 5b3, 13b7, 8, 17, 20b57, the subject of the 
total act of knowing, used equivalently to 
.f'.uli[IM!L, -IS 
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"mens nostra" (10b3): "res ••• noti tiam sui in 
anima gignit" 24bl7, 23a31, "malum non agat in 
animam. nisi per speciem boni" 2la42, "falsitas in 
anima" 23a49, "veritas in anima" 9b34, l0b6, 
"anima decipi" 24a33, 37; 
ii) intellect: "anima deprehendit in se rationem 
defectus" 2la44; 
intellect as judging: 11anima de omnibus judicat" 
9b44, 23a52, 11anima ••• an:imae quae cointelligit 
tempus componendo et dividendo" l3al4, 16, "com-
positio quam facit anima" 20b52; 
intellect taken as a whole, acting and possible: 
"sed anima ipsa hoc facit conformans seipsam 
nonenti" 2la29. 
Animal • 
Used only in examples of false judgment or false definition made by 
combining predicates that are irreconcilable -- "animal insensibile 11 
7al5, 17, "animal rationale mortale" 26b24, 29, 30. 
Note. From these instances it is easily inferred that the essential 
characteristic of animality is sensory life, and that animal is a 
generic notion including both brute animal and rational animal or 
man. 
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APPAREO, -1RE To appear, to be externally observable. 
Used only of the sensible qualities of an object -- "res enim 
notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa exterius apparent, 
quia cognitio nostra initium a sensu summit" 23a32, 23bl. 
APPETITIVUS, -A, •UM Orectic, appetitive, affective. 
Adj. from APPETITUS, q.v. Very general, opposed to "cognitivatt 
-- "vis cognitiva et appetitiva" 3a29, "motus appetitivae virtu-
tis terminatur ad res" 5b6. 
APPETITUS, -us Appetite, affection. 
a) A generic word to express the activity or affection of a 
thing toward the good, or the power of being so affected or 
so acting: "convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit 
hoc nomen 'bonum', ut in principia ~~h. dicitur, 'bonum est 
quod omnia appetunt'" 3a30, "bonum ••• dioit ordinem ad 
appetitum" 5bl6; 
b) specifically, 
intellectual appetite, the will: "res intellecta movet 
appetitum, et appetitus tunc duoit ad hoc quod perveniat ad 
rem a qua motus incepit" 5bl2. 
Note. It seems that no one word is adequate to express the idea 
conveyed by this term as used by St. Thomas. This is no doubt 
because it is not univocal but analogous, and must be applicable 
to the various acts of a variety of things from the natural 
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inclination of an insensible body for acting in a certain way to 
the will of God which is identified with the Divine Essence 
Itself. The word is derived literally from "ad" and 11peto", and 
involves a strong connotation of striving or desiring or tending 
toward: but the motion and imperfection so implied are not only 
inapplicable to the Divine Will but also to those acts of the 
human will which regard a good toward which there is no longer 
tendency or motion but which is actually possessed and enjoyed, 
including certain acts of love, "delectatio", "fruitio", "con-
sensus", "usus", etc. (Cf. Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, 12, arts. 
1-16). 
Spearman suggests Aristotle's word "orexis" (C. Spearman, 
Psychology~ the Ages, Macmillan Company, London, 1937, I, 
303), and this is Brennan's choice also (Robert Brennan, O.P., 
Thomistic Psychology, Macmillan Company, New York, 1941, 148, 
210). But this word in Greek, although it has a very broad 
meaning, conveys the same notion of tending (hence motion, imper-
fection) as the Latin "appetitus", so the solution thus offered 
is unsatisfactory. St. Thomas in Contra Gentiles IV, 19, uses 
the verb 11affici 11 in this connection, and the root meaning of the 
English word "affection", "to be affected toward", implied in 
such a usage indicates that some such word as affection or even 
attitude might be the most nearly approximate equivalent for the 
full breadth of "appetitus". 
r 
APPETO, -ERE 
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To desire, to tend toward, to be affected 
toward. 
The root verb from which APPETITUS (q.v.) is derived. It does 
not seem to have lost so much of its original root meaning as 
the noun, but retains a meaning closer to that indicated by the 
literal derivation -- "bonum est quod omnia appetun"t;" 3a33. 
APPREffi."'NDO, •ERE To apprehend. 
Literally, to take hold of, to grasp, to seize, but used in this 
work exclusively in a metaphorical sense to express the act of 
the knower in somehow possessing or uniting itself to the thing 
known. 
a) of intellectual kJaowledge, 
to conceive, to understand: 11apprehensum ab intellectu11 
4a38; 
to have within the scope of: "apprehensum sub intel-
leotu" 4a46; 
to know (in terms of simple essence): "dioimur propria 
intelligere cum apprehendimus quidditatem rerum" 26b7, 
"negationes et pri vationes ••• intelleotus ••• earum rationes 
apprehendit 11 20a51, 11 intelleotus ••• inoipit judicare de re 
apprehensa" 6b48, 54; 
b) of sense knmvledge, 
to sense, to know: 
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i) in contrast to "sense judgment" -- "in sensu ••• 
secundum hoc quod sensibile apprehendit, non est 
veritas et falsitas propria, sed solum secundum 
ordinem ad judicium quod ex formatione praedicta 
consequitur" 25b28; 
ii) not opposed to, but rather including in a very 
general way the notion of sense-judgment 
a') of proper (external) sense power 
"quaedam vis apprehensiva, quae appre-
hendit speciem sensibilam sensibili re 
praesente, sicut sensus proprius" 25b56, 
"et ideo sensus apprehendit rem ut est" 
26a3; 
b') of imagination-- "quaedam vis apprehendit 
eam re absente, sicut imaginatio" 26al, 
"sed ima.ginatio apprehandit ut plurinrum 
rem ut non est, quia apprehendit eam ut 
praesentem, cum sit absens 11 26a6, 7. 
APPREHENSIO, -IONIS Apprehension. 
Literally, a grasping, a taking hold of, but used always here 
of the knowing process metaphorically, in a sense like that of 
APPREHENDO ( q. v. ) 
a) of the intellect, 
r 
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i) of simple apprehension of an object, in contrast 
to judgment, 
apprehension, conception, understanding: "anima 
vero in quantum de rebus judicat, quodammodo agit. 
Unde res non dicitur falsa quia semper de se 
falsam facit apprehensionem" 23a56, "actus (.rorni-
cationis] apprehensioni animae adaequatur" 20b57; 
ii) in a broader sense, implying judgment also, 
estimate: "[res] natae sunt facere de se veram 
apprehensionem in intellectu humane" 20a32, 38; 
b) of sense, 
i) in contrast to sense-judgment (cf. APPREHENDO, 
b, i), sensation: 11 ex apprehensione tali natum 
est sequi tale judicium" 25b33; 
ii) more generally, to include the total act of sense-
knowledge (cf. APPREHENDO, b-, ii), perception: 
"apprehensionem sensus" 25b54. 
APPREHENSIVUS, -A, -UM Cognitive, knowing. 
Adj. from APPREHE~~O, q.v. Used of sense-power -- "vis 
apprehensiva 11 25b56. See also ELECTIVUS, Note. 
APPROPRIO, -ARE To appropriate, to assign or ascribe to. 
A theological rather than philosophical term, meaning to 
predicate an (essential, not personal) attribute of, or ascribe 
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a work to, a certain Person of the Blessed Trinity -- "si veritas 
propria accipiatur, essentialiter dicitur, taman appropriatur 
Personae I<'ilii 11 18b40, "quamvis tres illae personae di vinae re 
distinguuntur, taman personae (The Vives edition notes that one 
of the Paris codices (B) reads 11personis 11 here, a better read-
ing.] appropriata non differunt re, sed rati,one" 4bl9, 24. 
ARS, -TIS Art, exemplar, design. 
Knowledge of a thing to be produced: 
exemplar, exemplary idea, model, idea: "omnia (positiva] ab 
~ divini intellectus proveniunt" 23al0, "(res] imitantur in-
tellectum divinum, qui est earum mansura, sicut ~ est mansura 
omnium artificiatorum11 20a29, 11res ••• divino intellectui adaequa-
tur, sicut artificialis arti" 13b4; design, plan: "ordinationem 
rerum in intellectu divino existentam, sicut ••• secundum ordina-
tionam artis in artifice" 15b6. 
Note. The meaning of this word always includes what in modern 
times is called "practical" as well as "fine" art; in fact, the 
fgrmer notion is more predominant in St. Thomas's usage, con-
trary to the modern notion of art. Moreover, the word always 
refers in this work to something in the intellect -- "ars et 
cetera quae ad intellectum pertinent" 18b41 -- not mere skill in 
external execution. This is brought out clearly by a comparison 
of the two passages in which. St. Thomas curiously interchanges 
r.------------------------------~ 
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11ars" with "exemplar" and 11 intellectusn -- "res ••• per formam 
suam imitantur artem divini intellectus" 20a36, 24bl5, and 
"formam, per quam vel imitentur exemplar divinae artis" 20a47. 
ARTIFEX, -ICIS Artisan. 
Following the notion of ARS (of. Note, s.v.), the word refers 
not to an artist in the modern sense but rather means artisan, 
worker, craftsman, designer: "artificiata in intellectu 
artificis" 5b38, "ordinatio artis in artifice" 15b7. 
ARTIFICIALIS, -E adj. and subst. Artificial, manufactured, 
produced by man. 
Refers to anything produced by the skill of man, as opposed to 
natural generation or formation -- "res artificiales" 5b43, 
"res ••• divino intellectui adaequatur, sicut artificialis arti" 
13b3. 
ARTIFICIATUM, -I neut. subst. (not classical) Artefact. 
Manufactured article, human product: "artificiata" 5b37, 
"artificiatorum" 20a30. 
ASSIMILATIO, -IONIS Assimilation. 
The reception of an impression by which the knower becomes like 
or acquires a certain similarity to the thing known, hence, a 
"becoming liken: "omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimila-
tionem cognoscentis ad rem cognftam, ita quod assimilatio dicta 
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est causa cognitionis" 3a36, 37. 
Note. That this assimilation (which may be interpreted as the 
reception of the impressed species) does not formally constitute 
cognition is clear from the fact that St. Thomas here makes them 
cause and effect, which are always really distinct. Compare E! 
Veritate ~' 6, ~Potentia 1!, 5. And see Joseph de Tonquedec 
Critique~~ Connaissance (Beauchesne, Paris, 1929), Appendice 
II, "Connaissance et Assimilation", 461-467. 
ATTENDO I -ERE To notice, to recognize. 
Used only in a non-committal way almost synonymous with "cog-
nos co'' "adaequatio inter intellectum et rem attendi potest" 
6b42. 
AUCTORITAS, -ATIS Authoritative quotatiop, argument from 
authority. 
Used only once in this work, to refer to words of St. Augustine 
quoted in the dialectical arguments preceding the body of the 
article -- "in auctoritate inducta" 25a56. 
AURlJM FALSUM Fool's gold. 
That which can be mistaken for gold because of external appear-
ances, probably iron or copper pyrites: "aurum falsum, in quo 
exterius apparet color auri, et alia hujusmodi acoidentia, cum 
tamen interius natura auri non subsit" 23a45. 
r~--------------~ 
56 
B 
BONITAS, -ATIS Goodness. 
The abstract of 11 bonum", the attribute of being good: 11 in rebus 
••• ipsa ratio bonitatis 11 24bl8; 11dicimus sapientiam et bonitatem 
divinam esse aequales" l9all. 
BONUS, -A, -UM Good. 
a) As an adjective, 
The attribute of a thing by which it is appetible, or which 
establishes a relation of suitability of that thing with 
appetite: 11convenientiam ergo entia ad appetitum exprimit 
hoc nomen 'bonum', ut in principia Ethic. dicitur: 'bonum 
est quod omnia appetunt'" 3a3l, 32, "bonum dicit ordinem ad 
appetitum11 5bl4; 
an attribute or property not really distinct from the one, 
the true, and being, even in creatures -- "ens, verum, unum, 
et bonum ••• non oportet quod in rebus creatis distinguantur 
etiam realiter" 4b26, "sed ens, verum, unum et bonum secundum 
suam rationem habent quod sit unum" 4b36; 
but which does express a character not formally expressed by 
the term being, hence a "quasi-differentia" of "ens" --
"verum propria loquendo non potest esse differentia entia ••• 
sed aliquod verum se habet ad ens per modum differentiae, 
sicut et bonum; in quantum, videlicet, exprimit aliquid 
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circa ens quod nomine antis non exprimitur" 23b30; "bonum 
est quod Deus permittat deformitatem incidere" 2lal4; 
b) used in a more substantive way, 
i) in a quasi-abstract sense, 
good, the good, goodness: "bonum et malum sunt in 
rebus" 5bl8, "bonum, debitum, rectum, et hujusmodi 
omnia alio modo se habent ad permissionem divinam, et 
alio modo ad alia signa divinae voluntatis" 2lal, 
"hoc pertinet ad rationem boni" 20b55, "unde in hoc 
consistit ejus bonum" 20b24, "bonum uniuscujusque rei 
consistit in perfecta operatione ejus" 20bl9; 
ii) more concretely, 
a good, some good, good thing: "malum non agat in 
animam nisi per speciem~; quia taman est bonum 
deficiens, anima deprehendit in se rationem defectus" 
2la43, "omne bonum sit a Deo" 20b25, "ipse honor 
parentum bonum quoddam est" 2lal0, "ipsum verum sicut 
bonum intellectus" 20bl7, 24b24. 
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CADO, -ERE To fall. 
Used figuratively, 
To fall under the scope of, to be the object of: "id quod cadit 
sub actu voluntatis" 2la6, "id quod sub permissions cadit" 2lal4. 
CAUSA, -AE Cause. 
a) Non-committal -- "ut causa aliorum" 5a48, 11ad creaturas ••• in-
tellectus divinus comparatur ut mansura et causa" 18b34, 
9a34 (the question of how God's intellect is the cause of 
creatures is not discussed); 
b) efficient cause: "unde non esse extra animam existens non 
est causa efficiens veritatis, sed quasi exemplaris 11 2la32, 
in reference to which passage is to be read -- "non esse non 
est causa veritatis negativarum propositionum quasi faciens 
eas in intellectu" 2la27, so also 23a49; 11illa quae sunt 
causa aliorum essendi 11 4al4, "causa veritatis aliorum" 4al6; 
and by inference, "assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis" 
3a38 (cf. ASSIMILATIO, ~ s.v.) 
Note. In "causa exemplari efficiente" 2la34, the Viv~s edition 
omits the 11 exemplari 11 on the authority of three of the four 
Paris codices used (cf. EFFICIENS, Note). 
The word is used in this work without any attempt to define it 
or take care as to its technical meaning. 
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CAUSO, -ARE To cause. 
Like "CAUSA", the word is used here in a general and usually 
unspecified sense -- "inaequalitas ex ipsa re causatur" 23a30, 
"intellectus practicus causat res" 5b27; but with a slight im-
plication of efficient causality-- "nee taman res (falsa} ••• 
necessaria falsitatam causet" 23a50, "negationes at dafectus ••• 
Deus-non oauset 11 23al5. 
CLAUDO, -ERE To enclose, to bound. 
Note. The word is quoted from St. Anselm in the first dialeoti 
argument of the article (5), and is thus distinguished in the 
reply by St. Thomas -- 11veritas enuntiationis non clauditur 
principia et fine, non quod absque principia ratio fuerit, sed 
quia non potest intelligi quando illa oratio esset et veritas 
illi deesset" 13a41. 
COGIT.ATIVA (VIS) see VIS COGITATIVA. 
COGNITIO, -IONIS Knowledge. 
The result of assimilation -- "cognitio perficitur per assimila-
tionem oognoscentis ad cognitum, ita quod assimilatio dicta est 
causa oognitionis" 3a35, 38, or of conformity -- "ad quam oon-
formitatem sequitur oognitio rei" 3a49, or of truth-- "cognitio 
est quidam veritatis effectus" 3a51 (hence knowledge is not 
truth, but there can be no knowledge, even false, without some 
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truth. See Note under COGNOSCO.) It serves as a medium to unite 
the knower and the known object "actus cognitionis est medius 
inter cognoscentem et cognitum" 2lb50; 
a) in general, 
created knowledge: "omnis autem cognitio perficitur per 
assimilationem ••• a.ssimilatio dicta. est causa. cognitionis" 
3a.35, 38, where the 11 omnis 11 must be taken as exclusive of 
God, because of the "perficitur" and "causa"; 
human knowledge: 11scientia at cognitio rerum" 2bl9, 
which is seen in its fullness to be a. composite act in-
volving both sense and intellect "cognitio nostra. quae 
a. rebus initium sumit ••• primo·incipiat in sensu, secundo 
perficitur in intellectu" 25a26, 11 cognitio nostra initium 
a. sansu sumit" 13b7; 
Note. An indication of how closely St. Thomas united the 
notions of sense-knowle.dge and intellectual knowledge is 
had in 3a.35-49, where he speaks of "cognitio rei" 3a49 
which is the effect of "a.da.equa.tio rei et intellectus" 
(3a.47), and yet the example to which he refers ("ut dictum 
est" 3a48) is of sense-knowledge -- "visus ••• cognoscit 
colorem (3a.38-40). Cf. COGNOSCO, b. 
b) sometimes,specifically, 
i) human intellectual knowledge: "invenitur veritas 
in intellectu quidem secundum quod adaequatur 
r----------------------------------. 
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rebus quorum cognitionem habet" 20a26, "adaequa.-
tionem rei at intellectus ••• sequitur cognitio rei" 
3a.49, even of non-being 13bll; 
ii) God's knowledge: in this work, always of His 
knowledge of created things -- it is independent 
of time ... - "e.ius cognitio non concernit aliquod 
tempus" l3a32; 
and by it He knows truly what is in the future, 
and that in its own proper nature and not merely 
in its causes -- "divina. cognitio vera fuit de 
rebus pluribus futuris in tempore" leal7, 11et ideo 
veram cognitionem habuit ab aeterno de rebus etia.m 
in propria natura qua.mvis rerum veritates ab 
aeterno non fuerint" 14a30; 
and it is absolutely one -- "Deus ••• illa plura 
scivit una cognitions" 14al6, 15b44, 13a27, 
"quantumcumque diversa non cognoscit nisi unica. 
cognitione 11 15b42, without any diversity -- "non 
enim de diversis rebus diversas cognitiones habet" 
13a26, 25, "non singulis suam cognitionem imnit-
tens" 13a30. 
COGNITIVUS, -A, -u~ Cognitive, knowing. 
Knowing, having the power of knowing: 5b2, 23b54, opposed to 
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"appetitive." 3a29, in which instance intellectual lmowledge is 
implied by "ad intellectum" below (3a34). 
COGNOSCO, -ERE To know. 
a) said of intellect, 
i) of God's intellect -- 6a49, 13a28, 29, 15b44, 17a46, 
23all, 23al4; 
ii) of angelic intellect -- 9b49; 
iii) of human intellect, knowing things 3a6, 37, 5b4, 5, 
6a47, 13al2, 20b23, 2lb21, 24 (second occurrence), 25, •. 
26, 29, 35, 36, 39, 46, 49, 51, 53, 22a6, 14, 15, 
26a52, 26bll, 12, 17; 
with truth rather than things as object -- "veritas 
••• cognoscitur autem·ab intellectu secundum quod in-
tellectus reflectitur supra actum suum" 2lbl8, 15, 
23, 24 (first occurrence), 48; 
b) said of sense, 
i) of sense knowing its object -- "sensus cognoscit 
sensibile" 22a3, 8, 26a54, 11visus cognoscit colorem" 
3a40; 
ii) of sense knowing its own act, imperfectly -- "sensus 
cognoscit se sentire" 2lb38, 22a4. 
Note. The body of article IX contains an important series of 
occurrences of various forms of the word COGNOSCO. Modern 
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writers find in this passage some of the texts to which they most 
frequently appeal in discussing St. Thomas's position on the 
critical problem, as for instance the following: 
Respondeo dicendum, quod veritas est in intellectu 
et in sensu, licet non eodem modo. In intellectu 
enim est sicut consequens actum intellectus, at 
sicut cognita per intellectum; consequitur namque 
intellectus operationem, secundum quod intellectus 
reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum secundum 
quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cog-
noscit proportionem ejus ad rem: quod quidem 
cognosci non potest nisi cognita natura ipsius 
actus; quae oognosci non potest, nisi cognoscatur 
natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus, 
in cujus natura est ut rebus conformatur ••• (2lbll-28) 
I answer: it must be maintained that truth is in 
the intellect and in the sense, though not in the 
same way. For it is in the intellect both as 
naturally following upon the act of the intellect, 
and as knmm by the intellect: following upon the 
operation of the intellect insofar as the judgment 
of the intellect is of a thing according as it is, 
but known by the intellect insofar as the intellect 
reflects upon its own act in not only knowing its 
own act but in knowing its correspondence to the 
thing. Now this cannot be known unless the nature 
of the act is known, and this cannot be known unless 
is known the nature of the active principle, namely 
the intellect itself, whose nature it is to be 
conformed to things ••• (trans. mine) 
The expressions "cognita natura ipsius actus" and "nisi cognosca-
tur natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus" seem 
particularly strong, and might seem to favor what might be 
called in general a "critical" stand rather than a natural realis 
viewpoint on the critical problem. 
But to maintain that St. Thomas is here talking of some ex-
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plicit recognition of the formal nature of our knowing power and 
its act is highly questionable. Later works like the Summa 
Theologica (Ia, 16, 2) and the Contra Gentiles (I, 59), as well 
as an analysis of our own experience, favor the view that he 
refers simply to the concrete recognition of our mind's con-
formity to reality, the kind of recognition which is natural to 
intellectual knowledge as such, not due to any critical self-
analysis. (See Chapter V of the Introduction, supra, and the 
references therein.) 
CO-INTELLIGO, -ERE To understand simultaneously, to unite 
mentally. 
"Cursus enin1 Socratis est una, sed anima quae eomponendo et 
dividendo cointelligit tempus ••• diversimode intellegit cursum 
Soeratis ut praesentem, praeteritum, et futurum" l3al7. 
COI..LA'fiO, -IONIS Comparison. 
Literally, a conferring or comparison. Here, a comparison or 
mental juxtaposition, not intellectual -- "collatio quaedam" 
25b37, but under the influence of intellect, a sensory awareness 
of concrete relation: 11 quam facit in homine vis eogitativa" 
(25b37-38) in man, contrasted to the instinctive estinlate of 
animals "loco cujus in aliis animalibus est existimatio naturalis' 
(25b39-40), and to 11 judioium naturale" about the proper sensibles 
(25b34). 
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COM1ffiNSURATIO, -IONIS Commensuration. 
Proportion, correspondence, equation: used equivalently with 
"adaequatio" in notion of truth -- 11 commensuratio vel adaequa-
tio intellectus ac rei" 12b30, 12bll. 
COMMENSURATUM, -I P• participle of commensuro, ~· Commensurate. 
Known as equal, commensurate, measured, equated: ''unde secundum 
hoc denominatur aliquid verum, sicut et denominatur aliquid 
cormnensuratum" 12bl4. 
COMMUNIS., -E Common. 
a) As an adjective, 
common:· common to several senses -- "de sensibilibus com-
munibus" 25b42, 50, as opposed to "sensibile proprium"; 
b) substantively, 
a common note or attribute: 11praedicationem communis« 
5a48, 49. 
CO~~ARATIO, -IONIS Relation. 
Commonly in this work, 
relation: "de rebus in comparatione ad intellectum" 9a20., 26., 
31, 15a23, 42, 23a25, 27, 23b2, 5, used in the same sense as 
"convenientia" 3a40, and "ordo" 6a6 (Cicero uses it to translate 
t- '- I cl"~~O\l.cL-- compare "comparatur" 23b25). 
Note. Only once is it used in a sense even approaching that of 
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the English 11 comparison11 , i.e., a putting things in relation 
mentally -- "res autem dicitur vera per comparationem ad intel-
lectum divinum et humanum11 17a31, and here also the notion of 
ontological relationship predominates. 
COMP.ARO, -ARE To relate, to connect, to compare. 
As with COMPARATIO, the notion is usually that of ontological 
relation, not mental comparison. 
passive. is related to: 11res aliter comparatur ad intellectum 
practicum, aliter ad intellectum speculativum11 5b24, so also 6b9, 
9a33, 9bl0, 18, 23a3, 6, 23b35, 25bl7, l8b33; although it some-
times approaches the English meaning-- 15a32, 17b46, studied or 
considered in relation to: 11 comparatus" 25a32, 33, 50, 53, 
25b2, 13. 
C01PETO, -ERE To be attributable to, to belong to. 
"Veritas secundum quod competit negationibus et defectibus" 
2la20. 
COMPLEMENTIDII, -I Completion, fulfillment, perfection. 
11 Complementum cujuslibet motus est in suo termino" 5bl. 
CO:MPONO, -ERE To combine, to join, to judge, to compare. 
Never used in this work in a physical sense, but always of a 
mental operation, of the joining of objective concepts -- "partes 
definitionis ••• componi ad invicem" 7al4, 
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usually in combination with a parallel form of 11divido11 , to 
judge (affirmatively): 11intelleotus componens et dividens" 6b2, 
33, 56, 25b22, 26b21, "anima componendo at dividendo" 13al7. 
COMPOSITIO, -IONIS Composition, judgment. 
1. In the ontological order, to denote actual co-existence of 
the realities signified by the subject and predicate, com-
position: 11 compositio quae implicatur definitione " 7al6, 
25, "veritas non consistit in compositione quae est in 
rebus 11 20b50. 
2. In the intellect, the combining of two objective concepts, 
judgment: "in compositione quam facit anima" 20b51, 7a9, 
19, l8a23, usually in combination with "divisio", (affirma-
tive) judgment: 11 compositio et divisio" 7a2, 4, 23. 
COW?REHENDO, -ERE To comprehend, to include. 
1. Of a concept, 
to include in its comprehension: 20bll, 
to include in its application or consideration: 26b43. 
2. Of the mind, metaphorically (like APPREHENDO, q.b.), 
to comprehend, to grasp, to understand: "intellectus ex 
essentiis rerum comprehensis 11 26bl~ 
CO.MPRDLO, -ERE To press. 
To exert physical pressure on, to press on: "ut cum oculus 
comprimitur" 25al2 (in such a way as to distort the eyeball). 
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CONCEPTIO, -IONIS Conception, notion. 
The act of knowing, possessing truth: 19al9; 
notion, idea, conception: "conceptiones diversas ••• in quibus 
diversae veritates inveniuntur" 13a22, 13, 2b21, 25, 24b27. 
CONCIPIO, -ERE To conceive. 
To think of, to consider, to conceive: "ut si animal rationale 
mortale conciperet quasi definitionem asini 11 26b25, 28, 2b20, 
l9al7, 2la45. 
CONFOrunTAS, -ATIS Confornri.ty. 
Literally, having the same form as. Used equivalently with 
11adaequatio" (3a47) in the definition of truth, but less 
frequently "addit verum supra ens conformitatem sive adaequa-
tionem rei et intellectus" 3a46, 48. That it is not to be taken 
literally but rather as indicating a representative correspondeno 
or proportion is clear from its use for the relation between 
things and the Divine Intellect l0a22. 
CONFORMO, -ARE To conform. 
Literally, to have the same form as. Said of the relation of 
knower and object of knowledge, whether or object to intellect 
4bl, 10al3, 17a46 or of intellect to object 2lb28, even non-
being -- "anima ••• conformans seipsam non enti quod est extra 
animam" 2la30. 
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CONJUNGO, -ERE To join. 
Used of mental composition of objective concepts, like COMPONERE. 
To join mentally, to associate in a judgment: 11 conjungat partes 
. 
definitionis ad invicem quae conjungi non possunt" 26b26, 27 
--equivalent to 11 implicat affirmationem" (26b33). 
CONNOTATIO, -IONIS Connotation, implication. 
Used in the same sense as 11 importat 11 (18b21) -- "sine aliqua 
connotatione principii" 18b26. 
CONSENTA~~US, -A, -UM Befitting, in accord with. 
11Virtus ••• est habitus in modum naturae rationis consentaneusn 
14a52. 
CONSEQUENTER adv. Secondarily. 
Opposed to "principaliter" (18bll) -- "veritas in Deo princi-
paliter importat aequalitatem intellectus divini et rei quae 
I 
est essentia ejus, at consequenter intelleetus divini ad res 
crreatas" l8bl3, without the notion of consequence implied in 
the root. 
CONSEQUOR, -I To follow, to flow from, to belong to. 
a) To follow upon: 11 cognitorum ••• diversas conceptiones, quas 
diversae veritates in anima consequuntur" 13al4 {where it 
has a slight implication of its classical meaning "to 
achieve, 1111to obtain"), "sicut affectum consequentem" 3bl6, 
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opposed to "cognita11 -- "veritas ••• est in intellectu sicut 
consequens actum intellectus" 2lbl4, 15, 32; 
to flow from the nature of, to belong to: "veritas non ex 
ea parte consequitur creaturam qua deficiens est" lOalO, 
2b50, 52, 53, 3a9, 24bl8; 
b) to follow: used equivalently with 11 sequi 11 (25b33) -- 25b25, 
32. 
CONTRADICTORIUM, -I neut. subst. A contradictory (proposition). 
Used equivalently with 11affirmatio et negatio 11 -- "non sequitur 
contradictoria esse vera" 24a9. 
CONVENIO, -mE To accord, to fall together, to suit or befi 
Literally, to come together. 
a) to agree, to accord: 11in aliquo genera convenirent" 
2al7; 
b) to be the same thing: "ergo secundum quod id est, 
conveniant verum et ens" lb7; 
c) to belong to, to suit, to befit: "distinguitur actus 
essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit" 4b8, 10, 3a25. 
CONVENIENTIA, -AE Fitness, accordance. 
Literally, a coming together. 
a) The word expresses more than a mere relation -- 11 con-
venientiam. unius antis ad aliud" 3a24 -- a certain fit-
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ness. or aptitude~ something in a nature which appeals 
to or squares with something in another nature "con-
venientiam ergo antis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen 
1verum 111 3a33, 11 convenientiam ergo antis ad appetitum 
exprimit hoc nomen 'bonum'" 3a30, 6a27; 
b) a sort of ("quaedam") agreement, accordance: 11varitas, 
cum sit quaedam convenientia intellectus et rei, non 
propria invenitur in utroque" l0al8 (the cum-clause is 
·adversative, not illative). 
CONVERTO, -ERE To convert, to interchange. 
Used always in this work in the sense of logical conversion, t~e 
interchanging of subject and predicate in a proposition -- "verum 
••• convertitur cum ante" 6al7, 19, 25, 2al, 35, 39, 4b47, "cum 
verum et ens convertantur" l7a38. 
CORPORALIS, -E Bodily, corporeal. 
"Sensus nihil cognoscit nisi per organum corporale" 22a9. 
CORPUS, -ORIS Body. 
Not defined or analysed in this work. It has reference to a body 
which has dimensions -- 11diversorum corporum sunt dimensiones 
diversae" 9b28, the internal dimensions being three in number 
--
11mensuratur corpus mansura intrinseoa, sicut linea, vel 
superf~cie, vel profunditate 11 l2bl5; it is changeable -- "corpus 
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esse mutabile" 16bl7; and cannot be God -- 24a53, 56, 24bl. 
CORRESPONDENTIA, -AE Correspondence. 
Used like "adaequatio" in the formal definition of truth -- "quae 
quidam correspondentia adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur, et 
in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur" 3a43. 
CORRESPONDO, -ERE To correspond. 
Equivalent to 11adaequetur" -- 3b50, 6b42, implying at least the 
suitability for assimilation -- "ut ens intellectui correspondea~ 
3a42. 
CORR~TO, -ERE To corrupt. 
a) active. To corrupt, to destroy: "dispositio corrumpens" 
4a8; 
b) passive. opposed to "perpetuum esse" (l4b8), to cease to 
be: 14bl9, 51. 
CORRli'PTIO, -IONIS Corruption, change. 
a) Substantial change, ceasing to be, corruption: "corruptionem 
individui" 14b20, 49; 
b) accidental change: "corruptionem quantum ad accidentia ••• 
manente re" 18a6. 
CREDO, -ERE To believe, to opine. 
Not said of faith, whether human or supernatural, but of opinion, 
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to opine, to judge: "corpus ••• aliquos in errorem ind~, ••• ut 
crederetur unitas" 24b3. 
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DEFECTUS, -US Dei'ect, lack. 
Lack, imperi'ection, absence of something which ought to be: 
used equivalently with "negatio" 2la21, 23, 24, 23al3, with 
"privatio" 23al8, with ttdei'ormitas" 20b43, 46,47; 
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(moral) defect: "rationem dei'ectus, et in hoc concipit rationem 
mali "2la45, "defectus in actu fornicationis 11 20b35; 
(physical) dei'ect: "defectum intrinsecus vel extrinsecus im-
pedimentum; unde sensus ••• nisi sit impedimentum in organo, vel 
in madio" 25b45; 
lack of similarity: ndefectum, in quo i'ormaliter ratio i'alsitati 
consistit, ex dissimilitudine surgit 11 24a25, 1012. 
DEFICIO, -ERE To cease, to be defective. 
1. To cease to exist: "perpetuum et incorruptibile ••• quae 
nunquam inceperunt nee deficient" 14bl3; 
2. pres. part. defective, imperfect, falling short of', incom-
plete: 11 creatura in quantum deficiens est" 10a9, 11, 2la44. 
DEI<'Il\TITIO, -IONIS Definition. 
a) In logical sense, 
definition: 11dei'initio veri" 3b24, 36, 37; 
b) mental, rather than verbal, dei'inition, our conception or 
mental expression of ''quod quid est", 
r.~--------------------, 
concept, notion: 11 intellectus ••• conciperet quasi 
definitionem asini 11 26b23, 25, 26, 28, 32; 
opposed to judgment, 
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simple apprehension: "in intellectu formante definitiones 11 
7a7, 8, 10, 11, 13; 
c) ambiguously, either (a) or (b) -- 7al4, 18, 24. 
DEMONSTRABILIS, -E Demonstrable. 
Being susceptible of strict proof, as opposed to 11 investigando 11 
(2bl6) -- nin demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in 
aliqua principia per se nota" 2bl4. 
DEMONSTRO, -ARE To show forth. 
To manifest, to show forth: 11 sensibiles qualitates demonstrantes 
rumram quae eis non subest 11 23a39, 25a55. 
Note. 1'he word is used only twice in this work, and then not 
in its usual significance of logical demonstration but in its 
root meaning. 
DEPREHENDO, -ERE To be aware of, to note. 
"per speciem boni ••• anima deprehendit in se rationem defectus, 
et in hoc concipit rationem mali" 2la44. 
DESIGNO, -.ARE To designate, to mean. 
11aequalitas in divinis quandoque rationem quae designat 
distinctionem personalem" 19a3. 
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Note. The word differs from SIGNIFICO by having a greater im-
plication of intrinsic meaning, whereas the latter connotes more 
an arbitrary or external sign. 
DICENDu'M QUOD It must be maintained that. 
Introduces St. Thomas's own position (see OBJICIO, Note). 
DH':B'ERENTIA, -AE Difference. 
a) Strictly, as one of the five predicables of logic, 
(logical) difference: "verum, propria loquendo, non potest 
esse differentia entis 11 23b26, "ens enim non habet aliquam 
differentiam" 23b27, 2b28, 43, 11ut differentia ad genus" 
23b36; 
b) in a loose sense of (a) -- "quodammodo" (23b36) 23b30. 
DIGESTA, -ORUM Digests, Pandects. 
"in principio Digestorum" 14a56. 
Note. The reference is to the code of Justinian, as is clear 
from the identity of the definition of justice given there. 
Cf. Corpus Juris Civilis, Justiniani Digesta (ed. P. Krueger), 
apud Weidmannos, Berolini, 1928, I, 29b. 
DISPONO, -ERE To modify. 
passive. To be modified, to receive an impression, to become 
such: "visus per hoc quod disponitur per speciem coloris, 
cognoscit colorem11 3a39, "sensus disponitur" 25a54. 
r--------------------------------------~ 
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DISPOSITIO, -IONIS Disposition, condition. 
a) In general, 
any condition, state, quality or attribute: 11 dispositionem 
inducere" 14b34, 11dispositio enunciabitur" l4b34, "res ••• 
divino intellectui conformatur, qui eam cognoscit ut est 
secundum quamcumque dispositionem" l7a47, 11dispositio vel 
corrumpens vel minuens" 4a8; 
order, arrangement: 11dispositio ibi non accipitur secundum 
quod est in genere qualitatis, sed secundum quod importat 
quemdam ordinem" 4all; 
b) more specifically, 
i) an attribute not really distinct: "verum est dis-
positio entis non quasi addens aliquam naturam" 4a2; 
ii) real quality or condition: 11 dispositiones :materiales 
quae sunt causae corruptionis" 14b48, "dispositio 
rerumn 25bl5; 
determination of a sense power, impression: "sensus 
••• dispositionem suam intellectui demonstrat11 25a54, 
25bl4. 
DISSIM.ILITUDO, •ItHS Dissimilarity. 
Contrasted with SIMILITUDO (q.v.) -- 24a27, 35, 46, 49. 
DISTINCTIO, -IONIS Distinction. 
a) real distinction or difference: 11realis distinctio 11 19a 7, 
r----------------------------------------------------~ 
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under which is included the distinction between Persons of 
the Blessed Trinity -- 11distinotionem personalem, sicut cum 
dicimus quod Pater et Filius sunt aequales" 19a3, 12; 
b) mental distinction, difference of concept: "non realis ••• 
distinctio, sed rationis tantum, sicut cum dicimus sapientiam 
et bonitatem divinam esse aequales" 19a9. 
DISTINGUO, -ERE To distinguish, to conceive as different. 
passive. 
a) to be conceived as differing in reality: 11 etsi personae 
realiter ab invicem distinguantur, non tamen ab esse 
distinguuntur" 4b21, 23, "tres illae personae divinae re 
distinguantur" 4bl8, "ens, verum, unum et bonum ••• non ••• 
in rebus creatis distinguantur etiam realiter" 4b30, 35; 
b) to be conceived as only differing mentally, in concep-
tion: "ens, verum, unum et bonum ••• in Deo ratione 
distinguuntur" 4b29. 
DIVERSIFICO, -ARE To diversify, to make multiple. 
Contrasted with "una" (13a9) -- 11diversificatur veritas" l3al0. 
DIVISIO, -IONIS Division. 
a) Literally, in the ontological order, 
state of physical division or distinction: "ens ••• secundum 
divisionem unius ab altero, et hoc exprimit hoc nomen 
'aliquid'" 3al6; 
r~~------------------------------~ 
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b) metaphorically, applied to the recognition of discrepancy of 
objective concepts, 
(negative) judgment: see COMPOSITIO, 2, with which it is 
always paired. 
DIVIDO, -ERE To divide. 
Always metaphorically, to denote the separation of objective 
concepts in the mind, 
to judge (negatively): see COMPONO, with which it is always 
paired in contrast. 
, 
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EFFECTUS, US Effect. 
Of truth, as the result of the action of the object upon the 
intellect "veritas ••• ad intellectum divinum comparatur quasi 
ad causam, ad humanum autem ad affectum" 9a35; 18al8. 
EFFICIENS, -EliTIS Efficient. 
In contrast to "exemplaris 11 -- "non esse extra animam existens 
non est causa efficiens veritatis, sed quasi exemplaris" 2la32. 
Note. In 2la35 it is preferable to omit "exemplari" as do the 
Vives edition and three of the four Paris codices used for it 
(B, C, D), or else amend the text to read "(non)de causa 
exemplari [sed) efficiente". 
ELECTIVUS, -A, -UM Able to choose. 
"veritas dicitur ••• de homine, qui est eleotivus orationem 
suarum11 7a30. 
Note. The suffix 11 -ivusn usually denotes ability to do the 
action, with a connotation of actual performance which may vary 
for different words. 
ENS, ~NTIS (neuter adjectival substantive from~,~, not 
classical) Being. 
a) Note. The term is never formally defined or analyzed in 
this work. The derivation of the term is noted as indicating 
r------------------------------------------~ 
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that the notion of existence is prominent -- "'~' sumitur 
ab actu essendi" 3a6, "ratio autem antis ab actu essendi 
sumitur" 4b8; yet except for a few oases in which an actually 
existing thing is meant (cf. b, infra), the term as used 
throughout the work implies simply that to which existence is 
proper -- "quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens" 2b30 (cf. 
A. :Marc, pp. 87-90 of "L'Idee de l'Atren, Archives de 
Philosophie, 1933, X, 1-144). 
(In creatures) composition of essence and existence: "in 
omni ente ••• essentia ejus secundum quam esse dioi turn 3a2, 
"cum dicitur, 'Diversum est esse et quod est', distinguitur 
actus essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit" (4b6); 
b) by emphasis, 
actually existing being: 6a25, 15a32 (twice), 43 (twice); 
plural. the hierarchy of existing beings: "illa quae sunt 
perfectissima in entibus, ut substantiae intellectuales" 
2lb43; 
c) in the mental order, 
i) the notion or idea of being: "omnes aliae oo~cep­
tiones intelleetus accipiuntur ex additione ad ~" 
2b26 (twice), "ens non potest esse genus" 2b32, 34, 
43, 45, 4b4, 13, 23b26 (twice), 29. 
ii) the term or name being: "nomen 'res• ••• in hoc differt 
ab ante" 3a4, nverum et ens convertuntur" 17a38, 
ENTITAS, -ATIS 
6a17, "'~' sumi tur ab actu essendi" 3a6, 4a36 
(second occurrence). 
(not classical) Being. 
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The abstract term corresponding to the concrete ENS: "diversi 
gradus entitatis" 2b39, "ratio entitatis" 15b30, 3a49, 4a24, 
4bl, 10a39; 
used in parallel with the abstract "veritas" 9al9, 9b4, 20a41, 
55, 20bl2. 
Note. The term is not the abstract of "esse", existence. 
ENUNTIABILE, -IS neut. subst. Enuntiable. 
The formal object of a judgment, an unasserted judgment, the 
objective identity or difference of subject and predicate --
"omnium istorum enuntiabilium, Patrem esse vel generare, Filium 
esse vel esse genitum" 15bl6; 
known by God, but not through separate judgments -- "scivit Deus 
plura enuntiabilia, sed taman illa plura scivit una cognitione" 
14al4, 12b55; 
used once of truth precisely as an object of judgment of a 
created intellect -- 12b48. 
ENUNTIA'I'IO, -IONIS Proposition. 
1. The external, verbal expression of a judgment, proposition: 
"enuntiatio est signum intellectus" 24b27, 12b27, 17a~9; 
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equivalent to "propositio 11 (4a45) 4a44, 17a57 (in reply to 
argument where 11 oratio 11 , "enuntiatio" and "propositio11 are 
all used in same meaning); 
equivalent to 11 oratio" 13a41, 50; 
2. equivalent to ENLWTIABILE -- 14a7, 17b41, 44, 47. 
EN1JNTIO, -ARE To declare. 
ESSE 
1. Literally, 
to predicate, to pronounce: 14b37, 24a40; 
2. metaphorically, by simply being such rather than by formal 
declaration, 
to manifest: "sensus ••• non possunt omnino enuntiare nisi 
affectionem sua.m" 25bl. 
infin. of ~, ~~ fui. To be, existence. 
1. Used frequently simply as the infinitive of the copula~· 
2. As a noun, 
existence, the act of being, to be: "forma uniuscujusque, 
per quam~ habet" 24b8, 3b35, 14b16, 18, 17a41, 20a40, 
23bl7, 15b37, "per intellectum divinum eas in esse producen-
tem11 9a29, explicitly equivalent to "actus essendi" 4b6, 
used equivalently with the gerund 11 essendi" 4al8; 
i) opposed to "secundum rationem11 (16b56, 17a3), by 
emphasis, 
reality, extra-mental existence: "remanet idem 
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secundum rationem sed non secundum~" 16b56, 17a3; 
ii) not really distinct from the Persons in God ~- 4b22, 
24, 15bl4, but really distinct from the created 
essence -- "nulla res est suum esse 11 9b40. 
Note. From the explicit statement in the same paragraph that 
"nulla res est suum esse 11 (9b40), it is clear that 11 esse com-
pletum" must mean exi,stence which is complemented (by composition 
with essence) when it belongs to things actually existing in the 
universe -- "de rebus quae habent esse completum in natura" 
9b38. 
ESSENDI (gerund of ~· ~· not classical) Existence. 
The genitive case of the verbal noun ESSE, with which it is 
equivalently used 4b7, 15, "diversi modus essendi 11 2b40, 46. 
ESSENT IA, -AE Essence. 
Yfuat a thing is: "hoc nomen 'res' exprimit quidditatem siva 
essentiam entis 11 3a8, "in omni ente ••• essentia ejus secundum 
quam esse dicitur" 3a2, 
the determinate nature of a thing: "forma est invariabili 
essentia consistens" 16bl9, as opposed to what is merely in-
cidental ( 11accidentalis 11 9a22) -- "res in sua essentia per-
maneretu 9a25; 
contrasted with "accidentia11 -- "intima rei cognoscit; est enim 
intelligere ••• sensus enim et imaginatio sola exteriora accidentia 
r_----------------------------------~ 
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cognoscunt, solus autem intellectus ad essentiam rei pertinet" 
26a55, 26b, but used even of accidents, namely of our operative 
powers (22a6, 11) -- "sensus non cognoscit essentiam. suam" 22a6, 
equivalent to NATURA (cf. 2, a, 3.v.) 2lb45, 53, 55, 56, 22a3, 6; 
used of the s~~le Divine Essence -- 13a24, 15b26, 31, 18bl0, 13, 
16, 21, 19al5. 
(PER) ESSEN'I'IAM see PE.'R ESSE1"T lAM. 
ESSE11TIALIS, -E Essential. 
Pertaining to the essence, essential: contrasted with 11acciden-
talia" (l8a5, 9) -- "immutabilis quantum ad essentialia rei 
manente re" 17b56, 57, 18a5, equivalent to "per se" (23b4) --
23b3. 
ESSENTIALITER (not classical) Essentially. 
a) Essentially, naturally, necessarily; 11quaelibet natura 
essentialiter est ens" 2b30; 
b) opposed to "personali ter" ( 18a27), 
(predicated) as pertaining to the simple Essence of God: 
"esse in divinis nonnisi essentialiter dicitur," 15bl5, 
18a27, 18b38, 40. (The expression is from st. Augustine, 
De Trinitate, VII, 2, PL 42, 936.) 
EVIDENTIA, -AE Evidence. 
The perspicuity proper to cogent argument: 11ad cujus evidentiam 
r 
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sciendum est" 16b28. 
EXCEDO, -ERE To exceed, to go beyond. 
In a logical sense, referring to the extension of the concept 
of truth, not to its comprehension (as is clear from 2b32-36) 
"non excedit nee exceditur ab ente" 4b4. 
EXEMPLA...!{, -IS Exemplar. 
The model or pattern of things in the (divine) mind: "formam, 
per quam res imitentur exemplar divinae artis 11 20a47, "una 
veritas in exemplari" 10a47. 
EXEMPL.ARIS, -E Exemplary. 
Contrasted with "efficiens" (2la32) 2la33. 
Note. For "causa exemplari efficiente" 2la35, see EFFICIENS, 
Note s.v. 
EXElv:PLARITER By way of exemplary causality. 
"a veritate intellectus divini exemplariter procedit in intel-
lectum nostrum veritas primo~um principiorum11 9b50. 
EX'~PLO, -ARE To be the exemplary cause of. 
passive. To be derived or caused by way of exemplary causality, 
to have one's exemplary cause in: equivalent to "derivatur 
exemplariter 11 (8a43) in the argument (art. VI, Contra, 2) to 
which reply is being made -- "rebus propria exemplatis ab in-
r 
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tellectu divino" 10a27, 31, 
equivalent to 11 imitandi exemplar divinum11 (8b33) in the argument 
being answered (art. VI, Contra, 6) -- "res exemplentur dif-
formiter a veritate divina" 10a4l, 46; 
11 sicut similitudo faciei resultat in speculo" (l0b4-5) -- 10b2. 
EXISTENS, -ENTIS Existing. 
a) With emphasis on actuality or reality of existence, 
actually existing: "rei existentis extra animam11 6b45, 3b48, 
20a34, 40, 45, 23al7, 23b50; 
said even of (real) privations -- "non esse extra anima.m 
existens 11 2la32, and of falsity -- 11falsitatem in rebus 
existentem" 24al; 
b) non-emphatically, equivalent to the English participle (not 
noun) ""being", 
baing, existing: 11 Socrate existente albo 11 l7bl6, 11, l4b50, 
l5bl, 23a52. 
EXISTENT IA, ... AE Existence. 
The fact of existence: 11veritas quae in anina causatur a rebus 
••• sequitur ••• existentiam rerum" 6a40. 
EXISTI.HATIO, -IONIS £stimate. 
a) In intellect, 
estimate, notion, idea: 11 sicut res ••• faciunt veram existima ... 
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tionem in intellectu vel falsa.m" 25a39, 23b47, 53, 25b8, 14; 
b) in sense knowledge of brute animals, 
sense-judgment, evaluation: "sensus autem judicium ••• existi-
matio naturalis; et sic judicat vis sensitiva de sensibilibus 
comrnunibus et de sensibilibus per accidens'' 25b40. 
EXISTDW, -ARE To think, to opine. 
"quida.m existimaverunt Deum esse corpus" 24a53, 55. 
EXTERIOR, -IS Exterior, external. 
"sensus enim et imaginatio sola exteriora accidentia cognoscunt 11 
26a54. 
Note. This wording and the context suggest that "exteriora 
accidentia" are to be contrasted not only with 11 essentiam rei" 
(26a55), but also with certain accidents, (internal) properties 
known only to the intellect. 
EXTREl\mM, -I Bxtreme, term. 
The term or extreme of a relation: "in hac adaequatione vel 
commensuratione intellectus ac rei non requiritur quod utrumque 
extremorum sit in actu" 12b31. 
r 
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FACIO, -ERE To make. 
To make~ to cause efficiently (because of the "causa efficiens" 
2la32): 2la28, 29 ~ "falsam. faci t apprehensionem" 23a56. 
FALLACIA (ACCIDENTIS) see ACCIDENS, 3 • 
FALLO, -ERE To deceive. 
"cum 'fallere' dico significo actionem quamdam defectum inducen-
tem" 24al3, 14, "at ideo hoc quod dico 'fallere' ••• quantum ad id 
quod importat defectum, in quo for.maliter ratio falsitatis con-
sistit, ex dissimilitudine surgit" 24a22~ 43~ "judicium sensus 
fallitur" 25b52. 
FALSITAS, -ATIS :F'alsity • 
. Opposed to VERITAS (q.v.) in all its various uses. 
a) In dialectical portions of the work~ without implying a 
settled meaning, e.g. 24b3l; 
b) Opposed to "veritas rerum" -- "falsitas in rebus existens 
23b57~ 17a36, 25a47~ 48, 52; 
c) opposed to "veritas" in its most proper and formal 
sense -- "sicut veritas consistit in adaequatione rei et 
intellectus, ita falsitas consistit in eorum inaequali-
tate 11 23a2, "defectum, in quo formaliter ratio falsitatis 
consistit~ ex dissimilitudine surgit 11 24a26, 17a51, 17b9, 
r 
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14, 15, 22, 23a49, 50, 51, 24a30, 25a42, 25b53, 26b20, 
45. 
F'ALSUS, -A, -UM F'alse. 
Opposed to VERUS (q.v.) in all its uses. 
a) As an adjective, 
false, untrue: 
i) in the representative order -- 11falsa oratio" 
6a42, 7a8, 31, 11falsa definitio" 26b30, 32, 
"affirmatio falsa" 26b34, "intellectus falsus" 
6a42, 7a9, 17, 26, 24a4, 7; 
ii) in the order of reality -- "res falsae dicuntur 
quae natae sunt videri quae non aunt, aut qualia 
non sunt" Sal, "res dicitur falsa secundum quod 
nata est fallere 11 24al2, 22al7, 23a41, "per com-
parationem ad intellectum divinum nulla res 
potest esse falsa" 23a27, "aurum falsum" 23a45 
see AURUM F AI. SUM; 
b) used in a more substantive way, in a quasi-abstract sens 
false, the false, falsity: "ipsa veritas creata non 
habet aliquid simile falso" 10a6, 7, 8, "malum simplici-
ter invenitur in rebus, non autem falsum11 24b21, 5a38, 
5bl9, 6b28. 
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FINIS, -IS End. 
1. Ending, termination: nveritas clauditur principia et finelf 
13a41, 49. 
2. End, purpose: 24bl0, 11, 19, 29. 
FORMA, -AE F'orm. 
1. In a very broad sense, 
attribute, qualification, property: "equivalent to "dis-
positio11 (17a47) -- "veritas est forma maxime generalis, 
cum verum et ens convertantur" 17a37, 43, 11res ••• sub qua-
cumque forma existens 11 23a17, 14b39, 46, 16b17, 18, 21. 
2. Yhysical form, real determining principle: 
a) non-committal -- "res per formam suam imitantur artem 
divini intellectus 11 20a35, 46, 20bl5, 26, 24bl5; 
b) substantial form: "per quam formam etiam unaquaeque 
res esse habet" 20a39, l4b40, 42, 17a41, 23b42, 43, 
24b7; 
c) accidental form, intrinsic and real accident: op-
posed to that by extrinsic denomination -- 9b2, 6, 
opposed to "locus" (16b42) -- "forma inhaerens" 
16b50; 
i) generically considered -- "forma generalis ••• 
color 11 16b53, '17a1; 
ii) specifically-- "forma specialis •• albedo" 
16b53, 54. 
r 
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FORNlALITER Formally. 
Formally~ in the £ull and most proper sense: 
ratio falsitatis consistit" 24a26. 
11 in quo formaliter 
FORY.ATIO~ -IONIS F'ormation. 
(Representative) making or forming~ formation: 11formatio ••• 
quidditatum ab intellectu" 25b22~ 24; 
likewise, of sense apprehensions -- 25b31. 
FUNDO,-ARE To base (upon), to substantiate (in). 
Equivalent to 11 substantificatur" in the argument (art. X, arg. 3) 
to which reply is being made -- "oportet falsitatem in rebus 
existentem supra veritatem fundari 11 24a2. 
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Gffi~ERATIO, -IONIS The act of generation, begetting. 
11 generatio ad hoc est, secundum Philosophum, ut salvetur per-
petuum esse in specie" 14bl4, 15a36. 
GENUS, -ERIS Genus, class. 
a) In a broad and loose sense ("largo modo accipiendo genus" 
lOblO), 
class, kind: "veritas prima est quodammodo de genera animae 
humanae, largo modo accipiendo genus" l0b9-l0, 11, ·2b42, 48; 
b) strictly, as one of the predicables of logic, genus: 11 est in 
genera qualitatis 11 4al2, 14b53, "per modum quo differentia 
additur generi" 2b28, 32, 23b37. 
GIGNO, -ERE To generate, to produce, to cause. 
Metaphorically, of the action of the object on the mind -- "res 
••• sui notitiam in anima gignit" 24bl7. 
GRADUS, -US Grade, degree. 
"diversi gradus entitatis 11 2b39. 
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HABITUDO, -nns Relationship. 
11veritas ••• superaddit habitudinem adaequationis ad intellectum11 
20a42, 56, 20b5. 
Note. The above translation is confirmed on the basis of 
"referri" (20b2). 
F~ITUS, -US Habit. 
a) Loosely, in a sense approaching the root meaning of "a 
having", 
natural power and tendency to act in a certain way: "unde 
et intellectus habitus principiorum dicitur" 26bl3; 
b) strictly, as the genus of virtus, 
habit, (acquired) tendency to act in a certain way: "virtus 
est habitus in modum. naturae rationis consentaneus" 14a51. 
r 
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DflAGINATIO, -IONIS I!na.gination. 
"vis apprehensiva quae apprehendit speciem sensibilem ••• re 
absente, sicut imaginatio" 26a2, 5, 53. 
IMITOR, -ARI To imitate. 
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"res formam habet, artem di vini intellectus imi tatur" 24bl6, 18., 
18b43, 20a27, 35, 46. 
Note. The word is used only of the relation of things to intel-
lect, and only· to the Divine Intellect. 
IYMITTENS, -ENTIS Imparting, sending to. 
"[Deus) per essentiam suam cognoscit, non singulis suam cog-
nitione.m immittens" 13a30. 
Note. The literal meaning of this word and its use here in the 
active voice suggest an emphasis on the fact that God's knowledge 
unlike human knowledge, in no way depends on or is caused by 
creatures. 
HiffirlUTABILIS, -E Unchangeable, immutable. 
See MD~ABILIS, to the various senses of which it is opposed. 
IMPLEO, -ERE To fulfill, to measure up to. 
"res naturalis ••• dicitur vera, in quantum implet hoc ad quod est 
ordinate. per intellectum divinum11 5b48, 17b39. 
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IMPLICO, -ARE To implicate, to involve. 
passive. 
a) involved: "ipse defectus in actu fornicationis impli-
catus11 20b36; 
b) intended, implied: 11 compositio quae implicatur ••• 
definitionibus rerum" 7al6, 25. 
Note. The meaning is stronger than that of the English word 
"implied", sometimes almost equivalent to "asserted". 
D.1PORTO, -ARE To connote. 
To involve, to imply, to connote: 11nullam principii rationem 
importat" 18b2l, 7, 36, 37, 12bl2, l9a2, 19al3, 24a23, 25. 
Note. The meaning is perhaps not as strong as that of IMPLICO, 
although often stronger than that of the English "i:rnplied". St. 
Thomas suggests "connote" by the equivalent phrase "sine aliqua 
connotatione principii" (18b26). 
IN ACTU see ACTUS, 1. 
IN SE In itself. 
Absolutely, without reference to others: in contrast to "in 
ordine ad aliud" (2b54), equivalent to "absolute" (3al, 10) --
2b52. 
INAEQUALITAS, •ATIS Inequality, dissimilarity. l --------------1-·--L--it--er_a __ l_ly __ , __ in __ a_n ___ i_l_l_u_st __ r_a_t_i_on---f-r-om---a-1-g-eb __ r_a_, ________________ ~ 
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inequality: 17b8. 
2. Loosely, 
non-correspondence, dissimilarity: "sicut veritas consistit 
in adaequatione rei et intellectus, ita falsitas consistit 
in eorum inaequalitate11 23a2, 29. 
INDEX, -ICIS Indication, manifestation. 
11 illam formam cujus indicia e:x:terius ostenduntur per sensibiles 
qualitates 11 23b44. 
INDICATIVUS, -A, -UM Indicative, representative. 
Equivalent to "representativum alterius rei" (25b4) -- "sensus 
enim et est res quaedam in se, et est indicativus alterius 
rei" 25a49. 
INDIVISIO, -IONIS (State of) undividedness, absence of divisi~ 
"indivisio, et hanc e:x:primit hoc nomen 'unum'; nihil enim est 
aliud 'unum' quam ens indivisum" 3al0 -- involving the notion of 
"in se" (3a20) in contrast to 11divisionem unius ab altero ••• 
'aliquid'" (3al7). 
INDUCO, -ERE To bring in, to induce. 
1. To induce, to bring about, to be the (inadequate) cause of: 
11illa quae nata sunt contrarium dispositionem inducere" 
l4b35, 24al5, 42, 24b3 (twice). 
2. To bring in, to introduce: "cum definitione Philosophi 
supra inducta" 3b38, 5b53, 25a56. 
INFERIORA, -ORUM The lower bodies. 
"in majori mundo superiora nihil accipiunt ab inferioribus" 
26al3 -- ostensibly here the lower heavenly bodies and the 
things of earth. 
IliJFilGTUS, -A, -UM Indefinite. 
Not actually infinite, but potentially, i.e., implying not 
capacity for achieving actual infinity but simply unlimited 
potency, hence, 
indefinite(ly): "in infinitum iretur" 2bl7, 11 in infinitum 
procedere in rebus" l5al2, 16, 37; 
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indefinilte (in number): "possent esse infinitae relationes in 
eodem" l5a35. 
INI<'LECTO, -ERE To reflect. 
Equivalent to 11reflectitur 11 (2lb20) -- 11 intellectus inflectitur 
in seipsum, et intelligit se sicut et alias res" l7b30. 
INNATUS, -A, -UM Innate, connatural. 
"in intellectum angelicum species rerum innatae" 9b48. 
Note. The word cannot be taken in the literal sense of "inborn" 
here, obviously, for it is applied only to angels and not to men 
or animals. 
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INQUIRO, -ERE To investigate, to examine. 
11ulterius intellectus ex essentiis rerum comprehensis diversi-
mode negotiatur ratiocinando et inquirendo" 26b3. 
INSENSIBILIS, -E Unable to sense, non-sensory. 
"potentiae naturales insensibiles ••• sicut ignis" 22al2, 
"de.finitio falsa ••• quod aliquod animal est insensibile" 7al5, 17. 
Note. The term is not the opposite of "sensibile 11 (i.e., able 
to be sensed), but of 11 sensitivus 11 (i.e., sensory, able to 
sense). 
INTELLECTUALIS, -E Int ell actual. 
Endowed with intellect (angelic or human): "substantiae intel-
lectuales redeunt ad essentiam suam reditione completa 11 2lb44, 
22al. 
INTELLECTUS, -US Intellect. 
1. a) The power of knowing essence: "solus autem intellectus 
ad essentiam rei pertingit" 26a56. Very frequent in 
this work, usually of the human intellect, but often of 
God's intellect, sometimes of both-- "adaequationis ad 
intellectum humanum vel divinum" 20a43, once of angel's 
intellect -- 11 intellectum angelicum11 9b47; 
of intellect as causing things: "intellectus practicus 
causat res" 5b25, 26; 
r--------------------------------------------~ 
of intellect as determined or actuated by things: 
"intellectus speculativus ••• est quodammodo motus a 
rebus" 5b26, 29; 
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b) sometimes connoting the power as in act -- "veritas in 
intellectu" l2b26, 27, 17a30, 17bl0, 12, l8al8; 
c) the activitating part of the intellect, 
acting intellect: "intellectus agens describatur quo 
est omnia facere 11 6a50, 3b55, 56; 
d) the receptive part of the intellect, 
passive, or possible, intellect: "et intellectus 
possibilis quo est omnia fieri" 6a52 (but Cf. ACTIVUS, 
~). 
Note. St. Thomas suggests an etymological derivation, "nomen 
intellectus sumitur ex hoc quod intima rei cognoscit; est 
enim intelligere quasi intus legere" 26a51. The classical 
derivation is rather from "inter" and 11legere 11 • 
2. Denoting the intellect precisely as actuated, not merely as 
in 1, b, supra (cf. De Veritate XVII, 1 corp.), 
a) idea, concept: "voces eodem modo ••• sicut intellectus 
(nom. plur.] quos significant" 7a35, naddetur in intel-
lectu veritatis ratio principii" 18b31 (compare flcom-
positio intellectuum11 in SUllllJlB. Theologica, Ia, 17, 3 
Sed Contra): 
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b) judgment: "nomen intellectus compositi, scilicet prout 
' 
signifioat affirma.tionem propositionis 11 3b32, "enuntiatio 
est signum intellectus 11 24b28, 12b28, "eadem res quae 
significatur illis tribus propositionibus, non tamen est 
idem intellectus earum" 18a22, 23, 25. 
c) reasoning: "Alio modo potest accipi intellectus com-
muniter, secundum quod ad omnes operationes se extendit, 
et sic comprehendit opinionem et ratiocinationem" 26b41. 
INTELLIGENTIA, -AE Understanding. 
The act of intellection: 6b26. 
INTELLIGIBILIS, -E Pertaining to intellection. 
"veritas prima est quodammodo de genera animae largo modo ac-
cipiendo genus, secundum quod omnia intelligibilia vel incor-
poralia unius generis esse dicuntur" lObll, where it includes 
both the notion of able to understand and that of able to be 
understood (intelligible); 
11 intelligibile lumen" 10a27 see Lillv'lEN INTELLIGIBILE. 
INTEILIGO, -ERE To understand. 
a) The proper action of the intellect -- 11dicimur propria 
intelligere cum apprehendimus quidditatem rerum, vel cum 
intelligimus ea quae statim nota sunt intellectui notis 
rerum quidditatibus" 26b7, 9, 5bll; 
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"intelligere quasi intus l'egere" 26a52 see INTELLECTUS, 1., 
Note; 
b) to know intellectually, to understand: "ali quid intelligi 
sine altero" 3b41., 43, "intelligere se non esse" 13b40. 
INTE1TT IO, -IONIS Notion, concept. 
"intentio veri comparatur ad intentionem entis quod8lllill.odo ut 
differentia ad genus" 23b33, 34, 35, 36. 
INT Uf.A., -ORUM Inmost depths, internal nature, essence. 
Equivalent to 11 essentiam11 (26a55) -- 11 intellectus ••• intim.a. 
rei cognoscit 11 26a51. 
INVESTIGO, -ARE To investigate, to analyze. 
The method proper to first philosophy, as opposed to strict 
demonstration 11 in demonstrabilibus 11 (2bl4) -- "ita investigando 
quid est unumquodque" 2bl6. 
IRRATIOUALIS, -E Irrational. 
ISAAC 
Not possessed of the power of reasoning (not merely deprived of 
the active exercise of the power): rtanimal irrationale" 26b29, 
31. 
Rabbi Isaac Israeli. 
Note. This Jewish philosopher and doctor lived in E&vpt 
c. 845-940. He wrote in Arabic, but a Latin translation of his 
r 
' 103 
writings by Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187) was possessed by the 
scholastics and was available in the time of st. Thomas. Several 
extant thirteenth century MSS. are listed by J. T. Muckle 
("Isaac Israeli Liber de Definicionibus", Archives d 1histoire 
doctrinale et litt~raire du moyen ~ge, 1938, XI, 299-340) •. 
However, the exact words as given by St. Thomas do not appear 
in that text, being only approximated in one place (ibid., 307), 
whereas his own definition 11veritas est quod est 11 appears 
frequently (ibid., 321, 322, 333). "et sic dicit Isaac, quod 
'veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus'" 3b6. Cf. J. T. 
:Muckle, "Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth", .Archives 
d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen 1ge, 1933, VIII, 
5-8. 
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JlJDICHJM, -I Judgment, perception. 
1. Properly, referring to the intellect's own activity, 
judgment: "sed quando incipit judicare de re apprehensa, 
tunc ipsum judicium intellectus est quoddam proprium ei" 
6b49, 52, "secundum quod judicium intellectus est de re 
secundum quod est" 2lbl7, 23a51, 25!:>24. 
2. Analogically, of the operations of the sense powers, 
perception, natural estimate, sense-judgment: "sensus ••• 
judicium quod ex formations praedicta consequitur; prout 
scilicet ex apprehensions tali natum est sequi tale 
judicium" 25b31-33, 34, "judicium sensus est de re secundum 
quod est" 2lb33, "sensus judicium de sensibilibus propriis 
semper est verum11 25b47, Hin sensibilibus· conununibus et 
per accidens interdum judicium sensus fallitur 11 25b51, 52. 
JUDICO, -.ARE To judge, to perceive. 
1. Properly, of the intellect, 
to judge: "tunc autem judicat intellectus de re apprehensa, 
quando dicit quod aliquid est vel non est, quod est intel-
lectus componentis et dividentis" 6b53, 48, 9b45, 52, 53, 
56, 2la38, 25bl0, "anima vero in quantum de rebus judicat 
! non patitur a rebus, sed magis quodammodo agit" 23a53. 
1--------~ 
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2. Analogically. of sensory apprehension, 
JUS. JURIS 
to perceive, to sense: "sensus vera judicat de rebus" 
2lb36, 37, 25a44, 25b27, 11et sic judicat vis sensitiva de 
sensibilibus communibus et de sensibilibus per accidens" 
25b41. 
Right. 
What belongs to someone: 11unicuique jus suum tribuens 11 14b2. 
(No attempt is made at further definition or clarification.) 
JUSTITIA, -AE Justice. 
"justitia est 'constans et perpetua voluntas unicuique jus suum 
tribuens'" 14bl, 4, 11 justitia di vina 11 14a44, 11 justitia humana 11 
14a45. 
r 106 
L 
LOCUS, -I Place. 
"locus est inunutabilis terminus continentis 11 16b45 (Aristotle, 
Phys., IV, 4, 212a20), explicitly extrinsic-- "est extrinsecum .. 
••• sicut locus non dicitur moveri quando aliquid secundum locum 
movetur" 16b42, 43, 12bl7, "per localem motum non dicitur esse 
successio locorum in uno locate, sed magis successio locatorum 
in uno loco" 16b47, 49. 
LUMEN, -INIS Light, illumination, intelligence. 
a) Of God, 
(divine) intelligence: "a lumina divino11 10a27; 
b) of created intellects, with "intelligibile 11 , 
intelligence, light of intelligibility, illumination of the 
acting intellect: 10a27 (first occurrence), 29. 
Note. The word is used only in a preliminary dialectical 
argument (art. IV, Contra, 2) from the pseudo•Dionysius ( 11ut 
patet per Dionisium" 8a46) and in reply to the same. Further-
more, it is always used with the adjective "intelligibile" when 
said of creatures. The phrase would be translated literally 
"intelligible light", "light able to be understood", but this is 
meaningless in the context. Use of this and similar expressions 
in st. Thomas's commentary In Boetium ~ Trinitate (I,l) as 
referring to the action of the acting, or agent, intellect 
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suggest the meaning given above for the present case. This is 
born out by the phrases "vim manifestandi habetn (8a44) and 
11 ipse vigor intellectus ad intelligendum" (DeVer. IX, 1). It 
is analogous when applied to Divine and human intellectual 
illumination, by proper analogy -- "a lumina divino, tamen lumen 
propria dicitur etiam de intelligibilibus luminibus creatis ••• 
ideo non dicimus unum lumen" 10a27 (second occurrence), 28, 29, 
33. Cf. J. Guillet, O.P., "La lumiere intellectuelle d'apr~s 
s. Thomas 11 , Archives d'histoire doctrinale at litt19raire du 
moyen lge, 1927, II, 79-88. 
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:MAJOR M1JNDUS see ]JiUNDUS MAJOR. 
I'flALU.M, -I Bad, evil. 
a) As an adjective -- 11quamvis istum fornicari sit malum" 4a56, 
2la47; 
b) used in a more substantive way, 
:MANEO, -ERE 
i) in a quasi-abstract sense, 
the bad, badness: "malum est in rebus" 5bl8, 24bl9, 
"ratio boni et mali" 20b55, 2la46 (first occurrence); 
ii) more concretely, 
bad, bad thing: "malum non sit a Deott 2la37, 38, 39, 
11rna.lum non agit in animam nisi per speciem boni" 
2la42, 46 (second occurrence). 
To remain (in existence), to last. 
"prima perfectio est forma uniuscujusque per quam habet esse, 
unde ab ea nulla res destituitur dum manet 11 24b9. 
A~T~~IA, -AE Matter. 
a) (Prime) matter, undifferentiated matter: 11unitas per se 
attribuitur materiae primae, non per positionem alicujus 
formae unitatis, sed per remotionem formarum diversifican-
tium11 14b38, 42; 
b) (second) matter, matter united with form: 11 dicimus esse 
plures materias quam unam" 14b43. 
109 
Note. The term is only used in an example, and is not treated 
~ professo in this work. 
t<!ATERIALIS, -E Material, physical. 
'
1dispositiones materiales, quae sunt causae corruptionis 11 14b48. 
:riiATERIALITl'l..It Materially. 
In a logical sense, as opposed to formally, 
in subject-matter only: "non perfecte exprimit rationem 
veritatis, sed quasi materiali ter tantum" 23bl6. 
MAXIME In the fullest sense, most completely. 
11maxime entia ••• maxima vera 11 4al5, 17, 20, 21. 
MEDIUS, (-A), -UM subst. Intermediary, go-between. 
"actus cognitionis est medius inter cognoscentem et cognitum" 
2lb51, "non est possibile ut organum medium cadat inter potentiam 
sensitivam et seipsum" 22al0, "sensus inveniatur quodammodo mediu 
inter intellectum et res" 25a31. 
Note. The use of both masculine and neuter genders as sub-
stantives is confirmed in classical Latin usage. 
M8NS, MEUTIS ?.:ind. 
a) Opposed to "in rebus 11 (5bl9), 
r 
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mind, thought: "verum et falsurn in mente 11 5a39, 5b20 (a 
translation of .Aristotle's lv ("'tft]<t>\.u...,o(cx., Metaphys. VI, 
4, 1027b27 -- "thought" in the Oxford translation by W. !). 
Ross, ibid.); 
b) equivalent to 11 intellectus", 
MENSUP..A, -AE 
i) "mente nostra" 10b3, "mens decipitur" 24a48; 
ii) of God's intellect, always in context of exemplary 
causality -- 11in mente divina 11 14a4, 17b40, 43, 10b3. 
Measure. 
a) Norm, standard, pattern: equivalent to "ars" -- "veritas ••• 
in rebus secundum quod imitantur intellectum divinum, qui 
est earum mansura sicut ars est mansura omnium artificiato-
rum" 20a29, 9bll, 13, 23a7, usually with nextrinseca" --
11veritas ••• qua denominantur omnia vera sicut extrinseca 
mansura" 12b53, 13a50, 17b28, "mansura extrinseca, sicut 
locatum loco" 12bl7, 9bl8, 20; 
b) (internal) dimension, form (cr. FOIDv~, 1), measurement: 
'
1sicut mansura intrinseca ••• et has etiam mensuras oportet 
plurificari secundum pluralitatem mensuratorum, sicut diver-
serum corporum sunt dimensiones diversae 11 9b23, 25, 17all, 
"mensuratur autem corpus mansura intrinseca, sicut linea, 
vel superficie, vel profunditate'' 12bl5. 
r 
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MENS1JRATIO, -IONIS !leasure, norm. 
Equivalent to "mansura extrinseca" ( Cf •. MENSURA, a) -- 11 intel-
lectus enim practicus causat res, unde est mensuratio rerum quae 
per ipsum fiunt, ••• sicut omnia artificiata in intellectu 
artificis" 5b27. 
lVIE!IJSURO, -ARE To measure. 
1. To act as the norm for, to determine by way of exemplary 
causality (not "to ascertain measurement of", as in English): 
of the Divine intellect toward things -- "res ••• sunt 
mensuratae ab intellectu divino" 5b35, 39, 40, 41, 8bll, 
23a7, 18bl7, 34; 
of created things toward created intellect as knowing them 
"sed intellectus speculativus ••• res mensurant ipsum" 5b31, 
34, 41, 12b24, 20a33, but of created intellect toward thin&s 
it can make -- "intellectus practicus ••• mensurans" 5b42. 
2. Loosely -- "(Dei) cogni tio ••• aete.rni tate mensuretur" 13a34. 
MODUS, -I Way, manner. 
a) Used frequently, with no philosophical implications, to 
express the way or manner something is done or exists; 
except, 
b) the vmy something is conceived, 
aspect, meaning: "aliqua dicuntur addere supra ens in 
,quantum exprimunt ipsius modum, qui nomine antis non 
112 
exprimitur 11 2b35, 37 (second occurrence), 38, 48, 50, 3al3 
(first occurrence), 4a4. 
MOTUS, -us Motion, activity. 
a) In an intransitive sense, 
local motion: "per motum localem11 l6a46; 
activity, motion: 11 cujuslibet motus 11 5bl, 11motus cognitivae 
virtutis 11 5b2, 11motus appetitivae virtutis 11 5b5; 
whole sequence of connected activities: equivalent to 
11 circulum quemdam in actibus animae 11 (5b9 -- "res intellecta 
movet appetitum, et appetitus tunc ducit ad hoc quod per-
veniat ad rem a qua motus incepit 11 5bl4; 
b) in a transitive sense, 
activation, causation of movement: 11 lux quae causatur in 
aere ab extrinseco, scilicet ex sole, sequitur motum solis 
magis quam aerem" 6a37. 
MOVEO .-'ERE , To move, to set in motion. 
11res quae est extra animam movet intellectum, et res intellecta 
movet appetitum 11 5bl0, 12, 23b53, "sicut locus non dicitur moveri 
quando aliquid secundum locum movetur" l6b42, 43; 
perf. part. 11 intellectus speculativus ••• est quodammodo motus a 
rebus'' 5b30. 
Note. This verb is always transitive in the active voice, unlike 
the English "move" which is ambiguous. The passive is usually 
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indicated by the use of the preposition 11a., a.b", otherwise the 
passive ha.s the force of a. middle voice. 
.MULTUS, -A, -IDA Much, pl. many • 
11hujusmodi verita.tes resulta.ntes in a.nimabus nostris a. prima 
veritate sunt multae" 10b7. 
Note. The word here simply signifies numerical multiplicity, not 
variety of kinds or analogy. Cf. PLUS. 
MUNDUS Y.AJOR The macrocosm, the universe at large. 
The universe, including the heavenly bodies as well as the earth 
and its elements: "in majori mundo superiora nihil a.ccipiunt a.b 
inferioribus, sed e converso" 26al2. 
MUTABILIS, -E Changeable. 
a) Being the subject of change: "subjectum muta.tionis, sicut 
dicimus corpus esse muta.bile"· 16bl7, 18, 22; 
b) being the formality which changes: "secundum ipsum fit 
muta.tio ••• et sic quaeritur de veritate, an sit mutabilis" 
16b27; 
i) by extrinsic denomination -- "locus est immuta.bilis 
terminus continentia" 16b45; 
ii) by change of internal determination, 
a') within a. generic form, 11 secund'¥Ii esse sed non 
secundum rationem11 (17a3) -- "verita.s rei 
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secundum ordinem ad intellectum divinum ••• 
mutatur veritas rei mutabilis in aliam veri-
tatem, non in falsitatem" 17a35; 
b 1 ) by change of specific form, 11forrna enim 
specialis post mutationem non remanet eadem 
nee secundum esse nee secundum rationem" 
{16b54-56) -- 18a3, 4. 
See also MUTATIO, MUTO. 
!viUTATIO, -IONIS Change. 
Note. If translated "change", this word must be understood in 
a passive or intransitive meaning. 
a) In a general sense -- 16bl6, 24, 29, "facta omni mutatione 11 
18al2; 
b) specifically, 
i) extrinsic change; l6b40; 
ii) intrinsic change: 16b37, 51, 52; 
a 1 ) change within a generic form: 11sicut facta 
mutatione de albo in nigrum, manet idem color 
secundum co1mnunem rationem coloris, sed non 
eadem coloris species" 17a4, "forma generalis 
facta mutatione remanet eadem secundum 
rationem, sed non secundum esse" 17a2, 39, 44; 
b 1 ) change of specific form: 11 sicut albedo, 
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facta alteratione, nullo modo ma.net" 
{16b57-17al) -- "forma enim specialis post 
mutationem non remanet eadem nee secundum 
esse nee secundum rationem11 16b55, 17bl4, 55, 
18a6, 10. 
See also 1'..1UTABILIS, M1JTO. 
1iUTO, -ARE To change. 
a) In general 11aliquid dicitur mutari dupliciter; uno modo ••• 
16bl5, 23, 25, 17b24; 
b) specifically, 
i) to change only by extrinsic denomination: 16b39; 
ii) to change intrinsically: 16b30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 
50, "unde res creatae variantur quidem in participa-
tione veritatis primae; ipsa autem veritas prima, 
secundum quam dicuntur vera, nullo modo mutatur" 
17al5; 
a') To change within a generic form: (cf. 
MUTABILIS, b, ii, a', and MlJTATIO, b, ii, a') 
-- 16b53, 11 si autem accipimus veritatem in-
haerentem rebus, sic veritas mutari dicitur 
secundum quod aliqua secundum veritatem 
mutantur 11 17a22, 24, "mutatur veritas rei 
mutabilis in aliam veritatem, non in falsi-
tatem" 17a35; 
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b 1 ) to change as regards a specific form: (cr. 
MUTABILIS, b, ii, b', and wmTATIO, b, ii, b') 
-- 17a57, 17bll, 12, 13, 20, 53. 
See also MUTABILIS, 1ruTATIO. 
Nota. This verb is always transitive in the active voice, unlike 
the English "changen which is ambiguous. The passive is usually 
indicated by use of the preposition 11a, ab 11 , otherwise the passiVE 
has the force of a middle voice. 
r 
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NATURA, -.AE Nature. 
1. In the logical order, 
nature as conceived: "anti non potest addi aliquid quasi 
extranea natura" 2b27, 4a.3 .• 
2. In the ontological order, 
a) in general, 
nature, essential constitution: equivalent to "quod 
quid est~ (2Sa37) -- 23a40, 15a51, 17b4l, 42; 
equivalent to "essentia 11 -- 2b29, 44; 
with implication o~ internal source o~ activity, 
14a49, 52; 
i) opposed to "accidentia" -- 23a47; 
ii) said o~ accidents -- "ex natura virtutis est" 
14a53, "natura ipsius actus 8 2lb25, 40, 
"natura ••• intellectus" 2lb26, 28, 39; 
b) reality, extra-mental existence: "relatio naturae" 
15a50; 
order o~ things: "Deus natura sit prior omnibus 
creaturis" 15a48, 54; 
i) with "rerum", 
the world of reality, nature, the universe: 
"in rerum natura" 9b39, opposed to "in ratione 
tantum" (15a5, 25, 31) -- 14b54, l5al, 4, 11, 
24, 30, 39 , 56; 
NATURALIS, -E 
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ii) with "propria", 
in itself, existing in its own nature: "res 
non fuerint ab aeterno in propria natura" 
14a27, 28, :n. 
Natural. 
1. Physical, corporeal: "res naturales" 14a46, 5b32, 40, 42; 
having its own intrinsic nature 5b43; 
contrasted with what is free or voluntary 14a46; 
contrasted to what is in the realm of consciousness 
11potentiae naturales insensibiles" 22al2. 
2. Proper to a nature, flowing from the very nature of a thing: 
"naturalis autam actus alicujus rei semper est uno modo, 
nisi per accidens" 25b43, contrasted with "per quamdam col• 
lationem" (25b37) -- "sensus autam judicium de quibusdam est 
naturale" 25b35, "existimatio naturalis" 25b40. 
NATUS, -A, -UM Apt by nature. 
Note. Only the perfect participle of the verb "nascor" appears 
in the work, and not in the literal sense of "born", but 
denoting that which is so constituted that by its very nature 
it 'has a tendency or aptitude for a certain action or object. 
Apt by nature, able naturally, tending naturally: "res ••• natae 
sunt faoere de sa veram apprehensionem in intelleotu humano" 
20a3l, 3a25, 4a24, 4bl, 5b56, Sal, 7a28, l3b4, 20a31, 37, "illa 
r 
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quae ~ sunt contrariam dispositionam induoere" 14b34. 
NECESSARIO Necessarily. 
"neo res ••• neoessario falsitatam causat" 23a50, 25b9. 
NEGATIO, -IONIS Negation. 
1. (Verbal) negation, denial, negative propositions "negatio 
et affi~atio" 24al0, 3a8. 
2. In the ontological order, 
lack, non-entity: "negationes vel privationes existentes 
extra animam" 20a44, 13a54, "negationes et defectus" 2la20, 
23al2. 
NEGOTI OR, •A.RI To engage in. 
"intellectus ••• negotiatur ratiocinando et inquirendo" 26b2. 
Note. The word literally means "to do business", used 
metaphorically of engaging in any activity. 
NOMEN 1 - INIS Word, na.Jre , te~. 
Note. The word is frequently used, but always in the sense of 
simply a "word" in the grammatical sense. 
NON ENS Non-being. 
a) Opposed to ENS, a (q.v.), 
that to which non-existence is proper, that which has not 
existence: "omnis defectus est non ens" 24al8, "non ens est 
r 
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apprehensum ab intellectu" 4&37, 38; 
b) opposed to ENS, b (q.v., and see also FRIVAXIO), privation 
in the real order: "non ens extra an~ existans" 13b8, 13, 
15, 22, 55, 14a7, 8, 2la30. 
NON ESSE Non-existence. 
Opposed to ESSE, 2, 
non-existence, the non-being indicated by a negative propositio~ 
"non esse rei" l3bl8, "non esse extra animam existens" 2la27, 31. 
NOTUS, -A, •UM perf. part. of nosco. Knovm, understood. 
"principia per se ~" 2bl5, "quae statim nota sunt intel-
lectui" 26b9, "notis rerum quidditatibus" 26bl0. 
Note. The word is used in this work to refer to intellectual 
knowledge exclusively. 
NOTITIA, -AE Acquaintance, knowledge. 
"res ••• ingerant sui notitiam in intellectu nostro" 20a48, 23a31, 
24bl6. 
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OBJECTIO, •IONIS Preliminary dialectical argument, objection. 
"objeotio autem procedebat de causa efficiente" 2la34. See 
OBJICIO, l~ote. 
OBJICIO, -ERE To put forth, to throw in front of. 
"quae contra objiciuntur" 4a50, 24a32, "ex hoc patet solutio ad 
objecta" 22al6, 26b48. 
Note. It is clear from an analysis of the method of St. Thomas 
that OBJECTIO, 11objecta", "objiciuntur", etc., are not to be 
taken as equivalent to the more recent scholastic "objection", 
as to a thesis laid down. 
Aristotle's typical procedure in approaching a problem was 
to begin eaoh book or chapter with a review of the opinions of 
those who had previously discussed the question, less with a 
view to the setting down of historical fact than with a desire to 
put himself in c~ntact with the experience of earlier thinkers, 
and to set the problem in its clearest light before beginning his 
own analysis and solution. To call this the dialectical phase 
of his treatment is not to imply any of the display of skill in 
logic, still less any of the sophistry, sometimes connoted by 
the moder.n use of the term dialectical, nor to put it in the 
class of a mere schoolboy exercise upon a matter already settled, 
but rather to state the first step in his philosophical method. 
r 
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st. Thomas imitated Aristotle in this point more closely 
than the difference of the printed page would lead one to suspect 
His word "objicio" • like the Greek1'l'~o~ti..A.'A.<U (whence"Jt,~~A'1\fJ-O. • 
"problem"), means not to "object" against a settled thesis, but 
to offer for consideration. to throw up as a possible view. His 
own position, and the demonstration of the same, begins with the 
words, "Respondeo dicendum". That the arguments offered in the 
"Sed contra" are still in the dialectical phase of his pro-
cedure is clear for many reasons. First, by analogy with 
Aristotle, as discussed above, he is putting forth various pos-
sible solutions. Secondly, these arguments are almost entirely 
a matter of quoting authorities, and very often of Holy Scrip-
ture; yet it is known what place these held for St. Thomas in a 
strictly philosophical demonstration. Thirdly, the "Sed contra" 
often represents a view as divergent from his own as that in the 
first series of ar~~ents, so that his ~n position is a mean 
between these extremes; in this case he usually provides answers 
of "solutiones" to both series (e.g., art. IV of this work). 
li'ourthly, that he does not offer the "Sed contra" as his own 
view appears from cases where he answers it even though it is a 
single argument (e.g., Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, 8, 3), or 
where he eli sagrees with it explicitly in the body of the article 
(e.g., Summa Theologica, Ia 78, 4), or finally, where he comes 
closer to agreeing with the first series ("objections"?) in his 
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reply {e.g., Summa Theologica, Ia 17, 2). 
Cf. F. A. Blanche, "Le vocabulaire de !'argumentation et la 
structure de !'article dans las ouvrages de saint Thomas", Revue 
~sciences philosophiquas!! theologiquas, 1925, XIV, 167-187, 
asp. 180-182. Also Martin Grabmann, Die Geschichta ~ 
Scho1astischen Methode, Herder, Freiburg, 1909, 2 vols., esp. II, 
519; IvT..ichel Riquet, "Saint Thomas d'Aquin et les 'auctoritates.' 
en phi1osophio", Archives~ Philosophie, 1925, III, 2: 117-155. 
OBJECTUM, -1 Object. 
That which is presented for knowledge, hence, knowable and known: 
"quidditas rei est objectum intellectus" 26bl5, "sensus ••• ob-
jeotum sunt sensibiles qualitates" 23a34. 
OPERATIC, -IONIS Operation, function. 
"operatio, quae est finis rei, vel id propter quod ad finem 
devenitur" 24bl0, 20b21, 22, "intel1eotus ••• secundum quod ad 
omnes operationes sa extendit" 26b42, 26, 7a38, 21bl6. 
ORATIO, -IONIS Speech, words, assertion. 
"homo, qui est electivus orationum suarum" 7a30; 
equivalent to "enuntiatio" -- 6a41, 13a42, 43, 44, 48. 
ORDINATIO, -IONIS Ordering, plan. 
"verum est secundum ordinationam veram in inte1lectu divino" 
15b3, "sicut ••• ordinationan artis in artifice" 15b6. 
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ORDO, •INIS Order, relation. 
1. Order: 
a) arrangement, sequence: "hoc ordine progreditur" 
25a28, 
b) place in an order or scheme of things: "idem est 
~ alicujus rei in esse et veritate, ita scilicet 
quod ubi invenitur quod est maxime ens, invenitur 
quod est maxima verum" 4al8, 13. 
2. Relation: equivalent to "convenientia" -- "bonum ••• dicit 
ordinem ad appetitum" 5bl5; 
equivalent to "comparatio", "relatio" -- "veritas rei 
secundum ordinem ad intellectum divinum" 17a34, 49, 3al4, 
7al9, 20, 25b23, 30; 
in the phrase "in ordine ad" {does not denote purpose) --
2b54, 6a9, 9a38, 39, 23bl0, 40, 25a36, 41. 
ORGANUM, -I Organ, sense-organ. 
"sensus nihil cognoscit nisi per organum corporale" 22a9, 10, 
23b49, 26a4. 
Note. st. Thomas is not at all explicit as to the specific 
organs of sensation in this work. To define the mind of St. 
Thomas (and Aristotle) accurately on the localization of sense 
organs is a very difficult problem. cr. Joseph de Tonqu~ec, 
"Notes d'ex~g~se thamiste: Milieux et organes de la sensation", 
Archives de Philosophie, 1925, III, 2: 156-167. 
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PARS, PARTIS Part. 
1. Opinion, side of a dialectical discussion: "ideo oportet 
rationibus utriusque partis respondere". 
2. Logical component, note: "conjungit partes definitionis ad 
invicem" 26b26. 
3. A whole considered precisely as source of a certain class of 
activities: "vis cogitativa, quae est potentia sensitivae 
partis" (sc. animae) 25b39. 
(EX) PARTE RERUM see RES, c. 
I' 
PATIOR, -I To ~e acted upon. 
Opposed to AGO "intellectus ••• non patitur a rebus, sed magis 
quodammodo agit" 23a53, 18al9. 
PARTIC1~IS, -E Particular, individual. 
Equivalent to "individuo" (14bl7, 20) -- 14bl2. 
PER ACCIDENS Accidentally, incidentally. 
1. Accidentally, through mishap, unintentionally: "nisi per 
accidens impediatur" 25b44, 26bl9. 
2. a) Incidentally, by reason of something else: "species 
••• non corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens ad oor-
ruptionem individui" 14bl9, 26, 30, 35; 
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b) indirectly, by means of something else: "sensus ••• de 
sensibilibus ~ accidens" 25b42, 51. 
PER CONSEQl.J'lliS Consequently. 
By logical necessity, as a consequence, consequently: 2lb40, 
24a55. 
PER ESSENTIAM Essentially, in essence. 
a) Opposed to "differunt ratione" (4a28), 
in essence, really: "per essentiam differunt" 4a32, l5b36; 
b) opposed to "per suam speciem" (5a52), 
in real (physical) essence: "res non sunt in anima per sua.m 
essentiam, sed per suam speciem" 4b51; 
c) opposed to "diversas cognitiones" (13a26), 
through (Eis own) Essence: "[Deus] omnia per unum, scilicet 
per essentiam suam cognoscit" 13a29. 
PER POSTERIUS Secondarily, less properly. 
Explicitly equivalent to "secundario", 
secondarily, in an analogous sense: "seoundario autem dicitur 
verum et ~ posteriua" 7a6, 5a45, 55, 5b22, 6al6. 
PER PRIUS Primarily, properly. 
a) Contrasted with PER POSTERIUS, 
in a primary sense, properly, more properly: "per prius et 
posterius" 5b22, "verum per prius dicitur de oampositione 
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vel divisione intelleotus" 7a22, 4, 5a47, 50, 56, 5b23, 6a5, 
15, 6b30, 31; 
PER SE 
b) primarily: "per prius etiam inest rei veritas per compara-
tionem ad intellectum divinum" 9a30. 
Of itself. 
·a) Of itself, on its o1r.1n account, in itself: 11universale ••• non 
corrumpitur par ~· sed per accidens ad corruptionem in• 
dividui" 14bl9, "nomine substantiae exprimitur quidam 
specialis modus essendi, scilicet ~!! ens" 2b47; 
b) properly, by reason of its nature: "a sensu ••• cujus per!! 
objectum sunt sensibiles qualitates" 23a34, 14b22, 38, 23b4. 
PERCIPIO, •ERE To perceive. 
To know by sense knowledge: "sensu percipitur" l0a2. 
PERFECTIO, -IONIS Perfection, actuality. 
"duplex est perfectio" 24b6, 
a) substantial form: "prin~ perfectio est forma unius-
oujusque, per quam habet esse" 24b7, 13: 
b) operation: "secunda perfectio est operatio" 24bl0, 12. 
PERFECTISSIMUS, -A, -UM Most perfect. 
On the highest level of perfection (of species, not of most 
perfect individuals within species): "quae sunt £erfectissima 
in entibus, ut substantiae intelleotuales" 2lb43. 
PERFECTUS, -A, -UM Perfect. 
a) Complete, in the .full measure: Equi\18.lent to "completa" 
(5a49) -- "perfecta ratio veritatis" 5a52, 55, 23bl5; 
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b) perfect, adequate: "bonum uniuscujusque rei consistit in 
perfecta operatione ipsius" 20b20, 21, 24b26. 
PERFICIO, -ERE To perfect. 
To bring to perfection, to completea 11 cognitio nostra •• •.£!!.:. 
ficitur in intelleotu" 25a29, "cognitio perficitur per assimi-
lationem cognoscentis ad rem oognitam" 3a35, 45, 3b6. 
PERPETUUS, •A, -UM Perpetual, constant. 
Constant, unvarying once it is established: contrasted with 
"aeternum" -- 14a5, 46, 47, 14b8. 
PERSONA, -.A.E Person. 
1. One of the three Divine Persons of the Blessed Trinity (with 
no attempt at formal treatment or further definition) --
4bl8, 19, 21, 24, 18b4l. 
2. stage character, person of a play: "tragoedus qui represen-
tat varas personas in theatris" 24a4. 
PERSONALITER Personally. 
Appropriately to one of the Divine Persons: opposed to "essen-
tialiter" 18a27, "metaphorica vel similitudinarie accipitur 
veritas in divinis ••• et secundum hanc acceptionam veritatis 
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propria dicitur de Filio, et personaliter dicitur" 18b54. 
PERTINGO. -ERE To attain. 
To attain, to arrive at (not t•pertain to"): "solus intellectus 
ad assentiam. rei pertingit" 26a56. 
PHANTASIA. -AE Power of phantasy, imagination. 
Equivalent to "inaginatio" (26a2), contrasted with external 
sense -- "sensus non est dominus falsitatis, sed phantasia" 
26al0. 
PHILOSOPHUS. -I The Philosopher. 
Aristotle: this is the usual manner of referring to him, fre-
quent throughout the work. 
PLUS, PLURIS Mora, pl. several. 
"Veritatas autam quae sunt in rebus sunt pluras" 9al9, 53. 
Note. The plurality hare indicated is numerical, not of kind. 
Logical truth, truth in the mind, is analogous. but ontological 
truth, the truth of things, is one for each thing. multiplied 
only by plurality of things "plurium verorum sunt plures 
veritates; sed unius rei una est tantum varitas" 9a53-54. 
PONO, -ERE To assert, to affirm. 
Literally, to place. to set down. Metaphorically, as always in. 
this work, 
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to assert, to affirm: except in "cognoscunt aliquid extra se 
positum" 2lb47, where the participle means "existing", "located". 
POSITIO, -IONIS Affirmation, attribution. 
Cf. PONO. "unitas per se attribuitur materiae primae, non per 
positionem alicujus formae unitatis, sed per ranotionem formarum 
diversificantium" 14b39. 
POSITIVE Positively, affirmatively. 
"ea quae in rebus positive dicuntur" 23a8, contrasted with 
"negationes et defeotus" (23al2-13). 
POTENTIA, -AE Potency, power. 
1. Opposed to actuality, 
potency, possibility: "nulla est res quam intelleotus 
divinus non actu cognoscit, et intellectus humanus in 
potentia" 6a50, 56. 
2. Opposed to operation, 
power, ability, proximate principle of activity: equivalent 
to VIRTUS, 2, and VIS -- "potentiae naturales insensibiles" 
22al2, 11vis cogitativa, quae est potentia sensitivae partis" 
25b38, "potentia sensitiva" 22all, 4b33, 10a39. 
Note. In view of the fact that st. Thomas uses this word 
almost exclusively when speaking of the powers of the soul, 
it seems quite unjustifiable when translating St. Thomas to 
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risk the unpleasant connotations which have accrued to the 
word "faculty" in the psychology of the recant past. 
PRAI.'..~ISSA, -ORUM Previous considerations. 
"ut ex praemissis apparat" 16al. 
Nota. Derived f'rom "prae" and "mi tto", the word literally means 
"to send bef'ore". It here ref'ars, like "objecta" (22al6, 26b48), 
to the preliminary dialectical arguments proposed before the body 
of the article. Cf'. OBJICIO, Note. 
PRINCIPALIUS Chief'ly, in a more important sense. 
"res aliqua principalius dicitur vera in ordine ad veritatem 
intellectus divini" 9a37. 
PRINCIPIUM, -I Principle, beginning. 
1. Start, beginning: 
a) f'irst moment (in time): "veritas clauditur principio 
et f'ine" 13a41, 42, 48; 
b) f'irst part (in place): "in principio Digestorum 
dicitur" 14a56, 2b23, 3a5, 4a43. 
2. Logical principle, principle of demonstration, basic truth: 
"in damonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua 
principia per sa nota" 2bl5, "prima principia, quae cog-
noscimus cum terminos cognoscimus" 26bll, 13, 36, 46, 
"veri tas primorum principiorum secundum quam de omnibus 
judicamus" 9b51. 
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3. Ontological principle, origin: 
a) proximate principle of action, active power: "prin-
cipii aotivi, quod est ipse intellectus" 2lb26; 
b) origin: 
i) real cause: "ratio principii ad creaturas ad 
quas intelleotus divinus comparatur ut ••• 
causa" 18b32, 18, 20, 26, 35, 36, 37, 48, 6a34; 
ii) denoting origin or procession in the Blessed 
Trinity without dependence, causality, or suc-
cession in time -- "hoo modo dioitur veritas in 
divinis summa imitatio principii, quae Filio 
oonvenit" 18b51. 
PRIV.A.TIO, -IONIS Privation. 
Laok of something proper to a nature: "privationem quae est 
oaeoitas" 20b3, "negationes vel privationes non habent aliquam 
formam" 20a44, "privatio et negatio rei" 13a54, 20bl4, 23al7. 
PROCEDO, -ERE To proceed, flow logically. 
"objectio autam prooedebat de ••• " 2la34, 23b39. 
PROPINQUIOR, •IUS Nearer. 
Relative degree of perfection (not physical proximity): "sensus 
••• qui est propinquior intellectuali substantiae" 22al. 
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PROPORTIO, -IONIS Proportion, symmetry. 
Note. Like ADAEQUATIO, to which it is equivalent in this work, 
the word is not to be taken in a strict mathematical sense but as 
denoting a correspondence between the representative and the real 
order. "proportio intellectus ad ram" 2lb23, 41. 
PROPOSITIO, -IONIS Proposition. 
1. Equivalent to ENUNTIATIO, 1, -- "affirmatio propositionis" 
23bl8, 4a45; 
2. equivalent to JUDICIUM, 1, -- "causa veritatis negativarum 
propositionum quasi faciens eas in intellectu" 2la28, 
"intellectus compositi ... propositionis" 3b33. 
PROPOSITUM, -I Proposed (argument). 
"Et sic est in proposito" 14b44. Refers to dialectical argument 
to which reply is being made. Ct. OBJICIO, Note. 
PROPRIETAS, -ATIS Property, predicate. 
Loosely, referring to any quality or attribute which can serve 
as a basis for predication 
nomen 'homo'" 15b34, 13. 
"proprietas quam praedieat hoc 
PROPRIUS, -A, -UM Proper, own. 
1. Proper, suitable: 
a) proper or suitable to being known by a given external 
sense power: "de propriis sensibilibus" 25b35, 48; 
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b) suited to knowing a certain type of object or sensible 
quality: "sensus proprius" 26al. 
2. Equivalent to "suus", 
one's own: 11 cognoscunt essentias proprias" 2lb53, 6b40, 50, 
7a40, 26bl5. 
PURUS I -A., -UM Genuine, umnixed. 
Merely, simply (unmixed with any other reality, i.e., real horse 
in this case): "equus pictus non asset falsus equus, nisi asset 
~ pictura" 24a8. 
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QUALIS, -E Such, of such a kind. 
Broadly, not restricted to the category of quality -- "dicuntur 
falsa quae nata sunt videri aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non 
sunt" 6a2, 23a44, 25b52. 
QUALITAS, -ATIS Quality. 
11in genera qualitatis" 4al2, "a forma inhaerente, sicut ••• a 
qualitate sua" 9b7, "illam fo~ cujus indicia exterius 
ostenduntur per sensibiles qualitates" 23b45, 23a39, "sensus ••• 
cujus per se objectum sunt sensibiles qualitates" 23a34. 
Note. No attempt is made to define the word or discuss the 
category in this work. 
QU.ANTITAS, •ATIS Quantity. 
"est inhaerens ei ... sicut albedo vel quantitas" 16b34, 17a56, 
"genera, in quantum hujusmodi, aliquid ponant in rerum natura, 
quantitas enim ex hoc ipso quod quantitas est, aliquid dicit" 
14b55, 56. 
QUIDDITAS, -ATIS Quiddity. 
1. What a thing is: explicitly equivalent to "essentia11 --
quidditatem sive essentiam entis" 3a7; 
the proper object of intellection -- 11quidditas rei est 
propria objectum intelleotus" 26bl4, 8, 10. 
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2. The mental representation of quiddity, concept: 11 intellectus 
formans quidditates non habet nisi similitudinam rei existen-
tis extra animam11 6b43, 25b23, the result of the first 
operation of the intellect -- 11formatio <i,Uidditatis sit 
prima operatio intelleotus" 7a38, 6bl0, 34. 
Note. That knowledge of quiddity does not mean adequate and 
specific knowledge of an essence precisely as "infima species" 
is clear from a study of St. Thomas's description of the actual 
process of human knowledge, in spite of the rather ideal im-
pression he sometimes gives when speaking of knowledge in general 
Rather, as Gilson remarks on P• 222 of the work noted below, "the 
quiddity is the essence insofar as it is knowable and definable 
by us", at least in its generic but essential notes. The 
laborious process in store for him who would work out specific 
differences is referred to in article 12 of the work being 
studied, and in Summa Theologica, Ia, 85, 5 ad 3um; 17, 3 corp.; 
87, 1 ~ finem corp•• etc. Compare also the texts in which he 
states that "differentiae essentia1es sunt nobis ignotae" (B! 
Veritate IV, 1 ad 8um); ~ Disp. De Spirit. Creat., q. un., 11 ad 
3um; .&, Disp. £! Anima, q. un., 12 ad 8um. Cf. J. de Tonqu&dec, 
~ Critique~ la Connaissanoe, Note "Sur 1' expression de la 
derni~re diff&rence sp~cifique", 542-543; Etienne Gilson, 
Realisme Thomiste !,! Critique 2!_ ~ Connaissanoe, 222 and notes 
ibid.; Cajetan., ~ ~ ~ ~ Essentia, cap. vi, quaest. xv ad 
r··--·~ -· 
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initium; Pierre Rousselot, ~ Intellectualism~ St. Thomas, 
Sheed & Ward, London, 1935, 101-110. 
QUOD EST That which is, essence. 
Explicitly equivalent to "id oui actus essendi convenit" (4b7) 
-- "diversum est esse et quod.!!!, 4b6. 
QUOD QUID EST What a thing is, quiddity. 
Equivalent to "quidditas" (26bl4) -- "intellectus in cognosoendo 
quod quid est" 23a37. (Cf. de Tonqu,dec, ~Critique de la 
f"r I"';' "r Connaissance, Note "\b"'t.I.V\" tl.'lf4L ", 531-532.) 
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RATIO, -IONIS. Note, character, reason, argument. 
1. Most frequently, and throughout the work except as noted 
below, nn. 2, 3, 4, 
note, character: e.g., 
any for.m or perfection which can serve as a basis of pre-
dication or conception: "ratio veri in rebus" 24bl4, l5bll, 
27, 28, 30, "secundum rationem quae invanitur in creaturis" 
l8b45; 
nature, essence: "ratio veritatis compleatur in intellectu" 
14a34, "ens, verum, unum, et bonum secundum rationem habent 
quod unum sm1t, unde ••• realiter unum sunttt 4b32, 37; 
including real privations -- "negationes vel privationes 
existentes extra animam ••• intallectus earum rationes appre-
hendit" 20a49. 
2. a) Idea or concept: "intellectus rationem antis acoipit 
in seipso" l3bl4, "anima deprehendit in sa rationem 
defeotus" 2la45, 46, "nomine veritatis non axprimitur 
ratio oonceptionis" 19al9, 3a44, 3b26, 17a6, 17b34, ... ' 
l8b20, 32, 35, 37, l9a3, 23bl5, 24a26; 
b) (operation of) the mini: "secundum rationem" 16b56, 
17a3, "differunt ·ratione" 3b44, "distinctio rationis" 
19a9, 4a22, 26, 28, 4b20, 29; 
Jr 
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c) meaning, comprehension of a term: "veritas de lapide 
dicta claudit in sui ratione entitatem lapidis, et 
superaddit habitudinem ad intellectum" 20a55, 41, 
20b36, 55. 
3. a) Reasoning, consideration; argument: "oportet rationi-
bus utriusque partis respondere 11 23bl2, "ratio illa 
concedenda est" 23b38, 4bl0, 16, 13b31, 54; 
b) reason, explanation: 11cujus est ratio, quia ••• " 
2lb42, 22a7; 
c) ~' because of, by reason of: "attribuitur per se 
ratione ramotionis 11 14b32, 11dicitur vera vel falsa 
ratione compositionis verae vel falsae" 7a8. 
4. Power of reason: equivalent to "rationalis" -- "virtus est 
habitus in modum naturae rationis consentaneus" 14a52. 
Note. In 6al2 it can be translated 11the very fact", "the whole 
matter", "the reality" -- "eti~ si intellectus humanus non 
esset, adhuo, res dioerentur verae in ordine ad intelleotum 
divinum. Sed si uterque intellectus, quod est impossibile, in-
telligeretur auferri, nullo modo veritatis ratio remaneret" 
6a7-13. The sentence suggests that Aristotle, whose God did not 
know the world, had no real guarantee of ontological truth. 
RATIOCINATIO, -IONIS Reasoning, discursive thinking. 
11alio modo potast accipi intelleotus communiter, secundum quod 
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ad omnes operationes se extendit. at sic camprehendit opinione.m 
at ratiocinationem" 26b44. 
RAXIOCINOR. •ARI To reason, to think discursively. 
"ulterius intellectus ••• negotiatur ratiocinando et inquirendo" 
26b2. 
RATIONALIS, -E Rational, capable of reasoning. 
"intellectus falso ••• animal rationale mortale conciperet" 26b24. 
Note. The distinction between rational and other intellectual 
beings is nowhere brought out in this work. 
REALIS, ·E Real. 
Opposed to "rationis" (of. 2, b, s.v.) -- "realis distinotio 
intelligitur" l9a6, nnon intelligitur realis distinctio, sed 
rationis tantum" 19a9. 
RECTITUDO, •INIS Correctness. 
1. Correctness of representation, conformity: "veritas est 
rectitudo sola mente peroeptibilis. Rectitudo enim ista 
secundum adaequationem quamdam dioitur" 3b9-10. 
2. Moral rectitude: "Deus permittat deformitatem actus for-
nicationis incidere; non taman sequitur ex hoc quod ipsa 
deformitas aliquam rectitudinem habeat" 2lal7. 
Nota • 
......... 
The reading "aliquam" for "aliam" conjectured by the 
editors of the 1784 Venice edition and the Parma edition is 
r 
confirmed by the four Paris codices upon which the Viv~s 
edition is based, and is adopted by the latter. 
RECTUS, •A, •UM Right, correct. 
1. Logically correct: "recte fiat resolutio in prima prin-
cipia" 26b45. 
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2. :Morally right: "bonum, debitum, rectum et hujusmodi 11 2la2. 
REDEO, •IRE To return, to reflect. 
Literally, to go back, to return. Metaphorically ("quodammodo" 
26b47), not of a physical but of a mental return, 
to reflect: equivalent to "reflectitur" (2lb30) -- "secundum 
vero quod cognoscunt se oognoscere, jam ad se redire incipiunt" 
2lb49, "substantiae intellectuales redeunt ad essentiam suam 
reditione com.pleta" 2lb44, 56, 22a2, 13. 
REDITIO, -IONIS Return, reflection. 
Like REDEO, of mental returning, 
reflection: equivalent to REDITUS -- "substantiae intellectuales 
redeunt ad essentiam suam reditione completa" 2lb45, 56, 22a5. 
REDITUS, -US Return, reflection. 
Like REDEO, and equivalent to REDITIO, 
reflection: "reditus iste completur secundum quod cognoscunt 
essentias proprias" 2lb52. 
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REDUCO, -ERE To reduce. 
To give meaning in terms of, to reduce to: "veritas secundum 
quod competit negationibus at defectibus reducitur ad veritatem 
simpliciter" 2la21. 
REDUCTIO, -IONIS Reduction. 
Tracing back, reduction; equivalent to RESOLUTIO -- 11 in 
demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia 
per sa nota" 2bl5. 
REFERO, -RE To relate. 
a) Of things, 
to relate, i.e., to establish a relation: "veritas super-
addit habitudinam ad intellectum ••• cum habeat aliquid 
secundum quod referri possit" 20b2, 15a9, 17, 18; 
b) of predication, 
to have reference to: "affirmatio at negatio ••• non 
referuntur ad idem" 24all, 15bl9, 2la5, 12. 
REFLECTO, -ERE To reflect. 
Note. The verb in this work always appears in the passive, with 
the force of a middle voice. Equivalent to "redeunt" (2lb44), 
"inflectitur" (17b30). The word means literally "to bend back"; 
the metaphorical turn is brought out clearly by St. Thomas's 
uses. 
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"intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum secundum 
quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit pro-
portionem ejus ad ran" 2lb20, 31, 13b46. 
RELATIO, -IONIS Relation. 
1. That predicament which asserts a relation of one thing 
toward another: "cum omnia alia genera ••• sola relatio non 
habet, ex hoc quod est hujusmodi, quod aliquid ponat in 
rerum natura, quia non praedicat aliquid, sed ad aliquid" 
l4b56. 
2. The relation so indicated; equivalent to COMPARATIO (q.v.), 
used frequently throughout the work, e.g., "veritas ••• in 
rebus aliis invenitur per relationem ad intelleotum" 9al. 
RELATIVUS, -A, -UM subst. Related thing, term of a relation. 
"quando unum relativorum pendet ex altero" l5a26. 
~fOTIO, -IONIS ?rescinding. 
The result of mentally neglecting, prescinding from (not denying) 
11Quandoque attribuitur per sa ratione remotionis ••• sicut unitas 
per se attribuitur materiae primae, non per positionem alicujus 
formae unitatis, sed per remotionem for.marum diversificantium" 
l4b32, 40. 
REPRESENTATIVUS, -A, -UM Representative. 
Standing for, representative: opposed to "est res quaedam in se" 
(25a49), equivalent to "indicativus" (ibid.) -- "sensus ••• 
secundum quod est representativus alterius rei" 25b3. 
RES. REI Thing. 
a) In general, and throughout the work, 
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thing: "sic imponitur hoc nomen !!!• quod in hoc differt ab 
ente ••• quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen~­
exprimit quidditatem sive essentiam entis" 3a4-7; 
b) with NA.TURALIS (q.v.), 
body: "res naturales" 5b32, 40, 42, 43, l4a46; 
c) with special implication of actual existence, 
reality: "ex parte rerum" l0a50, "in rerum natura" 9b39, 
l4b54, l5al, 4, 11, 24, 30, 39, 56 (cf. NATURA, 2, b, i), 
"differunt re" 4b20, 4a54; 
d) thing as known by intellect: "res intellecta movet appetitum 
5bll. 
RESOLUTIO, -IONIS Resolving, reduction. 
Equivalent to REDUCTIO -- "resolutio in prima principia" 26b45. 
RESPECTUS, -"{js Respect, reference. 
"veritas ••• in rebus auten1 improprie et secundario, quia non nisi 
in respectu ad alterutrum duarum veritatum" 9a9. 
NOTE. The word is weaker than "relatio" (e.g., in 9al of this 
context), and implies mental consideration rather than onto-
logical relationship. 
RESPONDEO, -ERE 
1. a) 
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To reply, to correspond. 
To reply, to set down definitely: so used to intro-
duce St. Thomas's own position on the question at 
issue -- see OBJICIO, ~~ 
b) to answer the preliminary dialectical arg~ents: also 
indicating St. Thomas's own mind -- "et ideo oportet 
rationibus utriusque partis respondere 11 23bl2. 
2. To correspond, to accord: 11cuilibet vero intellectui oportet 
quod respondeat ens aliquod" 6a29. 
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SCIBILIS, -E subst. Knowable. 
Knowable, object of knowledge: "scientia dependet a scibili" 
15a28, 29, 30, 53, 55. 
Note. The word is always used in this work of the object of a 
creature's knowledge, actual or potential, never of God's 
knowledge. 
SCIENTIA, -AE Knowledge. 
a) In general, 
intellectual cognition, knowledge: nintellectus a rebus 
scientiam accipit" 9a36, 2bl9, 5b33, 15a27, 29, 31, 54, 55; 
b) implying knowledge through principles, 
SCIO, -IRE 
science: "sicut in damonstrabilibus oportet fieri reduoti-
onem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita in-
vestigando quid est ~umquodque; alias utrobique in infinitum 
iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum" 
2bl3-19. 
Note. The word as used in this work always refers to intel-
lectual knowledge, unlike COGNITIO, and furthermore to that 
of the human intellect only. 
To know. 
Equivalent to COGNOSCO, a, -- "ab aeterno soivit Deus plura 
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enuntiabilia, sed taman illa plura scivit una cognitione" 
14al4-15, 2lb55. 
SE HABERE AD To stand in relation to, to be raated to. 
Frequently used to designate a relation, e.g., 13a56, 13bl, often 
the dual relation expressed in a proportionality -- e.g., "in-
aequalitatem ••• quae ~habet ad falaitatem sicut aequalitas ad 
veritatem" 17b9. 
SE TENERE EX PARTE To be proper to, to pertain to. 
"non taman realiter ab esse distinguuntur: unde nee verum quod 
appropriatur personae Filii ab esse quod !! tenet ex parte 
essentiae" 4b25. 
SECUNDUM QUID In a certain respect. 
In a certain restricted sense, according to a certain considera-
tion; opposed to "simpliciter loquendo" 23b9. 
SECUNDUM QUOD Insofar as, according as, inasmuch as. 
Frequent in the work. The phrase in "judicium intellectus est 
de re secundum quod est" 2lbl8 can perhaps best be translated 
"according to a thing's existence" or simply "as it is". 
SECUNDUM REM In nature, in reality. 
Opposed to "ratione distinguuntur (4b29), equivalent to "non 
differunt re" (4b20) -- "sint unum secundum rem" 4b33. 
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SENSIBILIS, -E adj. and subst. Sensible, able to be sensed. 
a) In adjectival use, 
capable of being known by sense cognition: "sensibili re 
praesente" 25b57, 6b47, "sensibiles qualitates" 23a34, 
23b45, 25b57J 
b) substantively, 
that which is primarily known by sense cognition: "sensus 
cognoscit sensibile" 22a4, 25b27, 28, 35, 41, 42, 48, 50, 
26bl6. 
Note. The word never has the meaning of the English "sensible", 
i.e., "possessed of good sense", nor the active meaning "able 
to sense" -- of. SENSITIVUS. 
SENSITIVUS, -A, -UM Sensory, able to sense. 
"sensitiva potentia" 22all, 25b39, "vis sensitiva" 25b41. 
SENSUS, -US Sense. 
1. Meaning: (as in the phrase "the sense of this passage is ••• " 
"cum. dicitur ••• accipitur secundum quod ••• ut sit sensus: ••• " 
3b34. 
2. Sense power: equivalent to "potentia sensitiva" (22all) or 
"vis sensitiva" (~5b41) -- "sensus nihil cog;noscit nisi per 
organum corp orale" 22a8; 
a) in general, and throughout the work except as herein 
noted, 
SENTIO, -IRE 
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the senses (collectively): e.g., "cognitio nostra ••• 
incipiat in sensu" 25a29, usually with the implication 
oi' 
the senses precisely as in act: practically equivale 
to "sense knowledge", "sensation" -- e.g., "Utrum. 
veritas sit in sensu" 2la48, 2lbl2, 57, "sensus sen-
sibilium propriorum semper est varus" 26bl6; 
b) a particular sense power: "quaedam vis sensitiva, 
quae apprehendit speciam sensibilem sensibili re 
praesente, sicut sensus proprius" 25b57, 26a3, 9, 53. 
Note. On the soundness of' st. Thomas's doctrine on the 
action of' our sense powers in the i'ace of modern experi-
mental and abnormal psychology, see, Ch. Boyer, "Reflex-
ions sur la oonnaissance sensible salon saint Thomas", 
Archives ~ Philosophie, 1925, III, 2: 7-116. 
To $anse, to know by sense. 
"sensus cognoscit se sentire" 2lb38, 22a5. 
SEQUOR, -I To follow. 
1. To follow logically, to flow by logical necessity; "ratio 
non sequitur" 4bl0,_24a50. 
2. To follow, to be influenced by: "illud quod est in aliquo 
non sequitur illud in quo est, nisi quando causatur a prin-
cipiis ejus; unde lux quae causatur in aere ab extrinseco, 
scilicet ex sole~ sequitur motum solis magis quam aerem" 
6a33-36. 
SIGNIFICATIO~ -IONIS Signification~ meaning. 
Objectively~ 
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that which is si~ified, the object of the signification: "cum 
dicitur, significatione non existente rectum est aliquid sig-
nificari, verum est secundum ordinationem rerum in intellectu 
divino" 15bl. 
SIGNIFICO, -ARE To signify. 
a) Representatively~ 
to mean, to signify: "res quae significatur illis tribus 
propositionibus" l8a21~ "enuntiationi essentiale est ut 
signifi c.et ill ud ad quod significandum est insti tuta" 18al-2, 
3b30, 33~ l8b2, 16b20~ 23bl7, 24al4; 
b) to manifest, to show forth: "enuntiationis, quae intellectum 
significat" 12b28, 7a36, 17a30. 
SIGNUM, -I Sign. 
In this work, 
manifestative (not representative) sign, external manifestation: 
"enuntiatio est signum ·intellectus" 24b28, "signa divinae 
voluntatis" 2la4. 
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SIMILITUDO, -INIS Likeness. 
1. Relation of similarity: "similitudo propria invenitur in 
utroque similium11 10al6, 25, 24a20, 21, 24, 33, 36, 39, 44, 
48, 49, 57. 
2. Likeness, similitude, image: 
a) physical image: "similitudo faciei in specula" 9al4, 
10b4; 
b) likeness, mental image: "in quantum per similitudinem 
sui receptam in anima, cognitionem de se facit" 13b6, 
6b44, 9b54. 
Note. The word "imago" does not appear in this work. Con-
sequently, there is nothing of the careful distinction between 
image and similitude found in later works, e.g., Summa Theologica 
Ia, 93, 1. 
SIMPLICITER Simply, in a primary and unqualified sense. 
"non simpliciter debet.enuntiari" 24a40, 9b32, 13b56, 2la22, 
24b20; opposed to "secundum quid" -- 23b7. 
SING1JLUM, -I subst. Single thing, individual. 
"Deus ••• una cognitione cognoscit omnia ••• non singulis suwn 
eognitionem immittens" .13a30. 
Note. This passage is not to be construed as meaning that God 
does not know individuals. The import is that God does not 
place a separate~ of cognition proper to each single thing. 
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The "suam" is best taken as referring to "singulis" and not to 
"Deus", as can happen even in classical Latin. 
SPECIES, -EI Species. 
1. As in logic, 
kind, definite class, species: "species coloris" 17a7, 
"generatio ad hoc est ••• ut salvetur perpetuum esse in specie" 
14bl6. 
2. In the ontological order, 
specific nature, for.m: "ea quae sunt diversa specie ex parte 
rerum" 10a50, "res ex ipsa specie quam habet, divino intel-
lectui adaequatur 11 l3b2, 4, "vis apprehensiva, quae appre-
hendit speciem sensibilem sensibili re praesente ••• appre-
hendit rem ut est" 25b56. 
3. In the mind, 
representation, likeness, similitude: "res non sunt in anima 
per suam essentiam; sed per suam speciem" 4b52, 3a39, 9b47, 
2la43; 
equivalent to "similitudo" -- 5bl, 6b46. 
SUBJECTD"M, -I Subject. 
That in which something inheres: "accidens subjecto" 2b29, 
"subjectum mutationis" 16bl6, 20b54, 56. 
SUBSISTO, -ERE To subsist. 
To exist as a real being, to subsist: "res ••• non subsistere 
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possunt nisi per intelleetum divinum eas in esse producentem" 
9a28. 
SUBSTANTIA, -AE Substance. 
1. In the logical order, 
the notion or idea of substance: "substantia non addit super 
ens aliquam differentiam, quae significat aliquam naturam 
superaddi tam enti 11 2b45. 
2. In the ontological order, 
"sed nomine substantiae exprimitur quidam specialis modus 
essendi, scilicet per se ens" 2b46, "substantiae intellectu-
ales" 2lb44, 22a2. 
SUBStJM, -ESSE To underlie, to accompany. 
1. To underlie, to be the subject of inherence: "quando in 
aliqua re apparent qualitates demonstrantes naturam quae 
eis non subest" 22a40, 23a48. 
2. To accompany, to be mixed with: 11 creaturae, quamvis aliquam 
Dei similitudinem gerant in seipsis, tamen maxima dissimili-
tude subest" 24a46. 
SUM, ESSE 
Note. "To be among" is allowed as a primary meaning of the 
word in classical ~tin, confirming the second meaning 
assigned here. 
To be. 
For the infinitive as a substantive, see ESSE. 
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For the participle, see ENS. 
The word is otherwise used as usual in Latin; in three occur-
rences the notion of aotual existence is strongly connoted --
"quae in futurum. erunt, nunc autem non~~~ 12b34, 11etiam 
quando non est res ipsa" 12b38, 6a8. 
Highest degree of, most perfect type of. 
"in summa veritate sunt" 23a24. 
SUPERADDO, -ERE To add. 
1. In the logical order, equivalent to ADDO -- "veritas includit 
in sui ratione entitatem earum, et superaddit habitudinam 
adaequationis ad intellectum" 20a42. 
2. In the ontological order -- ":naturam superadditam" 2b44. 
SUPERIOR.a., -ORUM Higher things, the heavenly bodies. 
"in majori mundo superiora nihil accipiunt ab inferioribus sed 
e converso" 26al2. Se~ also INFERIORA, and MUNDUS MAJOR. 
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TEMPUS, -ORIS Time. 
Time, point of time: "anima ••• cointelligit tempus ••• diversimode 
intelligit cursum Socratis ut praesentem, praeteritum, et 
futurum" 13al8. 
Note. No formal explanation or definition of time is given in 
this work. 
TERMING, -ARE To terminate. 
To reach a goal, to finish: "motus autem cognitivae virtutis 
terminatur ad animam" 5b3. 
Note. This expression must be taken as speaking of the act of 
cognition entitatively, or psychologically, considered; termina-
tively, or epistemologically, it terminates in the object. 
TERMINUS, -I Term. 
1. Terminus, stopping~point, goal: "complementum autem cujus-
libet motus est in suo ter.mino" 5b2. 
2. Member of a proposition, term: "principia, quae cognosc~us 
cum terminos cognoscimus" 26bl2. 
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UNITAS, -ATIS Unity. 
1. The abstract of "unum", 
unity, oneness: "perfectior est unitas illius rei" 4bS9, 
14bS9, 39, 24257. 
2. Concretely, 
that which is one, a unity, a unit: "existimaverunt corpus 
esse unitatem ••• secundum hoc ergo corpus falsa unitas 
dicitur" 24a56-24bl, 24a54, 24b4. 
UNIVERSALE, -IS subst. Universal. 
Universal nature, nature prescinded from individuals: "non 
dicitur universale incorruptibile, quasi habeat aliquam formam 
incorruptionis" 14b45, "unde universale in rebus existens 
dicitur corrumpi in hoc et in illo" 14b50. 
Note. The doctrine of universals is not formally treated in 
this work, these passing references in answer to an objection 
being the only occurrences. 
ONUS, -A, -UM One. 
a) As an adjective, 
one, simple, incomposite: "essentiam divinam, quae ~est" 
15b26, 24a55; 
the attribute which expresses a state of undividedness in a 
thing -- "indivisio, et hanc exprimit hoc nomen 'unum•: 
157 
nihil enim est aliud ~ quam ens indivisum" 3all-12, 
"ens dicitur ~in quantum est indivisum in se" 3al9, 
"ens, verum, ~, at bonum magis uniantur in Deo quam in 
creaturis" 4b26, 36. 
Note. The usual scholastic definitions of "unum" give two 
notes: "indivisum in se 11 and "divisum a quolibet alio". 
St. Thomas ascribes only the first to the term "unum", 
reserving the other for the term "aliquid"; see ALIQUID, 1. 
b) In a more substantive use, 
one thing, unit: equivalent to UNITAS, 2, -- "cum in Deo 
sint unum" 4b34, 32, 37, 38; 
same one thing: "unum,sine altaro intelligi potest" 3b45, 
"unum non sit principium alterius" 18bl7. 
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VERBUM, -I Word. 
VERE 
1. Word, saying: "verbum Augustini est intelligendum ••• n l4al. 
2. The Word, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity: in 
article VII, "Utrum veritas in divinis personaliter vel 
essentialiter dicitur" -- 19al9. 
Truly. 
Truly, with truth: "si enim sensus ~ judicat de rebus, non 
taman cognoscit veritatam, qua~ judicat" 2lb35-37. 
Note. The word here does not mean 11in the true sense of the 
term", as is clear from "veritatem" (2lb37, 42). Cf. Paul 
Wilpert, "Das Problem der Wahrheitssicherung bei Thomas von 
Aquin: Ein Beitrag zur Gesohiohte des Evidenzproblams", Beitr:'ge 
~ Geschichte ~ Philosophie ~ Theologie des Mittelalters, 
1931, XXX, 114-119. 
VERITAS, -ATIS Truth. 
1. Usually, and throughout the work (the word occurs over 420 
times) except as noted below, nn. 2, 3, 4, 5, 
truth in its full and for.mal sense: "veritas est adaequatio 
rei et intellectusi• 3b7 (on whether this is really the 
definition of Isaac Israeli, of. ISAAC, Note s.v.); 
properly in the intellect rather than in the object -- "re-
ducitur ad veritatem simpliciter, quae est in intelleotu" 
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2la22, as is clear from the whole of article II, "Utrum 
veritas principalius inveniatur in intellectu quam in 
rebus", which is summarized by st. Thomas at the beginning 
of the body of article IV, 11Respondeo dicendum quod sicut 
ex praedictis, art. 2, patet, veritas propria invenitur in 
intellectu huma.no vel divino, sicut sanitas in animali" 
8b54-57. 
a) Primarily in the Divine Intellect, as is clear from 
article IV, "Utrum sit una tantum veri tas qua onmia 
sint vera" and article VIII, "Utrum omnis veritas 
sit a veritate prima". The truth of God's mind is 
called "prima veritas" art. VIII, 11veritas aeterna11 
12b43, "veritas prima at aeterna" 15b20, "veritas 
extrinseca (i.e., rebus]" 12b21, 11veritas ••• in 
intellectu divino" l4a42, "veritas immutabilis 11 
art. VI, 17al5; 
b) secondarily, but still "propria" (8b55) in the human 
mind -- "Est ergo in intellactu divino quidem veritas 
propria at prius, in intellectu vero humano propria 
quidem et secundario" 9a5-8; 
i) in t4e intellect, formally and strictly in the 
judgment -- "per prius invenitur in actu in-
telleotus oomponentis at dividentis quam in 
actu intelleotus quidditates rerum formantis" 
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(6b3l-34), "veritas per prius invenitur in 
compositions et divisions intellectus; secun-
dario autam ••• et per posterius in intellectu 
formants definitiones" 7a4, 7a21-25; 
ii) and, though not formally, in sense perceptions, 
especially in the sense judgment (of. 
APPREHENSIO, JUDICIUM, 2, and JUDICO, 2) --
"Sed veritas est in sensu siout oonsequens 
aotum ejus; dum scilicet judicium sensus est 
de re secundum quod est; sed taman non est in 
sensu siout cognita a sensu: si enim sensus 
vera judicat de rebus, non taman cognoscit 
veritatam qua vera judioat" 2lb3l-37. 
2. Improperly, i.e., analogously, 
ontological truth, the truth of things: 11veritas ••• in rebus 
autem improprie at secundario" 9a8, by extrinsic denomina-
tion -- "veritas improprie dicta ••• Denominantur autem res 
verae a veritate quae est in intellectu divino vel in intel-
lectu humano, sieut denaminatur cibus sanus a sanitate quae 
est in animali" 9a54-9bl, 9al-5; 
called "veritas inhaarens" l2b20, 45, 17a21, described as 
"veritas ••• quae est in ipsa re, quae nihil est alius quam 
entitas intellectui adaequata vel intelleotum sibi adae-
quans" 9b3-5, "veritas rerum existentium includit in sui 
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ratione entitat~ earum, et superaddit habitudinam ad intel-
leotum humanum vel divinum" 20a40-44; 3a51, 3bl, 4al5, 5b33, 
6a45, 9al8, 19, 25, 31, 51, 53, 54, 9b2, 24, 37, 42, 10a30, 
46, 12b26, 44, 13b21, 24, 54, 55, 14a32, 15b43, 17al0, 27, 
28, 33, 35, 36, 37, 43, 17b38, 18a3, 10, 18b44, 47, 50, 53, 
20a53, 54, 20b2, 10, 40, 44, 45, 52, 24al; 
a) primarily of the relation of things to God's intellect 
-- "Per prius etiam inest rei veritas per compara-
tionem ad intellectum di vinum quam humanum." 9a31, 
"veritas quae dicitur de eis in comparatione ad in-
tellectum. divinum eis inseparabiliter communicatur" 
9a25; 
b) secondarily, of the relation of things to the human 
intellect -- "veritas autam quae dicitur de rebus in 
comparatione ad intellectum humanum est rebus quodam-
modo accidentalis" 9al9. 
3. Said of words, by attribution to the acts of the intellect 
-- "voces autam eodem modo recipiunt veritatis praedioa-
tionem, sicut intelleotus quos significant" 7a34 
(of. INTELLECTUS, 2, a). 
4. Moral truth, veracity: "veritas quae est in confessionibus 
in judicio faoiendis" 14b5. 
5. Dialectically, in a non-committal manner, in the title of 
the question, in the titles of the various articles, e.g., 
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"Quid sit veritas", in the objections or preliminary argu-
ments, and in the following places -- 3a50, 51, 52, 55, 
3bl7, 4al9, l3a37, 56, l3b36, 57, 14a37, 14b5, l6b20, 22, 
27, 17a21, 22, 24, 25, 18al2, l8b3, 53, 25a35. 
Note. The notion of "veritas" in st. Thomas has been the subject 
of extensive study, for example, Blaise Romeyer, "La doctrine de 
saint Thomas sur la v~rit'"• Archives~ Philosophie, 1925, III, 
2: 1-54; Paul Wilpert, "Das Problem der Wahrheitssicherung bei 
Thomas von Aquin: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Evidenz-
problems~, Beitr~ge ~ Gesohichte ~ Philosophie ~ Theologie 
des Mittelalters, 1931, XXX, 1-214; Cardinal D. Mercier, "La 
notion de la v6rit'"• Revue N'o-Soholastique, 1899, VI, 371-403; 
Joseph de Tonqu,dec, ~ Critique de ~ Connaissance, Chapitre VI, 
11La question de la v'rit~" 219-246, esp. note 2, P• 239, and 
Appendice VIII, "Commentaire des trois premiers articles de la 
question I de Veritate", 508·518. 
F'or further readings see the Introduction and the General 
Bibliography of the present study. 
VERUS, •A, -UM True. 
Note. This word is used over 340 times in the work, with the 
same variations of meanings and use as VERITAS, q.v. It ex-
presses the concrete attribute of which VERITAS is the abstract, 
and st. Thomas in his own usage often makes one definition do 
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tor both, e.g., "convenientiam vero antis ad intellectum ex-
primit hoc nomen 'verum• ••• quae quidem correspondentia adaequa-
tio rei et intellectus dioitur, at in hoc formaliter ratio veri 
parfioitur" 3a33-45. He likewise affixes both VERITAS and VERUM 
to the same set of divisions, e.g., "Secundum hoc ergo triplicite 
veritas et verum definiri invenitur" 3a52•53. This equating of 
the two even when he is laying down formal definitions, and not 
merely in a passing reference, suggests that the divisions and 
remarks laid down under VERITAS will hold here also. 
Furthermore, this close parallel suggests a point which is 
brought out by a study of the actual uses of the word, namely 
that he often uses VERUM as a substantive ~d in a quasi-abstract 
sense, as the equivalent of VERITAS, e.g., 5b22, 6b34, 7a6, 22, 
20bl7, 23, 23b24, 29, 24all, 20, 24b24. However, it is used 
substantively in a concrete sense in 4a47, 5a38, 9a49, 53, 12b45, 
51 to denote that which is true, a true thing. 
1. Usually, and throughout the work except as otherwise noted 
herein, 
true: "veri ratio consistit in adaequatione rei et intel-
leotus" 6b35, 3a33, 45; 
a) primarily ~d most properly said of intellect, 
especially in the judgment -- "veritas per prius in-
venitur in compositions et divisions intellectus; 
seoundario autem et per posterius dioitur verum in 
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intellectu rormante definitiones" 7a22, "quando 
adaequatur ei quod est extra in re, dicitur judicium 
verum esse" 6b52; 
b) but also, though less formally, or sense, particularly 
sense judgment -- "et sic dicitur esse sensus ralsus 
vel verus ••• sensus judicium de sensibilibus propriis 
semper est verum" 25a41-48, "sensus sensibilium 
propriorum semper est varus" 26bl6. 
2. ]mproperly, i.e., analogously, 
ontologically true, conformed or conformable to some intel-
lect: "verum ••• dicitur ••• tertio de rebus, secundum quod 
adaequantur intellectui divino, vel aptae natae sunt adaequ · 
intellectui humano" 7a26-29, "si autam aocipiatur veritas · 
improprie dicta, secundum quam omnia dicuntur ~n 9a52, 
"denominantur res verae a veritate quae est intellectu divino 
vel in intellectu humano" 9a54-9bl, "res autem non dioitur 
vera nisi secundum quod est intellectui adaequata; unde per 
posterius invenitur verum in rebus, per prius autem in in-
tellectu" 5b20-23; 
even said or non-beings -- "quamvis istum rornicari sit 
malum, tamen ••• nat~ est oontormari intellectui, et secundum 
hoc.consequitur ratio~" 4a56-4b2, 20b31, 34, 37; 
a) prinarily, 
conformed to the Divine Intellect: "res aliqua prin-
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cipalius dicitur ~ in ordine ad veritatem intel-
lectus divini qu~ in ordine ad veritatem intellectus 
humani" 9a38, 42, 43, "res ••• secundum adaequationem 
ad intellectum divinum dicitur vera" 5b48; 
b) secondarily, 
conformable to a created intellecta "secundum autem 
adaequationem ad intellectum humanum dicitur res 
~· in quantum nata est de se formare veram 
aestimationam" 5b56, "Et ideo in definitions rei 
verae potest poni visio in actu intellectus divini, 
non autem visio intellectus humani nisi in potentia" 
6a54. 
3. Said of words, by attribution to the acts of the intellect 
"enuntiatio ~ dicitur" 13a51, 13b21, 14a7, 15b2, 17b41, 
47, "orationum suarum verarum" 7a31. 
4. Morally true, veracious: "verum--dicitur ••• quarto de homine, 
qui est electivus orationum suarum" 7a22. 
5. Dialectically, as VERITAS, 3, in the preliminary arguments, 
etc., and in 20b30. 
VIRTUS, -UTIS Virtue, power. 
1. Technically, as a species of habit, 
virtue: "justitia ••• quia virtus ••• est habitus" 14a50, 53. 
2. Operative power: equivalent to POTENTIA, 2(q.v., especially 
the Note, s.v.), and VIS --"virtus cognitiva" 5b3, 23b54. 
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3. Power, force: "res ••• ex virtute ejusdem speciei nata est 
sibi intellectum nostrum adaequare" 13b4, 7bll. 
VIS, Power. 
Operative po:wer: equivalent to POTE1TTIA, 2, and VIRTUS, 2 
n.!!!. cog;nitiva et appetitiva" 3a29, "vis sensitiva" 25b41, 
"vis apprehensiva" 25b55. 
VIS COGITATIV.A Cogitative power, particular reason, 
comparative sense. 
The internal sense power in man which corresponds to "vis 
aestimativa" in brute animals, called "comparative" because it 
operates "per quamdam collationem", called "particular reason" 
because it is the special instrument of the intellect in our 
knowledge of singulars: "sensus judicat ••• de quibusdam autem 
quasi per quamdam collationem, quam tacit in homine ~ cogita-
~· quae est potentia sensitivae partis, loco cujus in aliis 
animalibus est existimatio naturalis; et sic judicat vis 
sensitiva de sensibilibus oommunibus et de sensibilibus per 
accidens" 25b36-43. Cf. De Veritate X, 5 corp., ad 2um, ad 4um; 
Summa Theologioa, Ia, 78, 4; Rudolf Allers, "The Intellectual 
Cognition of Particular~", ~ Thomist, 1941, III, 1: 96-163; 
Julien Peghaire, •A Forgotten Sense, the Cogitative, According 
to St. Thomas", The Modern Schoolman, 1943, XX, 123-140, 210-229. 
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VISIO, -IONIS Vision, knowledge. 
Metaphorically, of intellect, 
cognition, knowledge: "visio intellectus humani" 6a44, 54, 55. 
VISUS, -US Sight. 
The external sense power of.vision, sight: "visus ••• cognosoit 
oolorem" 3a38. 
VOX, VOCIS Word. 
11voces ••• intellectus quos significant" 7a33. 
VOLlJNTAS, -ATIS Will. 
a) "voluntas divina" 2la5, 6, 7; 
b) state of will, habit: "justitia est constans et perpetua 
voluntas uniouique jus suum tribuens" 14b2. 
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